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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a cognitive semantic account of polysemy in the semantic field
of perception verbs in English, Basque and Spanish. It explores why and how our
experience and understanding of the five senses constrains and shapes the way in
which we create mappings between the physical domain of perception onto more
metaphorical and abstract conceptual domains of experience. The different
extensions of meaning in these verbs, both synchronically and diachronically, have
not taken place as a result of chance, but are grounded in our own conceptualisation
of these sense modalities. Secondly, the thesis focuses on how the polysemy in these
verbs is obtained, whether it is localised to only these perception verbs or whether it
affects the elements that complement these verbs in a sentence.
Chapter 1 sets out the nature and scope of the work, explaining the purpose of
examining the domain of perception verbs, and outlining the theoretical context and
orientation of the study. Chapter 2 presents a synchronic typological study of the
different meanings, both physical and metaphorical, found in perception verbs in
English, Basque and Spanish. Chapter 3 is a brief diachronic-etymological account of
these perception verbs in these three languages. Chapter 4 reviews two approaches to
meaning extension: Sweetser's (1990) semantic account of perception verbs, and
Pustejovsky's (1995) Generative Lexicon. It sets out the advantages and gaps that
need to be addressed in both approaches. Chapter 5 describes the physiology of the
five senses and the way in which human beings perceive these perceptual processes.
It presents a typology of the properties that characterise the source domain of sense
perception. Chapter 6 introduces the processes called 'Property Selection', which
constrain the mappings between the source and the target domain, both in
metaphoncal and physical extended meanings. Chapter 7 explores the question of
how the polysemous senses of perception verbs are obtained, whether they are the
result of the meaning of the perception verb only, or the result of the interaction
between the semantics of that verb and the other elements that co-occur in the same
sentence. It also explains the implications for the study of cross-linguistic polysemy.
Chapter 8 draws some conclusions on the issues discussed in this thesis and points
out further lines for future research.
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"Ihkusteaz, mintzatzeaz, entzuteaz eta usnatzeaz egiten da bekhatu, ez ordea
ukitzeaz bezala" (Axular 3 227-26)
"Por mis sentidos, que son puentes levadizos tendidos a este mundo, se que
no estoy sola ni lo estuve. Todos vivimos y respiramos el flujo y el reflujo del mundo
natural: el ritmo de las estaciones, los sonidos, olores, tactos, retozos de la luz...
Percibimos el sabor de los alimentos y el abrazo del amado, nuestra vitalidad y la
tierra bajo los pies"(A. Gala Las afueras de Dios)
"God! This woman sees more with her nose than she does with her eyes.
That's because she's blind with love, Sir" (Plautus Miles Gloriosus)
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS
POLYSEMY?
Polysemy is the term used in semantic analysis to describe the situation in
which a word has two or more related meanings. No matter how simple this
definition seems to be, polysemy is not a clear-cut concept. For decades, linguists
from different schools have been trying to give a sound account of what polysemy is
and how it can be accounted for (see Section 1.2). Unfortunately, it is still true that
polysemy remains a somehow muddy field in linguistic research.
The main purpose behind the present study is the analysis of the polysemy
that exists in perception verbs in English, Basque and Spanish. Perception verbs in
these languages not only convey meanings related to the physical perception of each
sense modality (vision, hearing, touch, smell and taste), but they are used to express
other meanings as well ('to meet' as in / '11 see you at seven, 'suspicion' as in to smell
fishy, 'to experience' as in to taste success). The aim is, therefore, to find out which
semantic extensions are found in this semantic field, but also to put forward
hypotheses as to why and how these polysemous senses happen.
Why it is possible that, for instance, the verb to see can mean both 'to
perceive with one's eyes', but also 'to understand' as in I see what you mean. Why
whenever we want to express that we are emotionally moved we use the verb to
touch (as in deeply touched), but we cannot use any other perception verb such as to
smell, to hear to convey the same meaning. In other words, the question is why these
semantic extensions seem to occur between very specific conceptual domains and not
others.
The reasons why these semantic extensions take place are important, but the
question of how these meanings are obtained is equally crucial. How these semantic
extensions are carried out, that is how two different conceptual domains, such as
physical visual perception and intellection are connected, and brought together. How
is it possible to shift from a physical domain to a more abstract domain9 How many
elements take part in the creation of the polysemy found in these verbs9
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And finally, this study will address the issue of how universal these
polysemous senses are to be considered; that is to say, whether these semantic
extensions are particular to one language or shared by different unrelated languages.
For this purpose, three languages from different families have been chosen: two
Indo-European languages, English (Germanic) and Spanish (Romance), and Basque,
a non-Indo-European language, apparently related to nothing else at all1.
In this thesis, I will tackle these questions and provide a framework which
will shed some light on the study and understanding of polysemy.
The basic theoretical assumptions in this thesis belong to the framework of
Cognitive Linguistics. The main theoretical and methodological principles of this
model are presented in Section 1.1. In Section 1.2,1 offer an overview of the state of
the art in polysemy. Three main trends in polysemy are analysed: Traditional
Semantics (Section 1.2.1), Cognitive Semantics (Section 1.2.2), and Lexical
Semantics (Section 1.2.3). This chapter finishes with an outline of the organisation of
this thesis in Section 1.3.
1.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: COGNITIVE
LINGUISTICS
Cognitive Linguistics is a new approach to the study of language that
emerged in the 1970's as a reaction against the dominant generative paradigm which
pursues an autonomous2 view of language (see Ruiz de Mendoza 1997). Some of the
main assumptions underlying the generative approaches to syntax and semantics are
not in accordance with the experimental data in linguistics, psychology and other
fields; the "generative commitment' to notational formalism, that is to say the use of
1 There have been many speculations about possible origins and connections (or lack of
them) of Basque since the sixteenth century. The search for relatives has been extraordinarily varied:
from almost every single language or language family in the Old World to even some New World
languages. Trask (1997: ch. 6) gives a very detailed account of such attempts.
2
The view of the language as an autonomous entity goes back to Structuralism (De Saussure
1916; Bloomfield 1914): in this model, the meaning of a word is determined by the language system
itself, whereas people's perception, interaction and conceptualisation are extra-linguistic factors. In
the Generative approach (Chomsky 1986), language is also viewed as autonomous but in a rather
different way. The language faculty (computational device which generates the sentences of a
language through the recursive rules on structured strings of symbols, assigning syntax and semantics)
is itself an autonomous component ofmind, independent of other mental faculties.
17
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'formal grammars' that views languages as systems of arbitrary symbols manipulated
by mathematical rules of the sort first characterised by Emil Post, is used at the
expense of descriptive adequacy and psychological realism (see Lakoff 1987). What
Lakoff refers to as 'nonfinitary phenomena' (Lakoff 1990: 43), i.e. mental images,
general cognitive processes, basic-level categories, prototype phenomena, the use of
neural foundations for linguistic theory and so on, are not considered part of these
grammars because they are not characterisable in this notation. It is from this
dissatisfaction with the dominant model that Cognitive Linguistics is created.
Cognitive Linguistics is not a totally homogeneous framework. Ungerer and Schmid
(1997) distinguish three main approaches: the Experiential view, the Prominence
view and the Attentional view of language.
The 'Experiential view' follows a practical and empirical description of
meaning. In this approach it is the user of the language who tells us what is going on
in their minds when they produce and understand words and sentences. Eleanor
Rosch et al. (1977, 1978) carried out the first research within this approach, mainly
in the study of cognitive categories, which led to the prototype model of
categorisation.
Within this framework, the knowledge and experience human beings have of
the things and events that they know well is transferred to those other objects and
events, which they are not so familiar with, and even to abstract concepts. Lakoff and
Johnson (1980) were among the first ones to pinpoint this conceptual potential,
especially in the case of metaphors. However, this does not only apply to the field of
metaphor but to other figurative resources which are not considered part of the
language in more traditional linguistics, such as metonymy (Panther and Radden
1999: Radden and Kovecses 1996 and Kovecses and Radden 1998).
The 'Prominence view' is based on concepts of profiling and figure/ground
segregation, a phenomenon first introduced by the Danish gestalt psychologist
Rubin. The prominence principle explains why, when we look at an object in our
environment, we single it out as a perceptually prominent figure standing out from
the ground. This principle can also be applied to the study of language; especially, to
the study of local relations (cf. Brugman 1981, 1988; Casad 1982, 1993; Lindner
1982; Herskovits 1986; Vandeloise 1991; among others). It is also used in
18
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Langacker's (1987, 1991a) grammar, where profiling is used to explain grammatical
constructs and, figure and ground for the explanation of grammatical relations.
Finally, the 'Attentional view' assumes that what we actually express reflects
which parts of an event attract our attention. A main concept of this approach is
Fillmore's (1975) notion of 'frame', i.e. an assemblage of the knowledge we have
about a certain situation. Depending on our cognitive ability to direct our attention,
different aspects of this frame are highlighted, resulting in different linguistic
expressions (see Talmy 1988, 1991, and 1996).
Despite these three different viewpoints in Cognitive Linguistics (see also
Wierzbicka 1986, 1990), the majority of cognitive linguists agree on the tenets
described in the following section. In both sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 I follow
Barcelona's (1997) framework for describing the methodological and theoretical
principles in this approach.
1.1.1. MAIN TENETS IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS
As human beings the way in which we interact with our world through our
spatial and temporal orientation, our manipulation of objects, our perception of the
things that surround us and our bodily movements influences how we construct and
understand meaning. Based on empirical research in different areas such as
Cognitive Psychology (Rosch 1973, 1977, 1978, 1983; Rosch and Mervis 1975), and
Anthropological Linguistics (Berlin and Kay 1969; Kay 1975) Cognitive Linguistics
argues that both the design features of languages, and our ability to learn and use
them are accounted for by general cognitive abilities, kinaesthetic abilities, our visual
and sensimotor skills and our human categorisation strategies, together with our
cultural, contextual and functional parameters (Barcelona 1997: 8).
Other approaches such as the Modularity Hypothesis (cf. Chomsky 1986;
Fodor 1983) view the ability to learn one's mother language as a unique faculty, as a
special innate mental module; here, language is understood as a product of general
cognitive abilities. It is the result of what Lakoff calls 'the cognitive commitment';
the fact that linguistic theory and methodology must be consistent with what is
empirically known about cognition, the brain and language (Lakoff 1990: 40).
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Therefore, the most fundamental tenet in this model is embodiment (Johnson
1987; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). Mental and linguistic
categories are not abstract, disembodied and human independent categories. They are
created by our experience of the world around us and constrained by our body.
Human conceptual categories, the meaning of words and sentences and the meaning
of linguistic structures at any level, are not a set of universal abstract features or
uninterpreted symbols (Barcelona 1997: 9). They are motivated and grounded more
or less directly in experience, in our bodily, physical, social and cultural experiences,
because after all, "we are beings of the flesh" (Johnson 1992: 347).
The second main idea is related to the theory of linguistic meaning. Most
cognitive linguists reject 'objectivist' theories of meaning. The term 'objectivism' is
used by Lakoff (1987, 1988) and Johnson (1987) to refer to those theories of
linguistic meaning that understand objective reality as independent from human
cognition, such as Frege (Geach and Black 1952), Montague's Model-theoretical
Semantics (Dowty et al. 1981; Cann 1993) and Barwise and Perry's (1983) Situation
Semantics. For Cognitive Linguistics, meanings do not exist independently from the
people that create and use them (Reddy 1993). Linguistic forms do not have inherent
meanings in themselves, they act as clues activating the meanings that reside in our
minds and brains. This activation of meaning is not necessarily entirely the same in
every person, because meaning is based on individual experience as well as
collective experience (Barcelona 1997: 9).
Therefore, for Cognitive Linguistics, we have no access to a reality-
independent of human categorisation, and that is why the structure of reality as
reflected in language is a product of the human mind. Semantic structure reflects the
mental categories which people have formed from their experience and
understanding of the world. This understanding of our linguistic skills as the result of
our cognitive abilities leads to deep methodological differences in respect to more
traditional approaches to meaning, as we shall see in the following section.
1.1.2. METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES
Human categorisation is one of the major issues in Linguistics. The ability to
categorise, i.e., to judge that a particular thing is or is not an instance of a particular
20
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category, is an essential part of cognition. Categorisation is often automatic and
unconscious, except in problematic cases. This can cause us to make mistakes and
make us think that our categories are categories of things, when in fact they are
categories of abstract entities. When experience is used to guide the interpretation of
a new experience, the ability to categorise becomes indispensable. How human
beings establish different categories of elements has been discussed ever since
Aristotle.
The classical view on categorisation, that of Aristotle3, claims that categories
are defined in terms of a conjunction of necessary and sufficient binary features, that
is to say that linguistic analytical categories impose a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for the membership in the category. This requirement not only implies
that categories have clear boundaries and that all members of a category have equal
status (Taylor 1995: 25) but also that there is an abstract, general definition with
which all the members of that category must comply. For instance, the different
senses of the word hand in John's hands are very big and in The hour hand of the
clock would be considered as related to one general, core abstract sense of hand.
However, this abstract definition of 'core meaning' is problematic; as
Sweetser (1986) points out, in cases when the extension of meaning has been carried
out by means of metaphor or metonymy, it is very difficult to identify this abstract
meaning. In the examples above, it could be argued that this core sense is a 'pointing
function', but this core meaning cannot account for other instances of hand as in My
life is in your hands, They are taking new hands or This matter is out ofmy hands.
These other examples lead us to another problem: no matter how complex this core
abstract meaning could be, it will leave some likely candidates outside.
These above examples would be analysed quite differently under the
Cognitive Linguistics methodology. Instead of relating these different senses to an
abstract default sense that includes all of them, the cognitive approach adopts a
prototype categorisation model (cf. Rosch 1973, 1977, 1978, 1983; Rosch and
Mervis 1975; Mervis and Rosch 1981). In this model human categories have two
'
Aristotle distinguished between the essence of a thing (what makes a thing be what it is,
indicates its individuality, its destruction is the destruction of all) and the accidents of a thing
(incidental properties, not determining part).
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types of members: the 'prototype' and several less-central members related to the
former in a motivated way. The prototype is the best, the most prominent and the
most typical member of a category. It is the example that first comes to mind when
one thinks of that category.
Prototype categorisation4 stems from Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1953) thesis
that necessary and sufficient conditions are not appropriate for defining the meanings
ofmany words. His example of the concept of game showed how there are very few
properties, if any, that are shared by all games; instead, one game shares some
properties with another game, and this other game may share some properties with a
third and so on. This concept of game is based on what he called 'family
resemblance': members of a family resemble one another in various ways. But,
everyone in the family does not need to share the collection of properties that define
that family, gradience (how much a member belongs to the family) and centrality
(central/good and non-central/bad members). In this same line of research, we find
other linguists and philosophers such as Austin (1961) (relationships among
meanings of words; analogy; primary nuclear sense3); Zadeh (1965) (study of
categories with fuzzy boundaries); Lounsbury (1964) (kinship categories); Berlin and
Kay (1969) (colour categories as an empirical establishment of Wittgenstein's ideas
of gradience and centrality), and the primary study of basic-categories of Brown
(1958, 1965). However Eleanor Rosch (see references above) was the first to provide
a general perspective on these problems.
Following Rosch's approach to categorisation, a cognitive methodology
identifies the prototypical use of hand as that referring to a part of the body, and
would treat the other uses of this lexical item as motivated, non-prototypical senses,
related to the prototypical sense in a systematic way. In The hour hand of the clock,
My life is in your hands and This matter is in your hands, the link is carried out by
means of metaphor; whereas in They are taking new hands, the link is metonymical
(part for whole).
4
See Lakoff (1987: Ch.2) and Taylor (1995: Ch.3.2.) for discussion on early development
research into categorisation. See Ungerer and Schmid (1996) for an overview on 'Prototypes and
Categories' (Ch.l)and 'Levels ofCategorisation' (Ch.2)
5 i.e. the central-prototypical sense.
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Another consequence of the primacy of cognitive abilities is that there is no
strict distinction between encyclopaedic and linguistic knowledge. Objectivists
differentiate between these two different epistemological types of knowledge. On the
one hand, 'linguistic' or 'definitional' knowledge that "corresponds to the essential
properties of the entities and categories that the words designate"; and on the other,
'encyclopaedic' knowledge "corresponds to the contingent properties of the entities
and properties that the words designate" (Lakoff 1987: 172). This dictionary-
encyclopaedia distinction leads objectivists to postulate a 'meaning per se' (Leech
1981: 70), independent of whatever the speaker may know about the states of affairs
that he is referring to. This paradigm also induces the distinction between literal
(objectively true or false) and figurative meaning (no direct correspondence to
entities and categories in the real world).
For Cognitive Linguistics, however, this distinction is not strict. Meanings are
cognitive structures embedded in our patterns of knowledge and belief; conventional
meanings arise from experience and knowledge and our complex conceptual
structures are invoked in language use and comprehension6. The fact that our
experience-based knowledge is present in linguistic meaning at every level implies
that there is not a strict distinction between lexicon and grammar7, between
semantics and pragmatics, between synchrony and diachrony. This is possible
because the same social, functional and cognitive motivation present in historical
changes is also observable in ongoing changes (Barcelona 1997: 11).
This continuum between language and experience has led cognitive linguists
to study how conceptual structures or cognitive models are reflected in language.
According to Langacker (1987: 147ff), most concepts invoke other concepts and
without making an explicit reference to them, they cannot be adequately defined.
Consider for instance the concept of [Monday], If we ask ourselves about the
meaning of the word Monday, we will probably say that it is a day of the week; but
again what is the meaning of [week]? Weeks are imaginative creations of the human
6
That is why meaning is claimed to be ultimately pragmatic.
7
As Langacker (1987: 3) states "'Lexicon, morphology, and syntax form a continuum of
symbolic structures, which differ along various parameters but can be divided into separate
components only arbitrarily".
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mind. The kind of imaginative structure required for the description of concepts such
as [Monday] are what Langacker (1987: 150) calls 'abstract domains': "any concept
or conceptual complex that functions as a domain for the definition of a higher-order
concept". These abstract domains are equivalent to Lakoffs (1987) 'Idealised
Cognitive Models' (ICMs) and Fillmore's (1982, 1985) 'frames'. These abstract
domains give structure to what Langacker (1987: 148) refers to as 'basic domains',
i.e. primitive representational fields, not reducible to another; they occupy the lowest
level of conceptual complexity. These basic domains are what Lakoff (1987: 281),
following Fauconnier's (1985) terminology, calls 'mental spaces' , mediums for
conceptualisation and thought. In this case, the basic domain of the concept of
[week] would be [time],
In some cases, one abstract domain or ICM on its own cannot define the
meaning of words. The latter may need the characterisation of several ICMs
simultaneously; this is what Lakoff (1987:74) calls 'cluster models' (or domains).
Another consequence of this primacy of general cognitive abilities is the
essential role of imagination. For many people, the word imagination is related to
subjectivism, idealism, and relativism. Since the Enlightenment9, imagination has
been despised in many theories of language, because it is regarded as a non-rational,
unruly, and idiosyncratic play of ideas, and therefore, unsuitable for scientific
research. In Cognitive Linguistics, imagination is considered a basic human
cognitive ability, central to human meaning and rationality. As Johnson (1987: 172)
explains, the way we reason and what we can experience as meaningful are both
based on structures of imagination that make our experience what it is. We make
sense of our less directly apprehensible experiences on the basis of more directly
apprehensible experiences. For instance, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 14ff.) have
shown how we project part of our bodily experience of three-dimensional space onto
our experience of happiness, when we say My spirits rose; or onto our experience of
sickness and death, as in He came down with flu.
s
'Mental spaces' are "constructs distinct from linguistic structures but built up in any
discourse according to guidelines provided by the linguistic expressions" (Fauconnier 1985 16)
9
See Johnson (1987: Ch. 6) for an account on the history of Imagination.
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Metaphor and metonymy are two basic imaginative cognitive mechanisms.
They are not figures of speech, as they are considered by many traditional objectivist
approaches (see, for example, Halliday 1985: 319-20); not even the result of a wide
array of contextual implications, as proposed by Relevance theory (Sperber and
Wilson 1995: 231-37; Papafragou 1996; Goatly 1997)10. They are the means by
which it is possible "to ground our conceptual systems experientially and to reason in
a constrained but creative fashion" (Johnson 1992: 351). As Barcelona (1997: 12)
puts it both mechanisms are "complex mental projections or mappings of our
knowledge of one domain of experience [the source domain] to structure our
knowledge of a different domain of experience [the target domain]" (Barcelona
1997: 12). But, whereas in metaphor, we map part of one conceptual domain onto
another separate domain, in metonymy, the mapping takes place within the same
domain.
For instance, in the sentence 7 see what you mean, we have two different
experiential domains: the source domain of the bodily act of visual perception and
the target domain of intellection. The mapping between these two different
conceptual domains is carried out by means of metaphor. However, in Mary tasted
the camembert, the mapping does not take place between different conceptual
domains, but within the same domain through metonymy; instead of the word
cheese, we have the name of the place where it is produced11.
In cases when the experiences mapped are more direct these can be
understood metaphorically or metonymically on the basis of Tmage schemas'. These
are "preconceptual structures that we acquire as a result of our earliest bodily
experiences" (Barcelona 1997: 12). Sentences such as Prices are going down or Turn
up the radio are based on the metaphor more is up /' less is down. This metaphorical
projection from more to up is in turn based on our understanding of quantity in
terms of the verticality schema. This schema is based on our everyday bodily
experience: whenever we put more liquid in a container, the level goes up. Other
10
Johnson (1992), Dirven (1993), Gibbs (1994), Cameron and Low (1999) are good reviews
of different approaches to these two tropes (mainly metaphor).
11
Radden and Kovecses (1996: 15) call this metonymy PLACE FOR THE PRODUCT MADE
THERE, and include it in the Production ICM.
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basic conceptual schemas are: the 'container schema', the 'source-path-goal
schema', the "figure/ground schema', the 'balance schema' and so on (see
Johnson 1987).
Most of these image schemas, metaphors and metonymies operate on the
basis of a conventional 'frame' or ICM. For instance, the metonymic mapping
between the food eaten and the customer in Lakoff and Johnson's (1980: 35)
example The ham sandwich is waitingfor his check works against the background of
the conventional restaurant frame or ICM.
Research on metaphor occupies a central position in Cognitive Linguistics.
One of the major problems that cognitive linguists still face is the question of how to
constrain metaphorical mappings. As we shall see in Chapter 6, attempts to constrain
the mapping process in metaphorical production and comprehension can be found in
12
Lakoffs (1990, 1993) 'Invanance Principle' i.e. "metaphorical mappings preserve
the cognitive topology of the source domain in a way consistent with the inherent
structure of the target domain" (Lakoff 1993: 215). The Invariance Principle is useful
in order to constrain the nature of those mappings: that is to say, it is not possible to
map from the source domain structure that does not preserve the inherent structure of
the target domain. The only problem with this principle is that it does not show
exactly what part of the source domain is the one that must be consistent with the
structure of the target domain.
Metonymy has received less attention than metaphor in Cognitive
Linguistics1'. Although early studies, such as Lakoff and Johnson (1980: Ch. 8) and
Lakoff (1987: Ch. 5-8 and case study 2), have stressed its importance for
categorisation, it was not until recently that metonymy came to be at the core of
current investigation. Radden and Kovecses (1996) and Kovecses and Radden (1998)
propose a working definition for metonymy based on Langacker's (1993)
12 See also LakotT and Turner (1989: 82), Brugman (1990), Turner (1987: 143-148, 1990a,
1991: 172-182, 1996), Jakel (1997).
13 For a review of the research on metonymy in Cognitive Linguistics, see Gibbs (1994
Ch 7)
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formulation14 that metonymy is a cognitive process through which we acquire access
to a mental entity via another mental entity and Lakoff s theory of ICMs. Kovecses
and Radden define metonymy as "a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity,
the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the
same domain, or ICM" (1998: 39). This view on metonymy involves four questions
that need to be addressed in the framework of metonymy: (i) identification of the
ontological realms where metonymy can occur; (ii) specification of the types of
conceptual relationships between the metonymic elements; (iii) definition of the
cognitive and communicative principles that select the most 'natural' vehicle-to-
target routes; and (iv) definition of the conditions for the selection of 'non-default
routes'.
Another important and interesting area of research is the interaction between
metaphor and metonymy. Goossens (1990) proposes the term 'metaphtonymy' to
cover the possible interrelations between metaphor and metonymy. Among these
interrelations, he distinguishes two as the dominant patterns: one where the
experiential basis for metaphor is a metonymy ('metaphor from metonymy') and
another where a metonymy functioning in the target domain is embedded within a
metaphor ('metonymy within metaphor'). Along similar lines, Barcelona (1997,
1998, in press b) proposes the conceptual dependency of metaphor on metonymy.
Another tendency is the theory of 'blending' or 'conceptual integration'. This
theory, developed from Fauconnier's early work on 'mental spaces' (1985, 1994) and
then by him and Turner (Fauconnier 1997; Fauconmer and Turner 1994, 1996, 1998;
Turner and Fauconnier 1995), takes metaphor and metonymy under a more general
mental mapping mechanism called 'blend'. As Barcelona (1997: 12) summarises
"this theory seems to explain how speakers and hearers keep track of referential
values and other factors in the conceptual mappings occurring throughout a
discourse, by constructing provisional conceptual domains or 'blends'".
As we shall see later in the analysis, this view of metaphor and metonymy as
largely automatic correspondences between experiential domains can be applied to
14 "The entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as a reference
point affording mental access to the desired target (i.e. the entity actually being referred to)"
(Langacker 1993: 30)
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the study of polysemy. In Cognitive Linguistics, the central approach to polysemy is
not that a word is associated with different senses but that these meanings are related
in a motivated systematic way by means of metaphorical and metonymical
mappings.
1.1.3. SUMMARY
In this section, I have summarised the main theoretical and methodological
tenets in the framework of Cognitive Linguistics. This thesis is built on these
assumptions. It has been shown how this model takes human experience as the
motivation for what is meaningful in the human mind; thought is not a manipulation
of symbols but the application of cognitive processes to conceptual structures.
Meaning structures come not only from the direct relationship with the external
world but also from the nature of bodily and social experience (how humans
experience with the world) and from human capacity to project from some aspects
based on this experience to some abstract conceptual structures. This is perhaps one
of the achievements of this approach: the fact that imaginative aspects of reason,
such as metaphor, metonymy and mental imagery are seen as central to reason, not as
extra-linguistic aspects. This allows for the existence of those meanings that do not
have real-world reference. As we shall see in Chapter 4, within the Cognitive
Linguistics framework, Eve Sweetser (1990) demonstrates that some polysemous
structures in Indo-European can be explained only by metaphorical projections,
motivated by common human experiences, within the human conceptual system.
In the following section, I review the state of the art in polysemy Three main
trends in polysemy are analysed in this section: Traditional Semantics (Section
1.2.1), Cognitive Semantics (section 1.2.2), and Lexical Semantics (Section 1.2.3).
1.2. THE STATE OF THE ART IN POLYSEMY
Polysemy has been traditionally defined as the case when "a lexical item15 ...
has a range of different meanings" (Crystal 1991: 267). This definition could seem to
l? There has been some discussion on the terminology used for the definition of what a word
is in dictionaries. Leech (1981: 229) proposes two definitions for'lexical item":
(i) a bundle of lexical entries sharing the same morphological specification p
28
B. Iraide Ibarretxe-Antuhano Chapter I: Introduction: What is Polysemy}
be very simple and straightforward at first, but since Breal (1900) addressed the
problem that this term may involve, many linguists have tried to find a solution for it,
without giving a definitive answer for it16. Polysemy is always presented in
opposition to homonymy. The basic criteria for differentiating the two cases is to say
that polysemy happens when one form has several meanings and homonymy, when
two lexical items happen to have the same phonological form17.
These definitions could make the problem look simple and place both cases at
opposite ends; especially if we look at typical examples of polysemy, like the verb
run, or at examples of homonymy such as bank ('river bank', 'money bank').
However, these definitions do not work for most of the cases where there is an
ambiguity in meaning, mainly because of the great number of borderline cases in
which the differences between one term and another are not so clear-cut (Lehrer
1974).
In this Section, some of the main approaches dealing with these phenomena
are reviewed. These approaches are Traditional Linguistics (Lyons 1977; Palmer
1981; Cruse 1986), Cognitive Linguistics (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Taylor 1995),
and Lexical Semantics and the Generative Lexicon (Pustejovsky 1995).
1.2.1. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO POLYSEMY: WHAT IS
POL YSEMY? WHA T IS HOMONYMY?
The traditional distinction between polysemy and homonymy is based on
whether there is one or two lexical items involved. Lyons (1977: 550) considers them
(ii) a bundle of lexical entries sharing the same morphological specification p, and the same
syntactic specification qt
Leech argues that it would be better to name each definition with a different term, namely
'lexical item' and 'lexeme' respectively. In this thesis, no distinctions are made between these two
terms, although the words dealt with in the analysis fall within the scope of definition (ii)
16 For an account of the changing patterns in the study of polysemy from antiquity to the 20th
century, see Nerlich and Clarke (1997)
17
Authors such as Taylor (1995), differentiate between homonymy and monosemv, where
the former is only restricted to those cases when unrelated meanings are attached to the same
phonological form and the latter when the lexical item has a single sense. As will be seen later, Lyons
(1977) includes under homonymy both cases, although he does differentiate between partial
homonymy, i.e homographv and homophony, and absolute homonymy
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as two types of lexical ambiguity and introduces some criteria for deciding when it
is polysemy and when it is homonymy.
One criterion is etymological information about the lexical item in question.
Lexical items with the same origin are considered as polysemic, whereas if they have
evolved from distinct lexemes in some earlier stage of the language then they are
regarded as homonymous. This condition is neither satisfactory nor decisive because
the history of the language does not always reflect its present state. For instance, in
present-day English, the lexemes pupilt 'student' and puptl2 'iris of the eye' are not
usually related by native speakers, but they are both derived from Latin
pupillus pupilla 'ward, orphan-boy' which is itself a diminutive of pupus 'child'19.
The opposite case is also fairly common, namely when native speakers consider two
lexemes derived from different roots in an earlier stage of the language as related.
For example, the lexemes eari 'organ of hearing' and ear2 'spike of com' come from
two different origins: earj evolves from OE eare from IE *aus- (cf. Latin auris 'ear')
and ear2 from OE ear (cf. Latin acus, acerts 'husk') and they merged into er(e) in
ME. However, most people nowadays treat these two lexemes as one polysemous
word and explain their relation by means of metaphor. Therefore, the etymological
criterion can be very misleading20 when deciding between homonymy and polysemy.
Another criterion is the unrelatedness vs. relatedness of meaning; i.e. the
nativ e speaker's feeling that certain meanings are connected and that others are not.
One of the major drawbacks that Lyons states for this criterion is that relatedness of
meaning appears to be a matter of degree, together with the fact that sometimes
native speaker's intuitions21 are far from being the true interpretation, as has been
seen with the ear example above. Attempts to formalise this relatedness of meaning
have also been made. Katz (1972), Katz and Fodor's (1963) Componential Analysis
18
Ambiguity itself is a complicated term as well. Tuggy (1993) sees ambiguity as related to
homonymy and polysemy more related to vagueness.
19 This example is very interesting because in Spanish the word niha also covers both
meanings 'young girl' and 'eye's pupil'.
20
Lyons (1977: 551) further states that the etymological criterion should not take part in the
definition of homonymy. First, speakers are not aware of such historical developments Second, this
information is irrelevant for synchronic analysis of languages.
21
In Leech's (1981: 229) view, the native speaker's intuitions are valid as long as the speaker
expresses the relation between meanings in terms of lexical rules. These lexical rules have
psychological reality to the extent that they are part of the native speaker's linguistic competence.
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proposes the decomposition or breakdown of the sense of a word into its minimal
distinctive features, i.e. into semantic components which contrast with other
components. These minimal distinctive features produce formulae called
componential definitions of the type [± human], [± adult], [± male] for the
description of lexemes such as man, woman, girl, boy in the semantic field of'human
race' (see Leech 1981: 96ff).
Unfortunately, this type of approach is not sufficient for the polysemy-
homonymy problem. First, the relatedness in the different sense of a word might not
be expressible in terms of ± features and also because in some cases, these features
are present in different degrees, not in absolute terms. A classical example of this
problem is the word bachelor (Fillmore 1977, 1982). In a simplified world, where
people are marriageable at a certain age, mostly marry at that age and stay married to
the same person, bachelor is just any unmarried male past marriageable age.
Flowever, outside this simplified world, the word bachelor does not apply. That is
why we find it so odd to call the Pope or a twice-married divorce bachelor, even
72
though they both meet the criteria of the definition given above". Secondly, as
Lyons (1977: 553) points out, "the possibility or impossibility of decomposing the
senses of lexemes into a (structured or unstructured) set of semantic components is
irrelevant, unless we can specify just how many components, or alternatively what
kind of components, two senses must share in order for them to meet the criterion of
relatedness ofmeaning".
An alternative solution for both problems is presented in my Property
Selection Processes in Chapter 6. I propose that, by means of different properties
present in the prototypical meaning of the lexeme, it is possible to describe such
lexemes and then see how only some of those prototypical properties are present in
the potential polysemous senses that may belong to such a lexeme. This would be a
possible formal explanation for such relatedness of meaning among possible
polysemous words.
22 Similar examples are discussed in Lakoff (1987) (mother), Coleman and Kay (1981) and
Sweetser (1987) (lie).
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A third way of attempting to establish polysemy is to search for a central or
core meaning. Based on the classical definition of a category as a set of necessary
and sufficient conditions for membership, Allerton (1979) proposes that when
different senses of a lexeme share a core meaning, they are polysemous. On the other
hand, cases when the core meaning cannot be extracted are to be considered as
homonymous. For instance, the word paper can mean 'newspaper', 'document' and
'academic lecture'; all these senses share the core meaning of 'important written or
printed material'. According to Palmer (1981: 105), this is possible when we have
cases of metaphors and the other senses have been transferred from that core
meaning. The disadvantage of this criterion is again to decide what the core meaning
is. As will be seen later in the discussion, under the Cognitive Linguistics approach,
neither the core meaning approach nor Palmer's acceptance of it in metaphorical
cases is admitted. The reason is the fact that metaphor is understood as a motivated
transfer between two different domains and this core meaning approach totally
defeats any attempt to show a motivated account of semantic extension. The
alternative to this approach within Cognitive Linguistics is the 'family resemblance
model' (Taylor 1995: 106) or what Lakofif (1987: Ch. 6, 1996: Ch. 1) calls 'radial
categories'.
Finally, there have been attempts to test the ambiguity" of lexical items.
Cruse (1986: 54ff) makes a distinction between 'indirect' and 'direct' ambiguity
tests. 'Indirect' tests are designed to find two occurrences of a word form with
different relations of meaning; these relations can be paradigmatic (e.g. synonymy)
or paronymic (i.e. identity of root but different syntactic category). According to
Cruse (1986), these tests are invalid since nothing can be reliably inferred from the
fact that a word form has different meaning relations in different contexts.
For the 'direct' ambiguity tests Cruse (1986) offers three criteria:
(i) Contextual modulation: an ambiguous form should not in every case be
totally conditioned by its contexts. In a disambiguating context, the word may
carry more information that can be accounted for in terms of interaction between
the context-independent meaning of the word and the semantic information of the
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context itself, whereas in cases of contextual modulation all information is derived
from the context.
(ii) Independently maximisable separate senses: under certain conditions,
the application of certain terms must be maximised within the current universe of
discourse, even if it creates some oddness24.
(iii) Antagonism of independent senses: cases where senses cannot arise
simultaneously without causing oddity24. This antagonism of senses can be tested
by the 'co-ordination test'; it is argued that sentences with an ambiguous lexeme
cannot have both meanings at the same time. For instance, in a sentence like (1),
the word light cannot mean both that the room is bright and that the furniture is
not heavy (Palmer 1981: 106).
(1) The room and the furniture were light.
Another test is that proposed by Kempson26 (1977: 129). She argues that to
distinguish ambiguous sentences, it is necessary to turn to anaphoric processes such
as the insertion of an expression like to do so too, where the anaphoric expression
demands identity of meaning of the two verb phrases in question.
(2) John went to the bank and Will did so too.
In this case, hank has to refer to the same entity, either the financial
institution or the side of the river in both VPs, but not to a different entity in each
one.
23
For an extended discussion of ambiguity, see Kempson (1977), Zwicky and Sadock (1975)
and Cruse (1986).
24 The two contrastive examples Cruse (1986: 60) gives are:
(1) ? Mary likes mares better than horses
(2) John prefers bitches to dogs
The oddity of (1) and the acceptance of (2) can be explained in terms of prototype theory.
Mare and horse do not correspond to the same level of categorisation: mare is subordinate level
category, whereas horse is a basic level category. If instead of horse, it had been stallion, the
respective subordinate level word, the sentence would have been correct. What happens in (2) is that
dog represents both the subordinate and the basic level categories, and therefore, the suitable category
for this particular case, i.e. subordinate level one, has been chosen.
25
The variety of anomaly brought by this simultaneous link of independent senses is allowed
in some contexts and is traditionally labelled as zeugma'.
26
A first version of the do so test was first discussed by Lakoff (1970).
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A third test is the so-called 'identity test'. In a sentence like (3), the adjective
light refers directly to Mary's coat and anaphorically to Sue's.
(3) Mary is wearing a light coat; so is Sue. (Cruse 1986: 62)
The adjective light can have two interpretations 'not heavy' or 'not dark'; in
(3) it must have just one of them, in both of the instances where it is implied, directly
or anaphorically.
These tests seem to work well in some ambiguous cases, but unfortunately,
there are too many counterexamples for us to be able to take these tests as a
definitive way of resolving ambiguity (Zwicky and Sadock 1975).
Another important distinction between polysemy and homonymy is the
syntactic behaviour of the linguistic form in question. Traditionally, homonymous
words are thought to be represented by two different syntactic categories.
As a way around these insufficient criteria, Lyons proposes the possibility of
circumventing the problem: the maximisation of either homonymy or polysemy; that
is to say, either to associate a separate lexeme with every distinct meaning or group
every distinct meaning under the same lexeme. The maximisation of homonymy is
the alternative chosen by Kempson (1977), who proposes a 'constant semantic value'
(1977: 82) for each lexical item in a language. If a lexical item has more than one
sense, it is characterised separately without taking into account the relation of this
sense with the other meanings conveyed by that lexeme. The other possibility, the
maximisation of polysemy, is taken by Cognitive Linguistics, although it is restricted
as they only consider the senses associated with a polysemous word with the same
syntactic category. Neither of these possibilities offers a complete solution, although
for methodological reasons the latter is preferred to avoid an infinite number of
dictionary entries.
One of the reasons that Lyons suggests for rejecting the maximised
homonymy alternative is precisely the fact that distinctions of sense can be
multiplied indefinitely as in examples such as mouth of the river, mouth of the tunnel,
mouth of etc. Taylor (1995: 105) also rejects this possibility on the basis of a
prototype categorisation theory. I argue in Chapter 7 that it is very important to bear
in mind what it is that really causes the multiplicity of meaning: is it the possible
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ambiguous lexeme {mouth) or the lexeme in conjunction with other arguments or
modifiers {ofthe river, of the tunnel)?
In view of these unsuccessful possibilities, Lyons attempts to make the
distinction between polysemy and homonymy more precise by proposing three
necessary conditions for absolute homonymy (L, and Lj are two lexical items):
(1) L; * Lj (Lexemic distinctness: the fact that there are two different senses
involved).
(ii) Li* = Lj* (Formal identity, which subdivides homonymy into partial
homonymy cases: homophony (two word-tokens are formally identical in the
phonic medium if they have the same phonological representation) and
homography (two word-tokens are formally identical in the graphic medium if
they have the same orthographic representation)).
(iii) (x e Lj* & y e Lj* & x = y & R (x, w,) & R (y, w,) -> (w, = wj).
Where R symbolises the relationship of realisation that holds between a form and
a morphosyntactic word. (Grammatical equivalence: the fact that both senses
belong to the same morphosyntactic category).
Lyons' main aim in trying to define absolute homonymy is to show that
polysemy"7 and absolute homonymy tend to produce purely lexical ambiguities,
whereas partial homonymy tends to produce ambiguity only in certain contexts.
These traditional approaches to polysemy provide a more or less successful
descriptive analysis of what polysemy and homonymy are; what lexical items are
homonymous or polysemous. Their major problem, however, is that they fail to
address several fundamental issues: the reasons why these lexical items have several
senses attached to them in the first place; how these meanings are structured: are
these senses grouped under the same lexical item by chance or is there any
motivation for the lexical item to convey specific meanings? Is the semantic content
of a single lexical item enough to create polysemy or, on the contrary, is the
27
Lyons defines polysemy as "the product of metaphorical creativity" (1977: 567). It will be
argued later in the analysis in Chapter 7 that polysemy is not only produced by means of metaphor,
but also by virtue of combinations between the different elements in the sentence in question
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interaction with the semantic content of the other lexical items that co-occur in the
same sentence necessary?
These issues, neglected by traditional approaches, are at the core of
investigation in Cognitive Semantics. In the following section, I present the
explanations that this model provides for these questions.
1.2.2. COGNITIVE SEMANTICS
Within this framework, the main distinction between polysemy and
homonymy is the systematic relation of meanings that takes place in polysemy
(Lakoff 1987: 316; Johnson 1987: 193). When speaking about polysemy, the fact
that we are dealing with multiple meanings is not the main point but the fact that
those multiple meanings are related in a systematic and natural way.
According to Lakoff (1987), polysemy has to be understood as categorisation,
that is to say the idea that related meanings of words form categories and that these
meanings bear family resemblance, an idea introduced by Austin (1961). Taylor
(1995: 108) explains this family resemblance category in terms of 'meaning chains'.
A lexeme can convey different meanings, A, B, C, D, ... A is related to B in virtue of
some shared attribute(s) or other kind of similarity. Meaning B in turn becomes the
source of a further extension to meaning C and so on. This 'meaning chain' can be
represented in (4), where any node in a meaning chain can be the source of any
number ofmeaning expressions:
(4) A-> B-> C~> D...
Taylor compares these 'meaning chains' to Lakoffs 'radial categories'. A
category is structured radially with respect to a number of subcategories: there is a
central subcategory, defined by a cluster of covering cognitive models and in
addition, there are noncentral extensions which are not specialised instances of the
central subcategory, but variants of it. The extensions of the central model are not
random, but motivated by the central model plus certain general principles of
extension. One of the advantages of this approach if compared with classical models
is that it offers adequate means of characterising the situations where one or more
senses are central or more representative.
36
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ICMs are complex structured wholes or gestalts. They do not necessarily fit
the world very precisely. There will always be some segments of society that the
ICM fits reasonably well and some others that it will not.
Polysemy is therefore the result of the extension of ICMs to form radial
categories" . Sometimes, a single ICM can be the basis for a collection of senses that
form a single natural category. For instance, the ICM of the lexeme window29 can
take three meanings: 'an opening in the wall', 'a frame fitting into the wall' and 'the
glass filling the frame fitting into the wall'. These three senses are not unrelated; they
form a natural category of senses, where correspondences remain physical. These
correspondences have been explained in terms of "image schemata'; i.e. recurring
structures of, or in, our perceptual interactions, bodily experiences and cognitive
operations (Johnson 1987: 79, see Section 1.1.2 above).
In some other cases, these correspondences do not take place within the same
ICM, but between the ICMs of two domains. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) propose
'conceptual metaphor' as one of the means for relating the different senses of a word.
Metaphor is understood as an experientially-based mapping from an ICM in one
domain to an ICM in another domain30.
This model of polysemy has been explored mainly with respect to
prepositions, where analyses such as Brugman (1981, 1988), Lindner (1982),
Herskovits (1987) and Vandeloise (1991) have shown the regularities and motivation
among the different senses that prepositions can convey. But as we will see in
Chapter 4, it has also been applied to the study of polysemy and semantic change in
other semantic fields such as perception verbs. Sweetser (1990) identifies this
metaphorical mapping of two different domains in the semantic development of
perception verbs. The mappings between the physical and the mental domains are
28
Although I focus only on the radial model in this section this does not mean that Cognitive
Semantics rejects the totality of other approaches such as inheritance models. These are accepted as
long as they fit the facts (see Langacker 1991b: Ch. 1) For instance, in the case of the chain vehicle-
car-sporis car, the fact that car inherits from vehicle the attribute means of transportation", and
sports car inherits all the features of car does not create any problem for Cognitive Semantics (I
owe this insight to Barcelona p c )
29
As will be seen later, Pustejovsky (1995) calls this type of polysemy 'complementary
polysemy", i.e. where the alternative readings are manifestations of the same core sense in different
contexts.
10
For a full account of different types of ICMs, see Lakotf (1987: 28 Iff.)
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viewed as an important influence in the historical development of polysemy and of
cognate words in related languages.
The way in which Cognitive Semantics tackles polysemy provides us with a
framework that explains and shows that meanings are not grouped together under the
same lexical item by chance. There is bodily-based motivation that causes and
organises radial categories of meanings. These radial categories are structured by
means ofmetaphor and metonymy. In this thesis I will use this model to explain why
perception verbs have the polysemous senses that they seem to convey.
This framework offers a good model for the explanation of why polysemous
senses are grouped together under the same lexical item. Its major drawback,
however, is that it does not seem to focus on how these polysemous senses are
created. In other words, what it takes to create polysemy, the semantic content ofjust
one lexical item, or the semantic content of that lexical item in conjunction with the
semantic content of other lexical items. As stated in the introduction to this chapter,
this point is central to my discussion in this thesis31. Cognitive Semantics does not
provide a sound answer, and therefore, we need to find a different model that does.
In the following section I sketch the main tenets of an approach that focuses
precisely on this last issue: Pustejovsky's Generative Lexicon.
1.2.3. LEXICAL SEMANTICS AND THE GENERATIVE LEXICON
The 'Generative Lexicon' is Pustejovsky's (1995) approach to the problem of
lexical ambiguity, to the multiplicity of word meaning and to the question of how we
are able to give an infinite number of senses to words using finite means. The main
thesis of this approach is that a core set of word senses is used to generate a larger set
of word senses when individual lexical items are combined with others in phrases
and clauses. This system has four levels (argument structure, event structure, qualia
structure and lexical inheritance structure) which are connected by generative
devices (type coercion, selective binding and co-composition) that provide the
compositional interpretation of words in context.
11
Chapter 7 is devoted entirely to this issue
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Pustejovsky argues that former approaches to natural language semantics
have ignored either the problem of how words are used in novel contexts or the
creation of such new senses on the basis of compositionality. In language, words can
have more than one meaning, but the means in which this extension of meaning is
carried out can vary. Based on Weinreich's (1963, 1964) two types of ambiguity,
Pustejovsky distinguishes between contrastive and complementary ambiguity.
'Contrastive ambiguity', traditionally known as homonymy, takes place when
a lexical item accidentally takes two distinct and unrelated meanings. Pustejovsky is
not interested in the reasons (historical, orthographical...) why this arbitrary
association of senses occurs, as they are not relevant for the lexicon construction and
the synchronic study of meaning (cf. Lyons 1977), but in the various processes that
can disambiguate lexical items with this type of ambiguity. He proposes the
following three processes:
(i) Pragmatically constrained disambiguation: when the comprehension of
the utterance is performed in a specific context.
(ii) Priming and context setting: disambiguation by virtue of the discourse
within which the sentence appears.
(iii) Sortally constrained disambiguation: the knowledge of the predication
relation in the sentence.
The other type of ambiguity is 'complementary polysemy': when lexical
senses are manifestations of the same basic meaning of the word as it occurs in
different contexts. He distinguishes between those cases where the category of the
lexical item changes and those where it does not; the latter is what he calls 'logical
polysemy'.
These multiple senses of a word have overlapping, dependent or shared
meanings and seem to be systematically related. In the cases of nominals,
Pustejovsky proposes seven different types of alternations: count / mass, container /
containee, figure / ground32, product / producer, plant / food, process / result, place /
32 An interesting example for this alternation is the 'animal grinding' as discussed in Pelletier
and Schubert (1986) and Copestake and Briscoe (1996).
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people. The appropriate interpretation depends on the context. For instance, in the
case of figure / ground reversals33:
(5) a. The window is rotting
b. Mary crawled through the window
The ambiguity of window as 'physical object' and 'aperture' and the choice
of one of the interpretations in each sentence is determined by the context in which
these sentences have been uttered.
In the case of adjectives, the logical polysemy depends on what the adjective
modifies; and finally, in verbs, it depends on the multiple complement types they
select, as for example in the case of inchoative and causative verbs.
The main difference between these types of ambiguity lies in the manner in
which the senses are related. In contrastive ambiguity both senses are contradictory
in nature, i.e. one is available only if every other sense is not. In complementary
polysemy, on the other hand, there is a weaker shadowing effect, both senses are
relevant for the interpretation of the lexical item in context, but one seems to be
focused for purposes of a particular context.
This is why Pustejovsky (1991, 1995: 39ff.) argues that the distinction
between these ambiguities is necessary and rejects other approaches such as the
'Sense Enumeration Lexicon' (cf. Hirst 1987), where such a distinction is waived.
The advantage of this type of approach is that the lexicon remains a separate and
independent source of data. It is insufficient, however, when accounting for the
creative use of words (new senses in novel contexts), the permeability of word senses
(not atomic definitions but overlap and make reference to other senses of the word)
and the expression ofmultiple syntactic forms (a single word sense can have multiple
syntactic realisations).
Logical polysemy has also been discussed by Briscoe and Copestake (1991)
and Copestake and Briscoe (1996) under the name of constructional polysemy' and
defined as one lexical item with apparent ambiguities that arise from a process of co-
33 The phenomenon of figure / ground, first introduced by the Gestalt psychology, is at the
very centre of the Cognitive Linguistics approach, see Talmy (1978), Langacker (1987, 1991a).
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composition in the syntax. This case is more apparent than real because lexically,
there is only one sense and it is the process of syntagmatic co-composition
(Pustejovsky 1991) that causes the sense modulation. Their approach is similar to
that of Pustejovsky (1995), but they also provide a formal mechanism for treating the
compositional interpretation derived from the qualia as defeasible knowledge.
Copestake and Briscoe (1996) also proposed another type of polysemy called 'sense
extension'. In this case, a lexical item is predictably related to two or more senses. It
is not a sense modulation but a sense change, and therefore, they argue that it
requires lexical rules that can create the derived senses from basic senses, together
with specific conditions related to the speaker and context.
Yet another type of sense extension not included in Pustejovsky's analysis is
'referential transfer', i.e. when a name of a property is mapped into a new name
denoting a property to which it functionally corresponds. This phenomenon has been
addressed in Fauconnier (1985) and Nunberg's (1996) 'predicate transfers', which
Nunberg argues are licensed pragmatically.
Pustejovsky's Generative Lexicon proposes a model that addresses the
question - neglected by Cognitive Semantics - of how senses are created. It states
that a core set of word senses is used to generate a larger set of word senses when
individual lexical items are combined with others in phrases and clauses. Although
Pustejovsky is mainly concerned with non-metaphorical meanings, it seems an
appropriate model to account for the way in which polysemy is created. In Chapter 4,
I apply this model to the analysis of the polysemous senses in perception verbs.
1.2.4. SUMMARY
In this section, three approaches to polysemy have been presented. The
traditional approach defines polysemy as the case when a lexical item has a range of
different meanings. Polysemy can be differentiated from homonymy by using a set of
criteria, such as the etymology, the unrelatedness of meaning, the central or core
meaning as well as some ambiguity tests. It has been argued that this model is mainly
concerned with a descriptive analysis of polysemy, without addressing questions
such as why and how polysemy is created.
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For Cognitive Semantics, a lexical item is polysemous when it has multiple
meanings related in a systematic way. This framework provides a good explanation
for the reasons why meanings are related to specific lexical items, but it fails to
account for the way in which such polysemous senses are created.
The last approach is Pustejovsky's Generative Lexicon. Polysemous senses
are understood as manifestations of the same basic meaning in different contexts. A
strong compositionality model, consisting of four levels of representation for a
lexical item, and generative connecting devices explains these senses. This
framework seems the most suitable for explaining how the semantic content of
different lexical items interacts in order to create polysemous senses.
1.3. ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
This introductory chapter has set out the nature and scope of the work,
explaining the purpose of examining the domain of perception verbs, and outlining
the theoretical context and orientation of the study. Chapter 2 presents a synchronic
typological study of the different meanings that perception verbs can convey in the
three languages under investigation: English, Basque and Spanish. These data will be
used in support and illustration of the discussions in the various parts of the study.
Firstly, this chapter will focus on the prototypical physical meanings in perception
v erbs; their classification according to the semantic roles of the arguments that those
verbs take, and the hierarchies that have been established in this semantic field.
Secondly, it will offer a detailed account of the different non-prototypical extended
meanings, both physical and metaphoncal, that these verbs can convey from a cross-
linguistic point of view. It will also include polysemous senses that are only-
particular to each of these languages.
Chapter 3 is a brief diachronic-etymological account of these perception
v erbs in these three languages. This chapter aims to provide further support for some
of the theoretical claims put forward in the course of this thesis, not to discuss in
detail either how or why these perception verbs have evolved the way they have, or
what their etymological origin is - this falls beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Chapter 4 reviews two approaches to meaning extension. Sweetser's (1990)
semantic account of perception verbs, and Pustejovsky's (1995) Generative Lexicon.
It sets out the advantages and gaps that need to be addressed in both approaches.
Chapter 5 describes the physiology of the five senses and the way in which
human beings perceive these perceptual processes. I present a typology of the
properties that characterise the source domain of sense perception. This typology is
considered to be the bodily basis that motivates the different mappings originated
from the physical domain of perception.
In Chapter 6 I investigate how extended meanings derived from the source
domain of physical perception, both physical and metaphorical, are constrained by
the typology of properties described in Chapter 5. I introduce the processes called
'Property Selection' which show what properties are transferred from one domain of
experience onto the other.
Chapter 7 explores the question of how the polysemous senses of perception
verbs are obtained: Are they the result of the meaning of the perception verb only, or
the result of the interaction between the semantics of that verb and the other elements
that co-occur in the same sentence? It also explains the implications for the study of
cross-linguistic polysemy.
In Chapter 8 I summarise the main findings in this thesis and propose a new
model for the analysis of polysemy. This model is composed of two complementary
parts: (i) 'Conceptual Polysemy' explains the different conceptual mappings that
exist between different domains of experience; (ii) 'Graduable Polysemy' explains
how these conceptual mappings are overtly expressed by lexical items in different
languages. Finally, I point out other areas for further research.
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CHAPTER 2: THE SEMANTIC FIELD OF SENSE
PERCEPTION
Perception verbs have supplied a rich field of research in linguistics:
grammaticalisation (Heine et al., 1991), complementation (Horie 1993) and semantic
change (Sweetser 1990). In this chapter, I analyse the different meanings that
perception verbs can convey in the three different languages under investigation:
English, Basque and Spanish.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.1 describes the
sources of the language material used in this thesis. Section 2.2 focuses on the
prototypical physical meanings in perception verbs; their classification according to
the semantic roles of the arguments that these verbs take and the hierarchies that
have been established in this semantic field. Section 2.3 offers an account of the
different non-prototypical extended meanings that these verbs can convey from a
cross-linguistic point of view. Section 2.4 summarises the results from previous
sections.
2.1. SOURCES OF THE LANGUAGE MATERIAL
The linguistic material used in support and illustration of the discussions in
the various parts of the study belongs to three different sources.
(i) Monolingual and bilingual dictionaries. The dictionaries that I have made
use of when writing this thesis are listed as a particular subgroup in the Bibliography
section. These examples are followed by an abbreviated reference within brackets.
(ii) Corpora of written Basque and Spanish34. Present-day Basque Reference
Corpus (EEBS)33 is the corpus used for Basque. EEBS is made available by the
34
English corpora, although consulted, have not been used as sources of language material. I
decided not to use these corpora because I considered that the dictionaries available provided enough
data to illustrate the main ideas put forward in this thesis. This was not the case in Basque and Spanish
either because there were not enough dictionaries at my disposal or because these dictionaries did not
offer enough examples. Although I am aware that the lack of English corpora may be an important
imbalance in the case of a more quantitative kind of research (for intance, a study of the frequencies in
the use of polysemous senses), it does not affect the results obtained in this case
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Basque Centre for Terminology and Lexicography (UZEI) and the Royal Academy
of the Basque Language (Euskaltzaindia). This corpus contains everything published
in Basque from 1900 to 1995, and it is updated anually. It makes up to a total of
3,553,000 forms. Reference Corpus for Present-day Spanish (CREA36) is the corpus
used for Spanish. CREA is provided by the Institute for Lexicography at the Royal
Academy of the Spanish Language. This corpus contains literary, journalistic,
scientific and technical texts, transcriptions from spoken language and from media
broadcasts. A total of 200 million words. These examples are also followed by an
abbreviated reference within brackets.
(iii) Examples that occur without any bracketed indication of the source have
for the most part been constructed by me, occasionally on the basis of an utterance
that I have seen or heard used. In addition, some of them have been taken from other
linguistic studies, and whenever I can straightforwardly pinpoint the origin of such
specially invented examples, I shall do so either in a note or in the accompanying
text. I have always consulted native speakers concerning the naturalness of these
examples.
Being the result of a dictionary/corpus-based study, the analyses offered
cannot represent one individual's linguistic system. They can only reflect language
use in a given community. Consequently, individual native speaker's intuitions may
deviate from the proposed analyses sometimes. These cases are indicated in the
discussion.
I would also like to point out that the main aim of this study is not to show
how frequent or salient the meanings presented are in each language, but just the fact
that it is possible to infer them. Therefore, I have not included any data on
frequencies.
2.2. PHYSICAL MEANINGS IN PERCEPTION VERBS
2.2.1. SEMANTIC CLASSIFICATIONS OF PERCEPTION VERBS
The semantic field of perception has five components: vision, hearing, touch,
smell and taste. Although the label 'perception' refers to verbs such as see, look,
36
'Corpus de Referencia del Espanol Actual'
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hear, listen, sound, smell, touch, feel and taste among others, as an overall group it is
very important for our analysis to bear in mind that these verbs can be classified in
three different groups according to the semantic role of their subjects.
The first group of verbs is traditionally described as "the receiving of an
expression by the senses independently of the will of the person concerned"
(Poutsma 1926: 341). As for instance example (1) shows:
(1) a. Peter saw the birds37.
b. Peter heard the birds.
c. Peter felt a stone under his foot.
d. Peter smelled cigars in the room.
e. Peter tasted garlic in the food.
In (1), the subject does not consciously control the stimuli; it refers to a state
or inchoative achievement. The process described in each of the verbs used in this set
of examples, namely see, hear, smell, feel, taste, is that of the perception of various
phenomena via the relevant sense organ: eye, ear, skin, nose and mouth (taste buds)
respectively.
This set of verbs is called 'passive perception" (Palmer 1966: 99), 'inner
perception' (Leech 1971: 23), 'cognition'38 (Rogers 1971: 206, 1972: 304), 'stative
with expenencer subject' (Lehrer 1990: 223), and 'experience' (Viberg 1984: 123).
The second group of verbs is those exemplified in (2):
(2) a. Peter looked at the birds.
b. Peter listened to the birds.
c. Peter felt the cloth (/to see how soft it was / ,9).
d. Peter smelled the cigar (/to see if he could smoke it/).
37 The examples in (1), and those in (2) and (4) below, are all taken from Viberg (1984)
38 In his thesis, Rogers (1973) divides this type of verbs into two classes: stative and
inchoative.
39 / /is the test frame.
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e. Peter tasted the food (/to see if he could eat it/).
These verbs are called 'active perception verbs' (Poutsma 1926: 341, Leech
1971: 23; Rogers 1971: 206, 1972: 304), 'active experiencer subject' (Lehrer 1990:
223), and 'active" (Viberg 1984: 123). They refer to an "unbounded process that is
consciously controlled by a human agent" (Viberg 1984: 123).
In order to distinguish between these two groups Gisborne (1996: 1) proposes
the 'deliberately test'. He assumes that those verbs that can occur with the adverb are
to be classified as 'agentive' (active) verbs, whereas those verbs that do not readily
occur with this adverb are examples of involuntary perception.
For instance (from Gisborne 1996: 1),
(3) a. Jane was deliberately listening to the music.
b. *Jane deliberately heard the music.
As the verb listen in (3a) accepts the adverb deliberately, it can be classified
as an agentive verb; while in (3b) the infelicity of this adverb with hear indicates that
it is an experience verb.
The last group is formed by those verbs whose subjects are the stimuli of the
perception as illustrated in (4).
(4) a. Peter looked happy.
b. Peter sounded happy.
c. The cloth felt soft.
d. Peter sme/led good / of cigars.
e. The food tasted good / of garlic.
This group is called 'flip verbs' (Rogers 1971: 206, 1972: 304), 'stimulus
subject' (Lehrer 1990: 223), 'copulative' (Viberg 1984: 123). and 'percept'
(Gisborne 1996:1).
Viberg (1984) establishes the differences between experience and activity
verbs on the one hand and copulative verbs on the other, on the basis of what he calls
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'base selection', i.e. the choice of grammatical subject among the deep semantic case
roles associated with a certain verb In the former case, verbs are 'experiencer-
based'; that is to say the verb takes an animate being with certain mental experience
as a subject. In the latter case, verbs are 'source-based' or 'phenomenon-based', as
the verb takes the experienced entity as a subject.
As seen from the description of each group above, these different types of
perception verbs receive different terms according to different authors40. In this
study, I follow Viberg's terminology for the experiencer-based verbs (i.e. active and
experience) and Gisborne's for the source-based ones (i.e. percept). Therefore the
basic41 paradigm of the verbs of perception in English is shown in Table 2.1.
Sensemodality Experience Activity Percept
Vision See Look Look
Hearing Hear Listen Sound
Touch Feel Touch Touch Feel Feel
Smell Smell Smell Sniff Smell
Taste Taste Taste Taste
Table 2.1: The basic paradigm of verbs of perception in English.
It is important to notice in the verbs presented in Table 2.1 that in cases such
as hearing there is a different verb belonging to this sense perception for each group.
In the other cases however, there are not different lexical items for each group. This
does not imply that the distinction between experience, activity, and percept is less
important in these cases (Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976: 618), but that, as Lehrer
(1990: 223) points out, only one polysemous verb corresponds to the three of them.
These three groups represent the three possible prototypical meanings that
perception verbs can convey. As introduced in Chapter 1, 'prototype' is the typical
40
See Rogers (1973) and Kryk (1979) for a critical survey of such classifications.
41
The verbs presented in this table are by no means the only verbs that can be included in the
semantic field of perception; other verbs such as watch, gaze, observe, notice, hearken, stink, stench,
savour, smack, among others could have been included. However, i have selected only the most
common, neutral, and prototypical perception verbs for English, as well as for Basque and Spanish in
the following section, because they are free from any specific connotations about the way in which the
perceptual act is being carried out.
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member of a category to which other members are related in a motivated way. It is in
this sense that I call these physical meanings prototypical
42
2.2.2. CROSS-LINGUISTIC DATA: BASQUE AND SPANISH
In the previous section it is shown how perception verbs are classified in
three groups according to the semantic role of the subject the verb takes. In Table 2.1
above, the basic paradigm for perception verbs in English is presented. In this
section, I apply this classification to perception verbs in the other two languages
under investigation: Basque and Spanish.
2.2.2.1. Basque Perception Verbs
Table 2.2 shows the basic perception verbs in Basque.
Sensemodality Experience Activity Percept
Vision Ikust Begiratu — (Iruditu)
Hearing Entzun / Aditu Entzun Aditu —
Touch — (Susmatu /
Nabaritu)
Ukitu —
Smell Usatndu Usnatu Usatndu —(Usain eduki erion)
Taste Dastatu (Sumatu
/ Nabaritu)
Dastatu Dastatu (Zapore Gustu
eduki)
Table 2.2: The basic paradigm of verbs of perception in Basque.
These experiencer verbs in Basque are illustrated in (5) below:
(5) a. Pellok txoriak ikust zituen
peter. erg bird,abs.pl see aux
'Peter saw the birds'
Pellok txoriak
peter.ERG bird,abs.pl
'Peter heard the birds'
entzun zituen
hear aux
42 What i call here 'prototypical' meaning has been referred to by other authors as ideal'
meaning (Herskovits 1986), and 'primary nuclear sense' (Austin 1961)
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c. Pellok harri bat sumatu zuen bere
oinpean
peter.ERG stone one perceive
footunder.lNE
AUX his
'Peter felt a stone under his feet'
d. Pellok puruak usaitu zituen gelan
peter.erg cigar,abs.pl smell aux room.lne
'Peter smelled cigars in the room'
e. Pellok baratzuria dastatu zuen jananan
peter.ERG garlic,abs taste
'Peter tasted garlic in the food'
aux food.INE
In the first group of experiencer verbs Basque has a lexical item for every
sense except for the sense of touch, where the verbs sumatu and naharitu are to be
used. These verbs both mean 'to perceive' and 'to notice'. Although both verbs refer
to general perception, it is very interesting to notice that the verb sumatu is related to
the sense of smell. This verb comes from the noun suma, which means 'smell, sense
of smell' (See Chapter 3). According to Viberg's (1983, 1984) lexicalisation
hierarchy in (6) below, a verb having a basic meaning belonging to a sense modality
higher in the hierarchy can get an extended meaning that covers some, or all, of the
sense modalities lower in the hierarchy.
(6) sight > hearing > touch > smell / taste
Based on this hierarchy, languages are classified in respect to the number of
senses that they can lexicalise. For instance, English has the five modalities: see,
hear, feel, taste and smelt, Malay has four: lihat 'vision', dengar 'hearing', rasa
'feel, taste' and hidu 'smell'; Swedish has three se vision', hora 'hearing' and kdnna
'feel, taste, smell'. Basque is included in the group of languages with only three
senses. Although sumatu no longer means 'to smell', the fact that it is derived from
suma 'smell' seems to contradict Viberg's hierarchy at least in the case of Basque.
This is because it is a verb from the sense of smell that is used for the sense of touch,
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which is higher up in the hierarchy. As a consequence, it cannot be included in the
same group of languages as Swedish.
For the group of activity verbs Basque has a complete paradigm as illustrated
in (7) below:
(7) a. Pellok txoriei begiratu zien
peter. ERG bird.DAT.PL look AUX
'Peter looked at the birds'
Pellok txoriei entzun zien43
peter.ERG bird.DAT.PL listen AUX
'Peter listened to the birds'
c. Pellok oihala ukitu zuen
peter.ERG cloth.ABS touch AUX
'Peter felt the cloth (/to see how soft it was/)'
d. Pellok purua usatndu zuen
peter.ERG cigar.abs smell aux
'Peter smelled the cigar (/to see if he could smoke it/)'
e. Pellok janaria dastatu zuen
peter.ERG food.abs taste aux
'Peter tasted the food (/to see if he could eat it/)'
In the case of percept verbs Basque is relatively poor. The sense of taste is the
only one that can be lexicalised by means of a perception verb as example (8.c)
shows. In the other cases it is necessary to use a related verb, e.g. iruditu 'seem', as
41
Although (7,b) is correct in Basque, native speakers feel more comfortable if the noun
kantu 'song' is included as in (7.b'):
(7.b') Pellok txorien kantua entzun zuen
peter.erg bird.gen.pl song.abs listen aux
'Peter listened to the birds' song'
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in vision (8.a); or a perception noun followed by the verb eduki 'to have' as in the
sense of smell (8.b) and also taste44 (8.d), (8.e).
(8) a. Pellok pozik zirudien
peter.ERG happy seemed
'Peter seemed happy'
b. Pellok usam ona / puru usatna zeukan
peter.ERG smell good.ABS / cigar smell.ABS had
'Peter smelled good / smelled of cigars' (lit. Peter had a good
smell / a smell of cigars)
c. Janariak ondo dastatu
food. ERG well taste
'The food tasted good'
zuen
aux
d. Janariak gustu ona zeukan
food.erg taste good.ABS had
'The food had a good taste'
e. Janariak baratzuri
food.ERG garlic





In sum, Basque has a different lexical item for all experiencer perception
verbs but touch. This sense modality is covered by a verb that refers to general
perception instead. Basque has a different lexical item for each activity perception
verb like English, but it lacks percept verbs except for the case of taste.
44
Note that gustu and zapore are borrowings from Romance This is a further indication of
the poverty of Basque in terms of percept verbs.
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2.2.2.2. Spanish Perception Verbs
The basic paradigm of verbs of perception in Spanish is shown in Table 2.3.
Sensemodality Experience Activity Percept
Vision Ver Mirar — (Parecer)
Hearing Olr Escuchar Sonar
Touch Tocar Sentir Tocar — (tener un tacto)
Smell Oler Olfatear Husmear Oler Oler a
Taste — (Notar) — (Probar) Saber a
Table 2 .3: The basic paradigm of verbs of perception in Spanish.
In the group of experiencer verbs Spanish has a verbal lexical item for each
perception45 except for the sense of taste as illustrated in (9). In the sense of taste it is
necessary to use the verb notar 'perceive'.
(9) a. Pedro vid los pajaros
peter saw the birds
'Peter saw the birds'
b. Pedro oyo los pajaros
peter heard the birds
'Peter heard the birds'
Pedro sintio una piedra debajo de su pie
peter felt one stone under of his foot
'Peter felt a stone under his foot'
d. Pedro olio el puro en
peter smelled the cigar in





45 In (9.c) the verb used is sentir 'feel'. The verb sentir in Spanish is the verb that describes
general perception. Although in this example a tactile verb is not possible, as will be shown in the
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e. Pedro nolo el ajo en la comida
peter felt the garlic in the food
'Peter tasted garlic in the food'
The second group of verbs, the activity verbs, has a verbal lexical item for
every sense except for the sense of taste as exemplified in (10). In the sense of taste it
is necessary to use the verb probar 'try'.
(10) a. Pedro mird los pajaros
peter looked the birds
'Peter looked at the birds'
b. Pedro escucho los pajaros
peter listened the birds
'Peter listened to the birds'
c. Pedro toco la tela
peter touched the cloth
'Peter felt the cloth (/to see how soft it was/)'
d. Pedro olio el puro
peter smelled the cigar
'Peter smelled the cigar (/to see if he could smoke it/)'
e. Pedro probo la comida
peter tried the food
'Peter tasted the food (/to see if he could eat it/)'
The last group of percept verbs is possible for hearing, smell and taste. In the
case of vision it is necessary to use the verb parecer 'to seem'; and in both touch and
next section, where the extended meanings of these verbs are analysed, it is possible to use the verb
tocar 'touch' as an experiencer verb, in the sense of'be in contact with'.
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taste the construction 'perception noun + verb tener 'to have" is to be used in order
to express such concepts.
(11) a. Pedro parecia contento
peter seemed happy
'Peter looked happy'
b. Pedro sonaba preocupado40
peter sounded wonried
'Peter sounded worried'
c. La tela tenia un tacto suave
the cloth had a touch soft
'The cloth felt soft'
d. Pedro olia bien / a puro
peter smelled well / to cigar
'Peter smelled good / of cigars'
La comida sabia bien a ajo
the food tasted well / to garlic
'The food tasted good / of garlic'
f. La comida tenia gusto Isabor de ajo
the food had taste of garlic
'The food tasted of garlic'
Although there seem to be no verbs for the sense of taste in Spanish for the
activity and experience cases, this assumption is not accurate. In Spanish there are
two main taste verbs, gustar and saber. As explained in Chapter 3, both verbs come
46 The choice of the complements that accompany the verb sonar in this case is restrictive.
Whereas sentences like Sonaba bien, lit. 'sounded well' are fully idiomatic, others like Sonaba
contento, lit. 'sounded happy' are not accepted by all native speakers It is also possible to lexicalise
this meaning by using the verb tener 'to have' followed by the NP un sonido 'a sound' + adj.
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from Latin. Saber comes from Lat. sapere 'taste' and 'be wise' and the meaning 'to
have a taste' is only preserved in Italian and in the Iberian romances. Gustar comes
from Lat. gustare 'taste'. Although in Middle Spanish it was used as a prototypical
activity verb, nowadays its meaning has shifted to 'to enjoy'. Roque-Barcia (1902)
distinguishes these two verbs on the basis of sensibility. Gustar refers to the action of
the gustative organs, whereas saber refers to the pleasure or pain that we feel when
we are tasting, i.e. saber is related to sensibility. Gustar seems to be a condition to
saber, because without gustar something, one cannot saborear it.
Summarising, in the case of experiencer and activity verbs, Spanish has a
verbal lexical item for each sense perception except for the sense of taste. In respect
to percept verbs, there are different verbal lexical items for hearing, smell, and touch
only.
2.2.3. SUMMARY
In this section the main prototypical physical meanings of the verbs in the
semantic field of perception in Basque, English and Spanish have been established.
Following Viberg's (1984) and Gisborne's (1996) classification of perception verbs
on the basis of the semantic role of their subjects, perception verbs are divided into
three groups: experience, activity and percept. In the following section the non-
prototypical meanings of these verbs in these three languages are presented.
2.3. NON-PROTOTYPICAL MEANINGS IN PERCEPTION
VERBS
In this section I analyse the non-prototypical meanings in perception verbs in
Basque, English and Spanish. Non-prototypical meanings are all those extended
meanings, both physical and metaphorical, that these verbs can convey apart from
the central prototypical meaning of physical perception as explained in Section 2.2.
In this analysis, I focus on activity and experience verbs only. I do not include
percept verbs because, unlike in English, they are relatively poor in Spanish and
almost non-existant in Basque. Whereas activity and experience verbs have verbal
lexical items for almost every sense in the three languages, (see in Section 2.2.2),
percept verbs are mostly lexicalised either by a peception noun followed by a verb,
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or by a non-perception verb. In order to avoid any possible imbalance that this lack
of percept verbs may have caused in the results of the analysis, I leave them outside
this study.
It is important to point out that in the following sections I do not consider
some of the more complex uses of perception verbs with different types of
complementation47. In other words, I do not study the functional dependency
between different syntactic types of complements and the entities that they encode in
each case. Entities refer to the different levels of abstraction involved when we
categorise the structure of the world. These different levels have been given a variety
of names in the literature. Vendler (1967, 1970) distinguishes between 'objects',
'events', and 'propositions'. Lyons (1977) between 'first', 'second' and 'third order'
entities. Hone (1993) between 'objects', 'directly perceived events', and 'indirectly
perceived events'. Dik and Hengeveld (1991) between the 'immediate perception of
an individual', the 'immediate perception of a state-of-affairs', the 'mental
perception of propositional content', and the 'reception of the propositional content
of a speech act'.
Studies48 have shown that there is a correlation between the type of syntactic
complement the perception verb takes and the entity encoded in each case. That is to
say, it seems that there is a relationship between the systematic meaning extensions
of perception verbs in the cognitive domain with the type of complement they take.
Observe the following examples:
(12) John saw the car
(13) John saw Mary crossing the street
(14) John saw that Mary crossed the street
In (12) the complement is the noun phrase the car which corresponds to what
Lyons' calls 'first order entity', a physical object. In (12) we understand that John
physically perceived a car with his eyes. In (13) the complement is a non-finite
47 See Noonan (1985) for more information about complementation. I would like to thank
Keith Mitchell for showing me how interesting perception verb complements can be.
57
B. Iraide Ibarretxe Antunano Chapter 2: The Semantic Field ofSense Perception
sentence, the gerund crossing the street. The meaning is still perceptual: John
physically perceived with his eyes an event, i.e. Mary crossing the street. This
complement corresponds to the 'second order entities'. The complement in (14) is a
finite clause. In this case the meaning of the sentence is not perceptual; John did not
see Mary walking from one side of the street to the other. What John saw is that
Mary was already on the other side and he deduced that she had crossed the street. In
other words, the verb to see does not encode the acquisition of sense data through the
eyes, but the mental manipulation of an information gathered by the eyes. Therefore,
there is a semantic extension from perception to cognition.
The systematic relationship between the semantics and the syntax of
perception verb complements has been discussed in a number of studies in respect to
several languages (see references above). This area, however, falls beyond the scope
of the present thesis, which is focused on a semantic description of perception verbs.
For each sense, first of all I discuss those extended meanings that are cross-
linguistic, and then I mention other extended meanings particular to each language
under investigation.
2.3.1. VISION
Vision is by far the most studied sense of the five. The semantic field of sight
has been analysed not only from the point of view of polysemy (Bauer 1949; Prevot
1935; Garcia Hernandez 1976; Alm-Arvius 1993) but also from the language
acquisition perspective (Landau and Gleitman 1985; C. Johnson 1999). In this
section I present a summary of the main extended meanings that vision verbs convey
cross-linguistically and in Basque, English and Spanish in particular.
The verbs used for the following analysis are see and look in English, tkust
and begtratu in Basque, and ver and mtrar in Spanish.
Due to the vast number of extended meanings possible in this sense I have
organised them into 4 groups. The first group of extended meanings is that which
relates physical vision with the intellect or mental activity. Within this group, the
48
See Caplan (1973), Bolinger (1974), Cooper (1974 a,b), Kirsner and Thompson (1976),
Declerk (1981), Vlach (1983), Dik and Hengeveld (1991), Horie (1993), Monnich (Ms ), Schule
(Ms ), among many others.
58
B. Iraide Ibarretxe Antuhano Chapter 2: Ihe Semantic Field ofSense Perception
following meanings 'to understand', 'to foresee', 'to visualise', 'to regard', 'to
imagine', 'to revise', and 'to meditate' are included.
The meaning 'to understand' is illustrated in (15), (16) and (17) below:
(15) I explained the problem but he could not see it (COL)
(16) Orduan(nik) ez nuen ikust (berak)zer esan
nahi zuen
then I.ERG NEG AUX see he.ERG what say
want aux.cOMP
'I didn't see at the time what he wanted to say' (elh)
(17) Es una manera apresurada de ver las
cosas
is a way hasty of see the
things
it's a very hasty way to see things' (CREA)
Another meaning belonging to this group is "to foresee' as in (18), (19) and
(20).
(18) I can see what will happen if you don't help (COL)
(19) Peiori gertatu zaiona aurretik ikusi nuen nik
peter.dat happen aux.rel.abs before.abl see aux I.erg
i already foresaw what has happened to Peter'
(20) Estoy viendo que mi hermano llega sin avisar
am seeing comp my brother arrives without notify
'I can see he is going to come without letting us know' (RAE)
In these three examples we foresee what is going to happen before it actually
takes place. In the case of Basque, it is necessary to add the word aurretik before' in
order to infer this meaning. Otherwise the verb takes the physical meaning "to
witness'.
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Another meaning in this group is 'to imagine', and 'to visualise'. In this case,
what we see in our imagination is something that has not taken place yet.
(21) I can't see him as a teacher (am)
(22) Esta chica ya se ve estrella de
cine
this girl already she.REFL sees star of
cinema
'This girl already imagines herself a film star' (lar)
(23) (Guk) Geure buruak galdurik ikusi genituen
we.erg our head.abs.pl lost see aux
'We saw ourselves lost' (is)
Another meaning in this group is 'to consider', 'to regard', and 'to judge' as
in (24), (25) and (26).
(24) Many saw her as a world leader (am)
(25) Nola ikusten duzu gure arazoa?
how see.HAB aux our problem.ABS
'How do you see our problem?' (ELH)
(26) No le veo nada malo
NEG he.DAT see.I.sg nothing bad
'I can't see anything wrong with it' (OSD)
Finally, the last meaning in this group is 'to revise', and 'to study'
(27) I have to see how I fix it (OSD)
(28) Zuk ekarntako dokumentuak ikusten
you.erg bring.rel document.abs.pl see.hab
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(29) No vimos ese tema en clase
NEC saw 1. PI. that topic in class
'We didn't look at that topic in class' (OSD)
The second group is the one that relates vision to social relationships. This
group includes meanings such as 'to meet', 'to pay a visit', 'to receive', 'to get on
badly', 'to go out with' and 'to accompany', 'to escort' (only English).
The first meaning is 'to meet'. In (30), (31) and (32), what is implied is that
these people are not only going to see each other, but that they have made an
appointment.
(30) I'll see you at seven (OSD)
(31) (Nik zu) Zazpietan ikusiko zaitut tabernan
I.ERG. you.ABS seven.INE.PL see.FUT AlTX pub.lNE
'I'll see you in the pub at seven'
(32) Se veian un par de veces al mes
they.REC saw.3.PL a couple of times to.the month
'They used to see each other a couple of times a month' (OSD)
'To visit' is another meaning that can be included in this group. In (33)
because the person we are going to visit is a solicitor, it is also implied that we are
seeking some advice or that we have some business with him. In the other two cases,
(34) and (35), this connotation is not implied.
(33) I'm going to see my solicitor now (COL)
(34) (Ni) Gaixo nentzan eta (zuek) ikust ninduzuen
I.abs sick was and you.erg.Pi. see aux
T was sick and you came to see me' (is)
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(35) Todavi'a no he ido a ver a la
abuela
still NEG have. l.SG gone to see to the
grandmother
'I still haven't been to see grandmother' (OSD)
In the examples below see means 'to receive'. This meaning is inferred when
the subject of the sentence is a person who usually does not visit other people, but a
person who is visited in order to get advice, to have an interview and so on. A person
like a doctor49 in the examples below, or the president, or the director.
(36) The doctor will see you now (AM)
(37) Medikuak orain ikusiko zaitu
doctor.ERG now see.FUT AUX
'The doctor will see you now'
(38) El doctor lo vera ahora
the doctor he.ACC see.FUT now
'The doctor will see you now' (OSD)
Another meaning is this group is 'to go out with'. In this case it is necessary
to give a time frame for indicating a durative period of time.
(39) They have been seeing each other for a year (amgd)
(40) (Haiek) Ihaz hasi ziren elkar ikusten
they.ABS lastyear start AUX RFC see.HAB
'They started to see each other last year'
49
Doctors do visit their patients, but in these examples it is implied that the patient goes to
the practice.
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(41) Se ven desde hace un ano
they.RKC see.3 PL since made a year
'They have been seeing each other for a year'
Another meaning is 'to get on badly' as in (42), (43) and (44). In this case it
is necessary to have a negative construction in order to indicate that the people
involved do not get on well.
(42) They can't see each other
(43) (Haiek) Ezin dute elkar ikusi
they.ERG cannot AUX REFL see
'They can't see each other'
(44) No se pueden ni ver
NEG REG can.3.PL not.even see
'They can't see each other'
A third group of meanings is that which links vision to reliability, and
assurance. Meanings such as 'to ascertain, to find out' as in (45), (46) and (47), 'to
make sure' as in (48), (49) and (50) and 'to take care' as in (51), (52) and (53) are
included in this group.
(45) Please see who's knocking (am)
(46) (Hark) Mendiaren gailurrera iritsita behean
zegoen hern hura ikusi zuen
he.ERG mountain.GEN top.ALL. arrive.PAR down.LNE
was.REL town that.ABS see AUX
'When he reached the top of the mountain he discovered the town
that was down there' (elh)
(47) Mira a ver quien llama a la puerta
look to see who calls to the door
'See who's at the door'
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Another meaning included in this group is 'to make sure'.
(48) See that it gets done right away (am)
(49) Mtra que los ninos hagan los deberes
look COMP the children do.sUBJ the homeworks
'See that the children do their homework'
Finally the meaning 'to take care' is also included in this group.
(50) He looked after his younger brother (am)
(51) Begtra iezadazu umea kanpoan nagoen
bitartean
look AUX.IMP child.ABS outside.INE am.COMP
while
'Look after the child while I'm away' (is)
(52) Mira por ti misma,los demas que se las
arreglen
look for you.dat refl the others that they.refl the
Fix.subj.3pl
'Just take care of yourself, and let the others sort out their own
problems' (osd)
Another meaning possible in vision verbs is 'to witness'. In this meaning the
emphasis is on the person that is looking. This acts as a 'passive witness' of the
events that happen, i.e. they do not personally take part in what is going on.
(53) He has seen much unhappiness in this life31 (COL)
50 In some Southern English dialects, saw can be used in this example as in He saw to his
younger brother (Cann p.c.).
51 This example can have another interpretation as well. The subject can be a 'passive
witness' that sees all this unhappiness as an observer, but on the other hand, the subject can be an
'active witness' who has experienced this unhappiness in his own Fesh (See (60) and (61) below).
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(54) Vieron confirmadas sus sospechas
saw. 3. PI, confirmed.PL their suspicions
'They saw their suspicions confirmed' (OSD)
Another possible meaning is 'to refer to' as in the examples below:
(55) Persons interested in the book's history should see page one of the
preface (am)
(56) Vease el capitulo siguiente
see.lMP.REFL the chapter next
'See the following chapter' (lar)
(57) (Zuri) Gai hori gustatzen bazaizu, liburu hau
ikust behar duzu
you.DAT topic this like.HAB if.AUX book this
see must AUX
'If you like this topic, you should see this book'
Apart from the cross-linguistic extended meanings just revised, each language
has developed further meanings. For instance, in English, it is possible to say (58)
with the meaning 'to escort': where the person is accompanying Nellie to her house.
(58) I'm seeing Nellie home (am)
In (59), there is another possible meaning in English 'to bring', and 'to last'"2.
(59) $500 should see you to the end of the month (OSD)
In Basque, the verb ikusi 'to see' can have the meaning "to suffer01 as in (60).
52 In a way this meaning can be derived from the one before, as this can be interpreted as
meaning the money should accompany this person for a month
53 This meaning is somehow similar to (53) discussed above In this case, as in one of the
interpretations in English, the subject is not only a witness of the suffering, but he experiences them in
his own flesh. This is what 1 have previously called 'active witness'
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(60) (Hark) Istilu gorriak ikust zituen
he.erg difficulty red.abs.pl see aux
'He suffered a great deal' (ELH)
It can be argued that the meaning 'to suffer' in (60) is carried out by the direct
object istilu gorriak, not only in the word istiluak "difficulties', but also in the word
gorrt 'red', which metaphorically means 'terrible, awful, extreme' in Basque"4.
However, as seen in (61) it is possible to infer this meaning without having it implied
in any other word in the sentence.
(61) Neureak tkusita nago
mine.ABS.PL see.PAR am
"I've suffered a lot' (ar)
Finally, in Spanish we have the meaning 'to be involved', and 'to be related'
as in (62)55.
(62) Y Schneider, ^que tenia que ver con la
obra?
and scheider what had. 3. so COMP see with the
play
'And what did Scheider have to do with the play?' (CORDE)
In this section I have analysed the related and non-related extended meanings
of vision in English, Basque and Spanish. These are summarised in Table 2.4.
54 See Perurena (1992) and Frank and Susperregi (1999) for more information about the
Basque colour system.
55 In Basque, it is also possible to have sentences like (1), but the meaning is more 'to be
related' than 'to be involved' as in Spanish,
(1) Honek ez du horrekin zer ikusirik
this ERG NEC AUX that.COM what see.PART
'This has nothing to do with that' (is)
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Meaning English Basque Spanish
Intellection group 'to understand' V V V
'to foresee' V < V
'to imagine', 'to visualise' V V V
'to consider', 'to regard',
'to judge'
V V V
'to revise', 'to study' V V V
Social group 'to meet' V V V
'to visit' V V V
'to receive' V V V
'to go out with' V V V
'to get on badly' V V V
Assurance group 'to ascertain', 'to find out' V V V
'to make sure' V V V
'to take care' V V V
'to witness' V V V
'to refer to' V V V
'to escort' V
'to bring', 'to last' V
'to suffer' V
'to be involved' V
Table 2.4: Extended meanings in vision in English, Basque and Spanish.
2.3.2. HEARING
Hearing is said to be the sense of linguistic communication and in fact in all
the meanings, both concrete and abstract, it seems to be so. There are always two
elements involved in this sense: the hearer and the speaker. The latter could be a
person or an object, known or unknown, but the fact is that it is always present.
The verbs analysed in this sense are hear and listen in English, entzun and
aditu in Basque, and olr and escuchar in Spanish.
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One of the extended meanings found cross-linguistically is 'to heed, to pay
attention'56 as in (63), (64) and (65).
(63) Listen to what I'm telling you
(64) Entzun esaten ari natzaizuna
hear say.HAB be. busy AUX
'Listen to what I'm telling you'
(65) Escucha lo que te estoy diciendo
listen.IMP it.ACC that you.DAT am saying
'Listen to what I'm telling you'
In these three examples the person that utters the sentence is demanding
attention from the hearer. A further development of this meaning is that in some
contexts the speaker does not only demand attention, but also that the hearer does
what he is telling him to do. In these cases hearing verbs come to mean 'to obey'57 as
illustrated in (66), (67) and (68).
(66) I told you to listen to your mother
(67) Seme batak ez eukan entzumk
son one.ERG NEG had listen.PART
'One of the sons was not obedient' (AR)
(68) Te he dicho que escuches a tu madre
you.DAI' have said COMP listen to your mother
'I told you to listen to your mother'
The condition of hearing as an interpersonal relation is said to have caused
the semantic shifts that the sense has undergone. In a way it makes sense and in the
56
A development of this meaning is the special use of these verbs as 'to attend a lecture, a
sermon, a play, a musical performance...' In these cases the hearer is a member of an audience. It is
very interesting to see that in Basque the meaning 'to hear mass' is lexicalised with a vision verb ikusi
'to see' instead.
57
In Chapter 3 the etymological relation between hearing and obey is discussed
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case of the shift, hear-»heed—»obey, it is true. The verbs of hearing in themselves do
CO
not mean 'obey' or 'pay attention'. It is in the context of a conversation, hence
interpersonal relation, that they acquire that meaning. Expressions like in Sp Hacerse
el sordo, Bq gor egin, Fr faire le sourd 'pretend not to hear', or Eng be deaf to a
plea, Sp Hacer oldos sordos clearly show this interpersonal quality of the sense of
hearing and also its metaphorical connections.
Another extended meaning of these verbs is 'to be told', 'to be informed' as
illustrated in (69), (70) and (71). This type of meaning has interesting implications
for the study of evidentials. Evidential are generally said to participate in the
expression of the speaker's attitude towards the situation his / her utterance
describes. Sense perception verbs are a common cross-linguistic source for
evidentials (see Willett 1988). Hearing verbs provide two kinds of evidence:
'attached', when the source of the speaker's information is of a primary source; and
'indirect reported', when the source is of secondary origin, i.e. hearsay. This
extended meaning will fit into the latter type59.
(69) I heard that you are going to Scotland
(70) Eskoziara joango zarela entzun dut
Scotland.all go.FUT aux.comp hear aux
'I heard that you are going to Scotland'
(71) He oldo que vas a Escocia
have hear.par comp go.2.so to Scotland
'1 heard that you are going to Scotland'
Finally, another extended meaning is 'to understand'.
(72) If I have heard well, you want to say that there is no solution
58
Except Dan lystre 'obey'.
59 For more information on evidentially, see Chafe and Nichols (1986).
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(73) Ondo entzun badizut, zuk esan nahi duzu
irtenbiderik ez dagoela.
well hear if.aux you.ERG say want aux
solution.part NEG is.comp
'If I have heard well, you want to say that there is no solution'
(74) Si le he oido bien, usted quiere
decir que no hay solucion
if you.dat have hear.par well you want
say comp neg exists solution
'If I have heard well, you want to say that there is no solution'
Apart from these cross-linguistic meanings, in Basque the hearing verb aditu
can also be used for the identification of smells as in (75).
(75) Kiratsa aditzen duzu
stink.ABS hear.HAB aux
'You smell a bad odour' (ar)
Another two extended meanings are possible in Basque if the heanng verb is
nominalised. One meaning is 'to be educated' as in (76) and the other is 'to have a
pact or agreement' as in (77).
(76) (Bera) Izketan aditua da
he.abs talk.lNE hear.abs aux
'He is a learned speaker' (ar)
(77) Jende hauk badute oraino,..., aditu edo
patu bat
people these.ERG already.aux now hear or
pact one
'These people already have an agreement' (ar)
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In this section, I have analysed the related and non-related extended meanings
of hearing in English, Basque and Spanish. These are summarised in Table 2.5.
Meanings English Basque Spanish
'to heed', 'to pay attention' V V V
'to obey' V V V
'to be told', 'to be informed' V V V
'to understand' V V V
'to be educated' V
'to have an agreement' V
Table 2.5: Extended meanings in hearing in English, Basque and Spanish.
2.3.3. TOUCH
The sense of touch has always been related to the field of emotions.
Expressions such as I'm deeply touched or touching words are widely used in
English. Already in 1921 Hans Kurath classified sense perception in respect to
emotions and stated how "the kinaesthetic, the visceral, and the tactual perceptions
have a relatively stronger tone than those of hearing and especially of sight, the taste-
smell perceptions taking a middle ground'" (p.39). Kurath explained this transfer of
meaning from sense perception to emotion on the basis of the similarity of feeling
that both domains share. This connection finds its explanation in the etymology as
well. Buck (1949:1062) points out that the general word in West Germanic languages
for 'feel of and for 'feel' as in 'perceive by touch' refers not only to the physical
perception but also to the emotions, even in the earliest periods of the language.
However, if we review the different meanings that tactile verbs can convey, it is
found that these verbs not only map onto the field of emotions but onto other
semantic fields as well.
The verbs used in this case are touch60 in English, ukitu6' in Basque, and
tocar in Spanish.
60 In English there are two verbal realisations of the sense of touch: to touch and to feel.
Although the verb to feel is etymologically a tactile verb (see discussion in 3.3) and it can be used as a
tactile activity and experience verb (see Section 2 2 1), it is also the verb of general physical
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In the first instance there are two62 physical extended meanings found in the
three languages. One meaning is 'to partake of food or drink' as in (78), (79) and
(80).
(78) John hardly touched the food
(79) Jonek ez du ia janaria ikutu
john.ERG NEG AUX hardly food.ABS touch
'John hardly touched the food'
(80) Juan no ha tocado apenas la comida
john NEG has touched hardly the food
'John hardly touched the food'
In these three examples we learn that John did not eat much of his food, so in
these cases, the meaning is 'to partake of food'. If we change the direct object food
for drink, then the meaning will be 'to partake of drink' instead. As argued in
Chapter 7, in the development of polysemous senses of a word it is very important to
understand that in some cases, the polysemy is due both to one of the words of the
sentence, in this case the verb, and to the meaning of the other arguments that the
verb takes.
It has been suggested (Barcelona p.c.) that instead of having the meaning 'to
partake of food or drink', which is too specific, it would be better to propose a more
general meaning like 'to partake of something'. That would cover not only sentences
like .John hardly touched the food, but also examples like I didn 7 touch a penny from
your money. Although this proposal is sensible to some extent, I have decided to
reject it and keep the former meaning for two reasons. First, because several
perception (cf. Lat sentire 'to perceive by the senses' and its Romance cognates). This 'double'
function of the verb to feel creates a problem in the analysis of its extended meanings, namely, to
decide which extended meanings are derived from which use (as a tactile verb or as a verb of general
physical sensation). In order to void this problem I have decided to include in this analysis only the
verb to touch, which is a more specific tactile verb.
61 IJkitu is the verb used in Standard Basque. In some of the examples discussed in this
section, the verb ikutu is also used. This is a variant in the Guipuzcoan and Biscayan dialects
62 Another extended physical meaning is 'to be adjacent to' as in The two houses touch, but
as this is an extended percept meaning it will not be included here.
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dictionaries I have consulted (cf. AMGD, AM, COL) contain this entry as a separate
one. Second, because I do not think these two sentences imply exactly the same
meaning. In my opinion, the inferences resulting from the two examples are
different. A sentence like John hardly touched the food can only make reference to
one action 'to eat' (or 'to drink' if we change the direct object for a drink), and the
verb to touch can be replaced by the verb to taste. In the second sentence, the verb to
touch is not related to the meaning 'to eat' (or 'to drink') and therefore, this
substitution for to taste is not possible. Here the meaning refers more to the fact that I
have not taken any money from that person, where 'taken' can be understood as the
'physical action of grabbing sth.', but also as 'to steal' it. Although not everybody
would comply with my intuitions, I think it will be safer for the time being to keep
the entry provided by the dictionaries rather than to propose a more general one.
Another physical meaning is 'to affect' as in (81), (82) and (83).
(81) Just don't touch anything in my room (am)
(82) Nork ukitu nau, nork ukttu ditu nire
soinekoak?
who.ERG touch AUX who.ERG touch AUX my
dress.abs.pi.
'Who touched me, who touched my dresses?' (is)
(83) i Quien ha tocado mis vestidos9
Who has touched my dresses
'Who touched my dresses?'
These three examples imply that not only has physical contact occurred, but
there has also been a change of state. In (81), the person who utters this sentence
does not want the other person to change anything in his/her room, whereas in both
(82) and (83), the person is asking about the person who did change the position of
the dresses from the place they were before. This meaning, which I term 'to affect",
has also a metaphorical extension as we shall see below.
73
B. Iraide Ibcirretxe Antuhano Chapter 2: The Semantic Field ofSense Perception
As far as metaphorical meanings are concerned there are four meanings 'to
affect', 'to reach' and 'to deal with'.
We have already seen that 'to affect' can be understood physically as in (81),
(82) and (83), but it also has a metaphorical interpretation as in the examples below.
(84) An appeal that touches us deeply (am)
(85) Edertasunak ukttu du azkenean Inakiren bihotz
gogorra
beauty.ERG touch AUX end.lNE inaki.GEN heart
strong.ABS
'In the end, beauty changed Inaki's hard feelings' (IS)
(86) Juan le toco el corazon a Maria
john she.DAT touched the heart to mary
'John touched Mary's heart' (CSE)
In these examples what is affected is the emotional side of the person in
question. In (84) the appeal was very emotive to us; we could not remain with the
same feelings or ideas that we had before hearing it. In (85) Inaki's feelings are
changed too, as a result of the beauty that he saw in a person or thing. Finally in (86)
John also affected, i.e. changed, Mary's feelings63. Although the emotional
perspective of touch has been seen as an independent metaphorical mapping
(Sweetser 1990: 37/43), I would like to include it as part of this wider meaning
domain 'to affect'. There are other examples in these languages where we have the
same 'contact-to-effect' chain and that can also be included under this label. For
instance, in Basque there is the expression ardoa ukitu, lit. 'touch wine', which
means that the wine is spoilt and can no longer be drunk. In Spanish, when a person
wins the lottery it is very common to say Me toco la loterla, lit. 'the lottery touched
me', in which case the lottery is the agent that provokes the change in me, that is to
say I became rich.
63 In this example, we have a further metaphor in the case of heart. According to Lakoff and
Johnson's (1980) theory, heart is not a physical object, but a metaphorical realisation of the image
schema of a container, where HEART is A CONTAINER FOR FEELINGS.
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Following recent theoretical developments in the Cognitive Semantics
framework (Radden, in press; Barcelona, in press b; among others), it could be
argued that this metaphorical extensions touch -> affect (non-physically) has a
metonymic basis. This metaphor64 could be based on the metonymic understanding
of caused physical change (i.e. affect) as touching, which is added to the
metaphorical mapping abstract change is as physical change. The possibility of
explaining not only this semantic extension but also a few others in this chapter65 by
means of metonymy, is an interesting alternative that I will not be able to pursue in
this thesis for two reasons. First, the fact that metonymy is not a clear-cut concept yet
in Cognitive Semantics. Most cognitive linguists view metonymy as the mapping
that takes place within the same conceptual domain, but there is still disagreement on
its referential character and on the domains which could be the target of these
metonymic mappings (see Barcelona, in press c). Second, the fact that many of these
studies were not available in press at the time when I was developing this thesis.
However, I would like to point out that the metonymic basis of perception
metaphors, as well as the relationship between metonymy as a cognitive device and
the theoretical hypothesis put forward in the following chapters, are areas that I
would like to investigate in future research.
Another meaning is 'to reach' as in (87), (88) and (89) below
(87) He touched the high point in his career. (col)
(88) 1685etik aurrera agintearen gailurra ukitu zuena
1685.ABL forward mandate.GEN top.ABS touch aux.who
'He who reached the top of his mandate from 1685 onwards' (IS)
b4 This kind of metaphor is what Radden (in press) calls a 'metonymy-based metaphor', i.e.
"a mapping involving two conceptual domains which are grounded in, or can be traced back to, one
conceptual domain".
65
For instance, the semantic extension vision -> social relationship could be explained
by the metonymy effect (see) for cause (visit, meet, receive. ..); or for the case of hear -> obey
the metonymic basis could be precondition (hearing) for result (obeying) I would like to express
my gratitude to Antonio Barcelona for introducing me to this model and for suggesting all these
possible metonymies.
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(89) Ha tocado el punto mas alto de su carrera
has touched the point most high of his career
'He has reaches the peak of his career' (OSD)
These three examples imply that there is a point, an aim to be reached or that
the moment to do something or end-point has arrived. In (87), (88) and (89), this
end-point is the success66 achieved in a career. In other cases, as in (90), the end-
point is spatial.
(90) The ship touches at Tenenfe (COL)
In (90) the ship has arrived at her destination, at the dock. In English the fact
that the ship is going to stay in the dock for a brief period of time is also implied.
However this is not the case in Spanish.
(91) El barco toco puerto ayer
the ship touched port yesterday
'The ship arrived yesterday'
In (91), the information we are given is simply that the ship arrived, but not
about the length of time it will stay.
In Spanish there is further usage of this meaning "to reach". What (92) implies
is that the time to pay has come. This usage is very interesting because it is
etymologically related to the onomatopoeic origin of the verb tocar, as we shall see
in Chapter 3. In old times the tolling of the bells used to announce events in villages.
Still in current times one can hear the church bells calling people to prayer. In
Spanish this is referred to as tocar a misa, lit. 'touch to mass'. In this example the
end point is temporal.
(92) Tocan a pagar
touch. 3.PL to pay
'It is time to pay' (RAE)
66 This positive interpretation is explained in Lakoff and Johnson (1980). (87) and (88) are
examples of what they call 'orientationaT metaphors: "metaphorical concept that organises a whole
system of concepts with respect to one another" (1980:15). Up is always related to good, high status
and it is opposed to ixjwn, which implies bad, low status; as in the expression to touch bottom
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These meanings are very iconic and could be represented in a diagram as
shown in Figure 2.1:
t (87), (88), (89) up=good
—> —»• (90), (91) dock=spatial
(92) temporal
i y bottom=bad
Figure 2.1: Representation of the meaning 'to reach'.
Another metaphorical meaning in the sense of touch is 'to deal with' as in
(93), (94) and (95).
(93) I wouldn't touch that business (am)
(94) Nik ez nuke gai hori ikutuko
I. ERG NEG AUX topic that touch. PUT
'I wouldn't touch that topic'
(95) Yo no tocari'a ese tema
I NEG touched. IRR that topic
T wouldn't touch that topic'
The examples above can be paraphrased as 'I wouldn't get involved in that
business / topic'. This meaning can be modified by the inclusion of an adverbial
expression as many limes, for a long time, in which case the meaning would be 'to
know by experience' as in (96) and (97) below. It could also mean 'to deal with
superficially', if a word like barely or the preposition on in English is inserted as in
(98)67.
67 In Chapter 7 I will discuss how the inclusion or exclusion of a lexical item affects the
meaning of the sentence in which it occurs in much greater detail.
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(96) (Nik) Unibertsitate-gaia luzaz ukitu dut
I.ERG university-topic.abs long touch aux
'I have dealt with university matters for a long time' (is)
(97) Ya he tocado ese tema varias veces
already have touched that topic several times
'I have already touched that topic several times'
(98) He barely touched on the incident in his speech (amgd)
The meanings analysed above are those that occur cross-linguistically in
Basque, English and Spanish. However, there are other meanings that are only
specific to each of these languages. For example, in English we have (99), which
means To ask for a loan'.
(99) Touch a friend for five dollars (am)
/TO
In Basque using the verb haztatu 'to touch', it is possible to infer the
meaning 'to consider, to weigh up' as in (100).
(100) (Guk) Hazta ditzagun arrazoiak
gu.ERG touch AUX reason.ABS.PL
'Let's consider the reasons' (elh)
Finally, in Spanish we have the meanings 'to correspond'69 as in (101), 'to be
a relative' as in (102), and using the verb tentar the meaning 'to persuade, to
stimulate, to inspire'70 as in (103).
68 Haztatu is more common in the northern dialects (see etymology Chapter 3)
h9 In Basque I found one example (2) with this meaning as well. However, this meaning is
usually expressed with the verb egon 'to be (stative)' in the dative as in (3):
(2) Jangoikoari ukitzen zaizkion gauzak
god.DAT touch.HAB AUX thing.ABS.PL
'The things that correspond to God' (is)
(3) Zuri dagokizu egitea
you.DAT is.DAT make.ABS
'It is your turn to do it'
0 This meaning is also possible with tocar as in (4):
(4) Le toco Dios en el corazon
him.DAT touched god in the heart
'God inspired his heart' (RAH)
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(101) Te toca un pedazo de tarta
you DAT touch a piece of cake
"There is a piece of cake for you'
(102) No se si le toca algo tu
cunado
NEG know.l.SG if he.DAT touches something your
brother-in-law
"I don't know if he is a relative of your brother-in-law' (mm)
(103) El diablo tento a Jesus en el desierto
the devil tempted to jesus in the desert
'The devil tempted Jesus in the desert'
The verb tentar is more widely used in this sense of 'to tempt' rather than in
the physical touch sense, however, this physical meaning is kept in expressions such
as ir a tientas 'to feel one's way', which is derived from this verb.
In this section, I have analysed the related and non-related extended meanings
of the sense of touch in English, Basque and Spanish. These are summarised in Table
2.6.
Meanings English Basque Spanish
'to partake of food' V V
/
V
'to affect' V V i\
'to reach' V V V
'to deal with' V V V
'to ask for a loan' V
'to consider', 'to weigh' V
'to correspond' \
'to persuade', 'to stimulate' \
'to be a relative' \
Table 2.6: Extended meanings in touch in English, Basque and Spanish.
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2.3.4. SMELL
The sense of smell is generally considered a weaker source domain for
metaphorical meanings in comparison with the other senses (Caplan 1973; Viberg
1984; Sweetser 1990). Although the sense of smell in human beings is not as
developed as other senses such as vision, Ibarretxe-Antunano (1997, 1999a, 1999b)
has shown that this sense does have several extended meanings. In this section these
meanings are analysed. The verbs71 used in this analysis are smell and sniff in
English, usaindu, usnatu72 and usmatu in Basque, and oler, olfatear and husmear in
Spanish.
In the first instance there is one physical extended meaning in the three
languages, i.e. To trail something', illustrated in (104), (105) and (106).
(104) The dog was sniffing the ground looking for the hare
(105) Txakurra usnaka zebilen erbiaren
dog.ABS smelling was hare.GEN
'The dog was sniffing around looking for the hare'
(106) El perro estaba olfateando el suelo
busca de la liebre
the dog was smelling the ground
search of the hare
'The dog was sniffing the ground looking for the hare'
In these examples the meaning of the verb of smell is still physical: the dog






In this study I only focus on verbs denoting neutral perception. Consequently verbs like
Eng stink and stench (as well as their equivalent words in the other languages, Bq ufaztu, kiraztu; Sp
apestar, + heder) are not included, despite the fact that in earlier stages of the language, they were
used for indicating neutral smell (see for instance OE stinc)
72 This verb is more widely used in the Northern dialects.
80
B. Iraide Ibarretxe Antuhano Chapter 2: The Semantic Field of Sense Perception
Apart from this physical meaning, smell verbs can have additional
metaphorical senses. For instance smell can also mean 'to suspect' as in (107) and 'to
guess, to sense something intuitively' as in (108):
(107) Things... wouldn't always get past the sharp-eyed QC. If a case smelt,
he would smell it (OED-1973)
(108) Mary can smell trouble a mile off (OSD)
In (103) smell is used in two different ways. The meaning of the former is
used as the indication of bad characteristics. It can be easily replaced by the verb
stink. The second smell is the one that interests us because it means 'to suspect'.
(107) could be paraphrased as 'if there was something wrong in the case, the QC
would suspect it'. It has been suggested that the second smell could be paraphrased
as 'to know' instead of 'to suspect'. Although it is true that there is a great deal of
variability in the interpretation of this example, it is important to take into account
that the information that we get when we use our sense of smell is not as reliable as
that we have if we use another sense, such as vision. In (107) the QC did not know
for sure that there was something wrong with the case and that is why the verb smell
is used instead of see, in which case the sentence would not offer any doubt in
respect of its meaning.
The meaning of (108) is rather different from (107). What it says is not that
Mary suspects that there is going to be trouble, but that in case there was, she would
sense it, she would guess it beforehand. Although sometimes guess and suspect can
be taken as synonyms, in these two examples they appear to be different. Suspect
always carries a negative meaning. If we suspect something or somebody, there are
always negative connotations implied. This is not the case with guess. What is
guessed might be a negative or a positive thing. Its quality is not implied by the verb
itself but by the fact that is foreseen.
Both meanings are not restricted to English. They are also possible in Basque.
In (109) smell has the meaning 'to suspect':
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(109) Sailburuaren kontuak zuzenak ez zirela
erraz usain zitekeen
minister,gen account,abs.pi, right.abs.pl neg were.cOMP
easily smell could
it was easy to suspect that the minister's accounts were not clear'
As in (107), in this example the verb of smell comes to mean 'to suspect'. We
suspected that the minister's accounts were not clear, that there was something
wrong with them. This verb is always connected to negative connotations.
And (110) smell has the meaning 'to guess'.
(110) Kanturako haren zera ikusiz, (nik) mutrikuarra
zela usaindu nuen
song.all.adn he.gen way.abs seeing I erg mutriku.gen
was.coMP smell aux
'From his way of singing, I guessed he was from Mutriku' (HM)
(110) might be a more illustrative example than (108) above. In (110) there
are no negative connotations or bad characteristics to be discovered, but only the fact
that this person was from a town called Mutriku. In his particular way of singing
there were some hints that make us guess where he came from.
Finally, these same meanings are found in Spanish, 'to suspect' in (111) and
'to guess' in (112):
(111) Me huelo que ella esta detras dc todo esto
I.REFL smell that she is behind of all this
T suspect she is behind all this' (OSD)
As in the previous examples in English (107) and Basque (109), there are
negative connotations implied in (111). These negative characteristics are not present
in (112) below:
(112) Juan ya se ha oltdo la broma
john already he.REEL has smelt the joke
'(I think) John might have guessed that it's a joke' (RCD)
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'To guess' and 'to suspect' are not the only two possible metaphorical
extensions in the domain of smell. Smell verbs can also mean 'to investigate' as in
(113), (114) and (115).
(113) The police have been sniffing around here again (rcd)
(114) Bere gauzetan usnaka ibili ondoren, bera
hiltzailea izan zitekeela usaindu nuen
he.GEN things.INE smelling be after he.ABS
murderer.ABS be could.COMP smell AUX
'After I sniffed around, I suspected he could be the murderer'
(115) Le han ordenado que husmee las
cuentas
he.DAT have.3.PL ordered that sniff.3.SUBJ the
accounts
'They have ordered him to investigate the office accounts' (hm)
In these examples, the police are not using their noses to physically smell.
Although the same kind of action as in (104), (105) and (106) above is implied in
these latter examples it should be understood in a metaphorical rather than a physical
way.
Apart from these cross-linguistic extended meanings, English and Basque
have developed other meanings unique to these languages.
In English the verb sniff also means 'to disdain', 'to show contempt' as in
example (116) below.
(116) The critics sniffed at the adaptation of the novel to film (am)
Basque has three more meanings, "to corrupt', 'to prophesy' and 'to go
unnoticed'. As briefly mentioned before, smell verbs are used in Basque to indicate
that the wine is rancid, or that the milk is gone off as in (117). As a metaphorical
extension of this meaning it is also possible to use these verbs to mean 'to corrupt' as
in (118).
83
B. Iraide Iharretxe Antuhano Chapter 2: The Semantic Field ofSense Perception
(117) Esnea usaindu da
milk.ABS smell AUX
'The milk has gone off (HM)
(118) Hangoen pentsamoldeak bizimoduz usaindu zuen
there.ADN.gen ideology.f.rg life.iNSTR smell aijx
'The neighbours' way of thinking corrupted their way of living' (HM)
Another meaning that is possible in Basque is 'to go unnoticed', as illustrated
in (119). In this sentence the meaning of the smell verb implies that this organisation,
AEK in the province of Biscay, has not received any funding at all. It is important to
point out that the meaning 'to go unnoticed' does not imply that the subject, AEK in
Biscay, did not want the funding, but that that they did not even have the chance to
participate or to partake of it and as a consequence they were left out.
(119) Gipuzkoa eta Arabako AEK urte erdiko
subentzioa jaso ezinean, eta Bizkaikoa urte
osokoa usaindu ere gabe
guipuzcoa and alava.ADN AEK year half.ADN
funding.ABS receive impossibility.INE and biscay.ADN.ABS year
whole.ADN.ABS smell also without
'AEK in Guipuzcoa and Alava could not receive half a year's
funding, but the one in Biscay did not get the whole year's funding at
all' (EEBS)
Finally, the meaning 'to prophesy' is also found in Basque smell verbs as in
1120).
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(120) [...Jalaba onek[...] etorkizun illunpeak urratu eta
erdi-ikusi edo usnatu zuela, esan genezake
daughter this.erg future obscurity.abs.pl break and
half-see or smell aux.comp say could .1.pl
'We could say that this daughter could explore and foresee73 the
hidden future' (EEBS)
In this section I have analysed the related and non-related extended meanings
of the sense of smell in English, Basque and Spanish. These are summarised in Table
2.7.
Meanings English Basque Spanish
'to trail something' V V V
'to suspect' V V V
'to guess', 'to sense' V V V
'to investigate' V V V
'to disdain', 'to show contempt' V
'to corrupt' V
"to prophesy' V
"to go unnoticed' V
Table 2.7: Extended meanings in smell in English, Basque and Spanish
2.3.5. TASTE
The physical sense of taste is generally linked to personal likes and dislikes in
the mental world. Perhaps the reason why this is so lies in the fact that the sense of
taste is most closely associated with fine discrimination. According to Buck
(1949:1031), among Hindus there are six principal varieties of taste with sixty-three
possible mixtures and among Greeks six, including the four fundamental ones:
'sweet', 'bitter', 'acid' and 'salt'.
73 Lit. she 'smelled, half-saw and broke into'
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This makes the sense of taste very accurate from a descriptive point of view
as it allows us to express ourselves very precisely when we want to describe a taste.
Although this relation between taste and likes / dislikes is very common cross-
linguistically, this meaning seems to be encoded only by taste nouns in Basque,
English and Spanish. It is for this reason that apart from the analysis of taste verbs, 1
devote a small subsection to the analysis of the meanings in taste nouns here as well.
The verbs used in this sense are taste and savour in English, dastatu in
Basque, and gustar, saber and saborear in Spanish. The nouns used are taste in
English, zapore and gustu in Basque74 and, sabor and gusto in Spanish.
One of the extended meanings that taste verbs have cross-linguistically is 'to
experience something' as in (121), (122) and (123).
(121) He has tasted the frustration of defeat (AMGD)
(122) (Hark) Ilabete bat eta erdiz presondegia jastatu75
zuen
he.ERG month one and half.INSTR jail.ABS taste
AUX
'He tasted the life in prison for a month and a half (LM)
(123) (Ellos) gustaron las mieles del triunfo
they tasted the honeys of-the victory
'They tasted the sweet taste of victory' (OSD)
Although in the English translation of (123) it could be argued that this
sentence could also mean 'enjoy', in the Spanish example this interpretation is not
possible. As we shall see in the examples of the following meaning, the verb gustar
in sentences like (131) below does mean 'enjoy, like', but in (123), it means
experience something, in this case a victory. The verb gustaron can be substituted by
74
As discussed in the chapter devoted to the etymology (Chapter 3), unlike in the other
senses, Basque does not seem to have a taste system of its own Taste words are borrowed from Latin
(verbs) and Spanish (nouns).
75 .Jastatu is a dialectal variation of dastatu
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the verbprobaron (probar76 'taste, try'), which does not imply enjoyment as in (124)
below.
(124) (Ellos) Probaron las mieles del triunfo
they tried the honeys of-the victory
'They tasted the sweet taste of victory'
The other extended metaphoncal meaning in taste verbs is 'to enjoy'.
(125) I savour the sweet taste of revenge
According to the OED, taste used to mean 'enjoy, take pleasure' as in (126).
This use, however, is archaic nowadays.
(126) If I wondered at Johnson not tasting the works ofMason and Gray,
still more have I wondered at their not tasting his works (OED-1791)
(127) (Hark) Munduko plazerrak dastatu zituen
he.ERG world.ADN pleasure.abs.PL taste AUX
'He tasted the pleasures of this world' (ELH)
(128) Garaipena dastatzen hasiak zirelarik, (haiek)
partidua eten egin zuten.
victory.ABS taste.haB beginning.abs.pl AUX-when (they.ERG)
match.ABS break make AUX
'When they started to savour the taste of victory, they cancelled the
match' (ELH)
These two examples of taste mean 'enjoy', however, they are not the same. In
(127) the connection with the actual physical sense of taste is more dominant. The
meaning of 'enjoy' is made implicit by the word plazerrak 'pleasure (pi.)', but
without it (127) might have meant 'experience' or 'try'. On the other hand (128) is
not so close to the physical meaning. It is true that a victory is something positive,
especially if you are the person that is winning, however, if we change the sentence
76 As discussed in Section 2.2, Spanish does not have an activity taste verb In this case the
verb probar (lat. probare 'try, experiment') is used instead.
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to something similar like (129), the meaning changes from taking pleasure in
winning to taking pleasure in the defeat of the opposing side.
(129) They started to taste the other team's defeat
To lose a game cannot be considered as something positive and therefore the
object itself does not imply this positiveness as in (127), but it does imply enjoyment
on the part of the subject. However in (130) the object overrides the positive
implicature.
(130) The Romans tasted defeat at the hands of a Barbarian army
(131) Le gusta jugar al futbol
he.DAT likes play to-the football
'He likes playing football'
Although the meaning 'to enjoy' exists in Spanish as in (131), the opposite
feeling is also possible:
(132) Me supo mal el decirselo
I.DAT tasted badly the tell-him-it.ACC
'I didn't like to tell him so'
This sentence can be also said with gustar as in (133).
(133) No me gusto el decirselo
NEG I.DAT liked the tell-him-it.ACC
'I didn't like to tell him'
In these examples, the feeling that is produced is not good or enjoyable, but
just the opposite. Instead of having two differentiated meanings, 'to enjoy' and 'to
dislike', 'to produce a feeling' could be considered the superordinate and to enjoy'
the hvponym.
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It is also worth noting that in these two examples, when the feeling produced
is that of a negative quality, the use of a negative77 form is required. This seems to
indicate that these verbs, when used without any qualifying adjectives or adverbs,
78
imply a positive meaning . This is also the case in the nouns derived from these
verbs.
Apart from these cross-linguistic meanings, the sense of taste in Spanish has
more meanings. This sense is quite unique in Spanish. While in other Romance
languages the cognates of the Spanish verb saber have kept only one of two
meanings from the Latin sapere 'to taste', 'to know'79, in Spanish both meanings are
still in use. The physical percept meaning discussed in Section 2.2 and the meaning
'to know'80 as in (134).
(134) Maria sabe la leccion
mary knows the lesson
'Mary knows the lesson'
In this section I have analysed the related and non-related extended meanings
of the sense of taste in English, Basque and Spanish. These are summarised in Table
2.8.
Meanings English Basque Spanish
'to experience something' V V V
'to produce a feeling' V V V
'to know' V
Table 2.8: Extended meanings in taste in English, Basque and Spanish.
77
This is also possible in Basque. For example,
(5) Joni futbola ez zaio gustatzen
john.dat football.abs neg aux like.hab
'John doesn't like football'
78 The role played by the different arguments that verbs take in the overall meaning of the
sentence is discussed in Chapter 7
77
The etymology and development of this verb is explained in Chapter 3
80
The kind of knowledge expressed in the verb saber is the same as that encoded in G wissen
or Fr savoir
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2.3.5.1 The nouns of the sense of taste.
In this section I review only those meanings conveyed by taste nouns that are
not present in taste verbs in the three languages of the sample. The taste nouns
analysed are taste in English, sabor and gusto in Spanish, and zapore and gustu in
Basque81. These meanings are represented in Table 2.9.
Meanings taste sabor gusto zapore gustu
'Liking, preference' V V V
'Ability to perceive and enjoy what is
beautiful and harmonious'
V V V
'Judgements of aesthetic, intellectual
artistic or social matters (standards)'
V V
'Discretion, delicacy' V V
Table 2.9: The nouns of the sense of taste in English, Spanish and Basque.
As seen in Table 2.9, the Sp taste noun sabor and the Bq zapore are not very
productive in terms of metaphorical extended meanings if compared with the other
two taste nouns, Sp gusto and Bq gustu. The etymological origin and semantic
development of these words in Spanish may explain why this is so. Sp sabor is
related to the verb saber. This verb has two meanings 'to have a taste (percept)' and
"to know' (see Section 2.2.2). Sp gustu is related to the verb gustar, which nowadays
means 'to like', but as explained in Chapter 3, it used to function as a taste activity
verb in Middle Spanish. Therefore, it seems that only those nouns deriving from
activity verbs have developed these metaphorical meanings summarised in Table 2.9.
The relation between the sense of taste and personal likes and dislikes is only
present in the nouns, as in examples (135) and (136).
(135) She has a taste for foreign travel (OAL)
This sentence means that she likes travelling in foreign countries She prefers
that kind of travelling.
These two nouns are loanwords from Spanish (Bq dastatu 'to taste', also from Latin - see
Chapter 3),
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(136) Modern art is not to everyone's taste (Oal)
This means that not everybody likes modern art.
However, some other meanings are possible too. In (137) and (138) it is not
only that we like or dislike the fact that Peter has money or Mary's clothes but also
that we make judgements according to our standards or to the social or aesthetic
standards of the time we live in.
(137) Peter's got more money than taste
(138) Mary has no tote for clothes
Finally, another meaning is possible, that of delicacy and discretion.
(139) That remark lacks taste (col)
In this sentence, we are implying that that remark is rude, not appropriate for
that moment. Again, in this sentence we are making judgements according to our
standards.
It is worth noticing the fact that when the word taste, as well as its
equivalents in the other languages of the sample, is not accompanied by any gradual
modifier or qualifying adjective it always refers to positive characteristics. Therefore,
if we say
(140) Pedro tiene gusto para la ropa
peter has taste for the clothes
'Peter has taste for clothes'
what we mean is that the clothes he chooses are nice, that he combines the
colours very well and so on.
In conclusion it can be said that the nouns of the sense of smell present two
cognitive meanings: on the one hand, likes and dislikes, and on the other judgements
based on social, aesthetic, intellectual and artistic standards.
2.3.6. SUMMARY
In this section the main cross-linguistic extended meanings of the five sense
perception modalities have been analysed. Meanings particular to Basque, English
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and Spanish have been also briefly discussed. In the sense of vision four groups of
extended meanings have been presented: intellection group, with meanings such as
'to understand', 'to foresee', 'to imagine' and 'to judge'; social group including 'to
meet', 'to visit' among others; reliability group with 'to find out, to ascertain', 'to
make sure' and 'to take care', and finally other meanings such as 'to witness' and 'to
refer'. 'To heed, to pay attention', 'to obey', 'to be informed' and 'to understand' are
the extended meanings discussed in the sense of hearing. In the sense of touch four
meanings are presented, 'to partake of food', 'to affect', 'to reach' and 'to deal with'.
'To trail something', 'to guess', 'to suspect' and 'to investigate' are the meanings
included in the sense of smell. Finally, in the sense of taste we have the meanings 'to
experience something' and 'to produce a feeling' in the verbs, together with the
meanings Tikes, dislikes', 'judgements of aesthetic, intellectual, artistic or social
matters' and 'delicacy' found in the taste nouns.
The high number of extended meamngs in the sense perception verbs
indicates that this semantic field is highly polysemous. The fact that many of these
meanings are found in three different unrelated languages, Basque, English and
Spanish, points out that these extensions of meaning are not language particular, but
a cross-linguistic phenomenon, although not all languages share precisely the same
meaning transfers.
2.4. CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter I have analysed the semantic field of sense perception from a
cross-linguistic point of view using Basque, English and Spanish as the main
reference languages.
In Section 2.2 the physical meanings of this semantic field are discussed.
Following Viberg's (1984) and Gisborne's (1996) classification of perception verbs
on the basis of the semantic role of their subjects, perception verbs are divided into
three types: experience, activity and percept. These physical meanings are regarded
as prototypical because they are the central meanings that these verbs convey. In
Section 2.3 non-prototypical or extended meanings of the sense perception verbs are
analysed. These meanings are only those resulting from activity and experience verbs
alone. The great number of meanings discussed in this analysis shows that this
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semantic field is highly polysemous and that most of these meanings are not
particular to one language, but shared by at least the three languages used in this
research.
In this chapter I have analysed the different meanings of perception verbs. I
have presented 'raw' data from the languages analysed. The aim of the rest of this
thesis is to try to make sense of the reasons why and how these meanings are
conveyed by this particular group of verbs and no other.
In the following chapter the etymology of the verbs used in the analysis will
be discussed. The objective of this chapter is to provide further support for the claim
that meanings evolve from a physical domain to a more abstract domain. It is also the
aim of this chapter to show how words that are not etymologically related convey the
same meanings.
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CHAPTER 3: THE ETYMOLOGY OF
PERCEPTION VERBS.
In the previous chapter I have given a synchronic analysis of the semantic
field of perception verbs in English, Basque and Spanish. This analysis offers us a
picture of what meanings are conveyed by these perception verbs in present-day
English, Basque and Spanish. However, perception verbs have not always contained
the same meanings in the past. Semantic change occurs as a step by step process over
time, such that at any given period a word may have several meanings and over time
some of these meanings will remain, while others will change or disappear. Thus, the
study of polysemy in perception verbs presented in the previous chapter can be
considered as only one stage in the semantic development of these verbs.
In order to understand why perception verbs have their present-day meanings
it is necessary to examine how their meanings have developed and what the sources
of perception verbs in these three languages are. Etymological information is very
useful because as Sweetser puts it, "through a historical analysis of 'routes' of
semantic change, it is possible to elucidate synchronic semantic connections between
lexical domains; similarly, synchronic connections may help to clarify reasons for
shifts of meaning in past linguistic history" (1990: 45). In this chapter, an
etymological study of perception verbs is presented both as background information
for some of the claims made in this thesis and as a basis for future research into
semantic change in this field.
The study of semantic change underwent a long period of relative neglect. It
was generally regarded as whimsical, random and irregular, mainly because it did not
offer as many tractable data to systematic analysis as other fields in Linguistics, such
as Phonology and Syntax. The creation of general rules that could explain how and
why these changes took place was thought to be impossible (Hock 1986: 308). As a
consequence, most of the studies in this area focused on individual changes rather
than on the search for regular semantic changes, which could provide some
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generalisations and constraints . It was not until the last twenty years that Ullmann's
statement that in semantic change "the existence of [...] regularities is in most cases
extremely hard to demonstrate, and their very possibility is still doubted by many
scholars" (1957: 154) was questioned and disputed.
Researchers within the framework of Cognitive Linguistics, such as Sweetser
(1990)(see Chapter 4), have challenged this view. They have shown that there are
certain types of semantic change that are regular and recurrent enough to be
predictable. It is important to remember that, as pointed out in Section 1.1.1, the
traditional Saussurian dichotomy between synchrony and diachrony is not strict
within this framework. Meanings are cognitive structures embedded in our patterns
of knowledge and belief, and therefore it can be said that the same social, functional
and cognitive motivation present in historical changes is also observable in ongoing
changes. In other words, if we can provide a model that accounts for how and why
polysemy occurs in a semantic field in present-day language, it will be possible to
apply the same constraints and parameters to the study of how and why semantic
evolution occurs in the same semantic field.
Unfortunately a thorough analysis of the semantic changes in perception
verbs is beyond the scope of this thesis. Here I base my analysis on present-day
meanings of these verbs. Stemming from these data I propose a model that accounts
for the reasons why, as well as for the ways in which, these meanings are conveyed
by this semantic field in particular (see Chapters 5, 6, 7). Whether the framework put
forward in this thesis can be applied, as predicted, to the study of semantic
development remains a question for future research. The etymology of perception
83verbs " presented in this chapter will help to stimulate such a research by providing a
useful basis that may have predictive applications.
The etymological descriptions that follow will be used as further support for
some of the claims put forward in this thesis. These descriptions support the cross-
82 Traditional accounts for semantic change can be found in Antilla (1972), Bloomfield
(1935, 1983[ 1914]), Hock (1986), Jeffers and Lehiste (1979), Ullmann (1957, 1962), among others.
McMahon (1994) is a good survey of both traditional and more recent approaches in semantic change.
83 Most of the information gathered in this chapter is drawn from etymological dictionaries
(see special section in Bibliography), as well as specialised books on the subject. As it is not my aim
to propose new etymologies or to disclaim any of those already in existence, I have limited myself to
report what my sources have said about the etymological origins of these verbs.
95
B. Iraide Ibarretxe-Antunano Chapter 3: Ihe Etymology ofPerception Verbs
linguistic character of the semantic extensions presented in Chapter 2. The languages
used in this analysis belong to different language families. English and Spanish are
both Indo-European, but the former is a Germanic language, whereas the latter is a
Romance language. Basque is not etymologically related to either. It is an isolated
language. The fact that the perception verbs in these languages are not
etymologically related, but at the same time show the same polysemous senses, gives
further evidence for the cognitive linguistic tenet that these semantic extensions are
motivated by our bodily, physical, social and cultural experiences. The bodily basis
of the semantic extensions in perception verbs is presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter
6 shows how it may constrain the creation of such extended meanings.
It is to the description of the etymology of these perception verbs that we now
turn.
3.1. VISION
There are four possible roots that words related to the sense of sight may have
in Indo-European (IE) languages. Sight seems to be etymologically linked with
words related to 'light', 'eye' and 'knowledge'. According to Buck (1949) the
following are the IE roots:
IE *weid-: in words related to 'to see' in Greek, Latin (videre 'see') and
Balto-Slavic languages and in words related to 'to know' in Greek, Celtic, Germanic
and Indo-Iranian. It is not clear which of these meanings is the first one. On the one
hand, 'to know' can be considered as a secondary development starting in the
perfective: 'have seen' > 'know'. On the other hand, the view that both 'to see' and
'to know' come from a common 'recognise' is also held.
IE *derk- as in Welsh drych 'sight, appearance'.
IE *spek- as in Latin aspicere 'to look'.
IE *okw- in most of the words for 'eye', cf. Lat oculus, Sp ojo, It occhto.
IE *Ieuk- in words for 'light, bright', cf. Lat lux 'light', Gk leukos 'white'.
In general, some of the words meaning 'to see' (experience) can also be used
in the sense of'to look' (activity). The case of Greek blepo 'see' is interesting in that
the meaning seems to have shifted in the opposite direction: 'look' > 'see'.
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Some words related to 'to look' are also connected to the notion of 'to
watch', 'to guard', for example Greek horao 'see'.
Therefore, sight is related etymologically with knowledge, light, and
guarding. What makes these etymological links interesting is not only their role
among IE languages, but the fact that in other languages, which are non-IE and
whose words for sight are not related to these roots described above, the words for
sight also develop the same meanings. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the Basque verb
ikusi, which is not related to any of these EE roots, can also mean 'to understand'.
Thus it seems that the connection between the domain of vision and that of
knowledge is very deep and that it goes beyond etymological roots.
The English verb see comes from ME seen < OE seon, cognate of OHG
sehan (G sehen) and Mdu sten (Du zien). All these forms come from Oteut *sehw <
PreTeut *sequ. The English verb look comes from OE locian, which is an OTeut verb
type *ldkdjan 'to see', 'to look'.
There are two main vision verbs in Basque: ikusi and begiratu. Both are
found in the first written text in Basque in 1545 (Etxepare). Ikusi seems to be a very
old verb in Basque. The proto-form could have been *ekusi, which changed into
ikusi, as a result of vowel assimilation84. Although currently the synthetic forms of
this verb are no longer widely used, they were very frequent in the 16th century, for
example, nik da-kus-at (I.ERG see) T see'85. The etymological origin of begiratu <
*bigiratu has been widely discussed in the literature. On one hand, it can be regarded
as having derived from the word begi 'eye' + -ra 'allative case' + -tu 'verbal ending',
but many scholars seem to agree on its Latin origin from the verb vigiliare or the
noun vigilia. According to Michelena (1964:102), the influence of begi "eye' has
been secondary and a product of folk etymology. The evidence to support the Latin
origin comes from the fact that begiratu means 'to look at', 'to watch' in the West,
whereas in the east86 it means "to keep', 'to preserve', which is a meaning closer to
84
Michelena (1988), Hualde et al. (1995), and Trask (1997) are good surveys of the state of
art in Basque historical linguistics.
8 The verb entzun 'to hear' also has these synthetic forms, as for example nik da-nzu-t (I.ERG
hear) 'I hear". Both verbs entzun and ikusi are regarded as words of Basque origin and the fact that
they have these synthetic forms supports this claim (See Gomez and Sainz (1995)).
86
East dialects such as Labourdian and Zuberoan are more conservative than those in the
West, therefore the meaning 'to keep', 'to preserve' should be considered older.
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its Latin cognate. Another common verb of sight in Basque is behatu (1545). This
verb seems to be used in the place of begiratu in the eastern varieties (Etxepare,
154587), with the meaning of'to look at'. Michelena ([1985] 1990: 221) relates this
verb with the word belarrt 'ear', which in the eastern dialects is beharri. If this origin
is true it would be an interesting point as it would be a counter-example of Viberg's
(1984) hierarchy of sense perception, because it reverses the order proposed by him,
from hearing to vision instead of from vision to hearing (see Section 2.2 above).
The Spanish verb ver comes from Lat videre. Ver is a common verb used in
all dialects and it has been in use since the first written texts in the same form, apart
tli 88from an early veder in Berceo (13 century) .
The Spanish verb mirar comes from Lat mirari 'to amaze', 'to astonish'. In
the 12th and 13th centuries the meaning of mirar was the etymological meaning in
Latin 'to amaze'. In the 14th century, this meaning evolved towards the meaning 'to
contemplate', but still with an emphasis on the curiosity factor. Finally, in MSp this
verb substitutes the OSp catar and comes to mean to 'to look at'. According to the
Corominas and Pascual (1983)(henceforth DCECH) this development is common to
Portuguese and Catalan, whereas in the other Romances, the meaning 'to
contemplate' has been kept until the present day. This meaning has also been also
kept in the Basque verb miraritu 'to amaze', derived from the noun mirari miracle'.
3.2. HEARING
Indo-European words for hearing often come from the physical domain, from
the physical organ of hearing, i.e. the ear, hence Lat audtre < *aus-dh from the root
*aus 'ear'.
The English verb hear comes from ME heren < OE (Anglian) heran < Oteut
*haurjan. Cognates outside Teutonic are unknown. There is a theory that it might
have a connection with the root auz- 'ear' and hence with Lat audi-re, and Gk
otKoueiv akovei, but this is extremely doubtful. The English verb listen comes from
87 Behatu is already present in Etxepare (1545), but Sarasola's dictionary dates it to
Leiparraga (1571).
88 See Lapesa (1980), for more information on the history of the Spanish language
98
B. Iraide Ibarretxe-Antuhano Chapter 3: The Etymology ofPerception I'erbs
ME listen < OE hlysnan derived from the Indo-European root *fCleu-s 'hear' or
'listen'.
In Basque there are two main verbs: entzun and aditu. As in the case of ikust
"to see', the verb entzun 'to hear' has also these synthetic forms, for example, ntk da-
nzu-t (I.ERG hear) 'I hear'. The fact that they have these synthetic forms supports the
claim that entzun is a word of Basque origin (Michelena [1985] 1990: 114; Azkue
1905). Some authors (Schuchardt 1923, 1925; Lhande 1926; Lopelmann 1968) have
argued that this word comes from the Lat intensionem, the accusative of the noun
intensio from the verb intendere 'to stretch out', 'to direct one's attention to'.
The Latin word intendere has given way to related words in Romance
languages, cf. Sp entender 'to understand', Fr entendre 'to hear', and It intendere 'to
understand'. This is not the case in Basque. It is very strange that in the Romance
languages the Latin intendere has given words related to understanding and not in
Basque. Fr entendre should be the only similar shift to the Basque one, but as
explained later on, originally this word also meant 'to understand'. An analogy with
the Basque word is likely to be impossible. The verb aditu, on the other hand, seems
to come from Lat audire.
The etymological origin of the Spanish verb oir is the Lat audire, cognate of
Gk au5r| uude 'voice'; this comes from the verb auco auo 'to howl', 'to cry out'.
According to the DCECH it is found in Berceo (13th ct.), and in the future tense a
residual -d- from the Latin word can be still seen (fut. odredes 'you will hear'). This
word has been inherited by all Romance languages, although in some it is no longer
used for the hearing sense; for instance Fr oui'r 'to hear' has been replaced by
entendre (Lat intendere 'to stretch out', 'to direct one's attention'), which originally
in OFr meant "to understand', as it does in most of the Romance languages which
took this Latin word. Another curious example is the substitution of the verb
meaning 'to hear' by the verb meaning 'to feel'. This happened in Italian, where
sentire (Lat sentire 'to feel') means 'to hear' and in Catalan sentir, 'to hear'. It is also
possible to use sentir to mean 'to hear' in some varieties of Spanish, for example in
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela and Puerto Rico. Although it could be
thought that the reason for this substitution in Argentina was due to the influence of
Italian and its usage of sentire as an auditory verb, the fact that some other varieties
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of Spanish as well as Catalan share this usage makes it implausible. According to the
DCECH the reason may lie in the fact that oir is too short, and that in Spanish Creole
languages, due to a phonetic rule which replaces u by o (in hiatus), there is an
intolerable homonymy with huir 'to run away'. A way of differentiating these two
words is the use of senttr 'to feel'. The semantic closeness between sentir and oir has
been present in Spanish for a very long time; for example in El Quijote, Cervantes
(16th ct.) uses both forms for audition but always with the following distinction: oir
indicates a clear and distinct sensation (sound) and sentir is used whenever the type
of perception is not specified and, if referring to audition, when the sound is very soft
oq
or vague. The verb sentir better represents this vagueness .
The Spanish verb escuchar comes the old ascuchar, which is a development
of the Vulgar Latin form *ascultare, from Lat auscultare 'to listen' (auscultdre is in
itself a compound of aus (< auris 'ear') and cultare < clutare (frequentative theme of
cluere 'to be known as'). It is found as early as the Cid (12th century)(auscuchar) and
Berceo (13th century)(escuchar). An interesting word derived from this root is
escucha 'spy, bug': An escucha was the sentinel in the night shift, which comes from
an old meaning of the verb excubo 'to listen in the night'. This is interesting because
it emphasises the fact that escuchar is not only hearing but hearing with attention. In
the darkness of the night where the sense of vision cannot be used as much as during
the day, humans have to rely on other senses and hearing seems to be the most
reliable one. However it is not only the perception of sounds that matters here, but
also the perfect identification of those sounds.
3.3. TOUCH
In English there are two central verbs for the sense of touch. The first one is
touch, which was introduced in ME from Ofr touchier. This word is the
onomatopoeic formation from the syllable toe that gave origin to all these Romance
cognates. Another possible origin proposed by Diez and now largely rejected was
linking the Romanic toccare with OLG *tokkon, *tukken, MLG tocken, tucken To
draw or to pull with force', 'to pluck', but, according to the OED, the change of
89
For more examples on sentir and oir see DCECH p. 267
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meaning from 'to pull' to 'to knock' is inexplicable. The second word is the verb
feel. It correspongs to ME felen < OE felan 'to examine by touch'. This verb is
derived from Ger *foljan 'to feel', which in turn is related to Lat palma 'palm' (->
palpare 'to touch'), Sktpant 'palm'.
In Basque the central verb of this sense, ukitu, first appeared in writing in
1617. Along with its dialectal variants ikutu and iikiitu. According to Lopelmann
(1968), hunkitu and ukitu could come from a possible *tuki with the same origin as
Spanish tocar and its Romance cognates. However this is highly implausible because
the loss of a voiceless plosive at the beginning of a word is not a common
phenomenon. Haztakatu and haztatu are both more common in the Northern dialects
and the latter was already present in Leizarraga (1571). Both verbs come from the
noun hazta which means both 'weight' and 'sense of touch'. The relationship
between these two meanings is connected to the hand which in the first meaning is
the means of weighing and in the second is the means of touching. As the LMD
clarifies: "etymologiquement, action de verifer la pesanteur d'un objet en le
soulevant de la main, ou le prenant aux bras". Thus it seems that a semantic
expansion took place early in the language, from the physical act of weighing to the
other physical act of touching. As noted in Section 2.3.3, this physical weighing has
shifted to an abstract meaning, as it now means 'to weigh, to consider'. This shift is
somehow predicted and expected, as when we have to judge something we always
place the pros and cons of the problem in a balance and we take the decision in
accordance with the reasons that have more weight90.
Tocar is the main verb of the sense of touch in Spanish. The DCEDH argues
that this verb has its origin in the onomatopoeic formation from the syllable toe,
which imitates a knock, and that one of its first meanings would have referred to the
ringing of the bells or other percussion instruments. Another sense of this verb that
the DCEDH considers to be very old is 'to knock on the door' tocar a la puerta,
90
This metaphorical icm could be called: judgements are decided in a balance, where
expressions such as to weigh up the pros and cons, lightweight character, counterbalance, tremble in
the balance, turn the balance and so on can be included. (For a full list of these metaphors, see
Wilkinson 1993).
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which reflects the onomatopoeia very well91. In my opinion the physical touch in
Spanish should be divided into two groups, one which refers to the sense of touch as
perception, and one which is more related to the sound and hence closer to its
etymological origin. If touch has its origin in an onomatopoeia, which expresses the
action and sound of a knock, then this word must have undergone an extension of
meaning in the following direction92:
knock-percussion instrument > general perceptive touch.
The English and Basque data also support this statement. In Basque as we
have already explained, the verbs of touching are not related to playing instruments.
In English touch was used in this sense, but now is not used in this way. This is
understandable as touch was a loan from OFr tochier, which is derived from the
same onomatopoeia. But if we take the Anglo-Saxon word for touch, i.e. feel, it
cannot be used in this sense.
3.4. SMELL
The English verb smell has its origin in OE but it is not recorded, and not
represented in any of the cognate languages. It appears in ME as smellen. It seems
that E stink < OE stinc was first used for neutral smell and then, when smellen was
introduced it came to mean "bad smell'. A similar process takes place with stench,
OE stenc. This verb already meant 'bad smell', but nowadays it is even stronger than
stink.
Sniff comes from ME sneuien. sniffen from a Scandinavian origin. It is also
proposed that this verb has an imitative origin, as in snuff {OED).
The Basque verb usaindu is composed of usain. Usui means 'odour, smell,
aroma' and then -tu, which is one of the verbal suffixes for the perfective participle
(>Lat participial suffix -TU)93. Usmatu (usmotu) is derived from usma 'sense of
91
This meaning of the verb tocar is now still in full usage. However, not only the expression
tocar la puerta is possible, but also tocar el timbre, lit. 'to touch the buzzer', 'to ring the bell'. The
expression should be pulsar el timbre 'to press the buzzer". This is an example of lexical innovation,
i.e when an old word becomes adjusted to the modern uses.
92
Apart from this extension of meaning to a more general field, within the 'sound field' tocar
is nowadays used for any instrument, not only percussion or knocking, but also in the general sense of
playing instruments.
93
See Trask (1995) for a description of Basque non-verb forms and their etymological origin.
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smell, guess'; usmo94 'guess, conjecture'; and -tu, a verbal suffix (see above).
Finally, usnatu is derived from usna 'sense of smell, sagacity' and -tu, a verbal suffix
(see above). As we shall see in the etymological analyses of the Spanish verbs below,
the origin of the Basque verbs is here considered to be related to the Sp verb
husmear.
The Spanish verb oler comes from Lat olere. In Latin this verb was originally
used intransitively as a percept verb, i.e. only with the subject of the thing that emits
odour, whereas olfacere (Sp olfatear) was left for transitive uses (as an activity and
experience verb). According to the DCECH, this distinction was no longer present in
Berceo (13th ct.), where a nominalisation of the Sp verb oler covered both instances.
Another characteristic of Sp oler is that this verb refers to the perception of
good and bad smells indistinctively. Other Romance languages use different verbs to
distinguish between good and bad odours. For instance, Fr sentir 'to smell' and putr,
puer (< Lat putere 'to stink'), empester 'to stink'.Similarly in It sentire, odorare 'to
smell' and puzzare (< Lat putere) 'to stink'. Portuguese also seems to have only one
verb: cheirar 'to smell', 'to stink'. Portuguese also has empestar for 'to smell out'
(cf. Fr empester, Sp apestar).
An interesting point here is the fact that some Romance languages have
adopted the Latin word sentire in the place of olere-olfacere. Sentire 'to feel' is
usually the verb used for describing general perception, and as seen in the section on
hearing, it can also mean 'perception by the ear'.
The Latin verb olere itself seems to come from an IE root for 'smell' od- (cf
Gk o^co ozo 'I smell'). Olfatear comes from Lat olfactare, verbal form of olfactus,
which is the supine of olfacere 'to smell'.
Both oler and olfatear have concrete and non-concrete meanings. The
concrete meanings 'to perceive' and 'to emit a smell' are already present in their
Latin cognates: olere 'to give off a smell', 'to smell sweet', 'to stink' and olfacere 'to
detect the odour of, 'to sniff at'. Their figurative meanings, however, seem to be
particular to the Spanish verbs as the Latin verbs do not share them.
94
This is very interesting as the main meaning of the noun is no longer 'smell' but the
figurative one, 'suspicion, guess, conjecture".
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The etymology of husmear is very interesting. According to the DCECH, the
primitive forms of this verb seem to be usmar, osmar, which have the same origin as
Fr humer 'to sniff, 'to inhale', It dial usmar 'to sniff, 'to smell an animal trail', It
ormare "to follow a trail', Rum urma 'to follow'. These verbs find their origin in Gk
osmasthai oapacrBai 'to smell', 'to sniff, derived from osme oapr| 'odour'. In
Spanish, this word appears quite early in the language. In the Glosas Silenses (10th
ct.) osmatu is found and in La Plcara Justina (17th ct.) the modern form husmear is
already present.
The DCECH states that in the Iberian Peninsula, the OSp *osmare 'to smell a
trail' and the Lat aestimare 'to appreciate' were often mistaken, and that this
phonetic and semantic hesitation also occurred in Basque in verbs such as asmatu,
usmatu and usnatu, which mean 'to perceive smells', 'to make up and to suspect'. A
few comments should be made here. It seems quite reasonable that the verbs
discussed above all come from Latin, however the generalisation that has been made
in this dictionary is not accurate enough. Although asmatu and usmatu could be
similar to the case in Spanish, asmatu does not have any of the meanings above,
except 'to make up', 'to invent', which in turn is not shared by the other two. Asmatu
means 'to invent', 'to devise', 'to plan', 'to think of, 'to make up', 'to guess', 'to
conjecture', 'to imagine', 'to figure out' (GALW). Later on in the discussion the
DCECH states that the Basque words sumatu, somatu and susmatu3 could be
variations of the same verb husmear, from the OSp sub-osmare, but as Cat has
preserved the group -sm- up to now it could also come from an old alteration of
*osumare. From all these suppositions, it would appear that the Basque words come
from Spanish. However, the fact that osmatu appears in the Glosas Silenses, which
are well known as having Basque elements, and the variation in Basque between o
and u (cf. somatu-sumatu) are inconsistent with this conclusion.
95 Michelena ([1985] 1990: 292) and Mujika (1982: 209) argue that the s- in susmatu is an
expressive s-, which added to the verb usmatu Susmatu nowdays does not mean to smell', but 'to
suspect' However, the fact that this verb is formed from the noun (s)usma 'smell' makes it very
interesting as an example of the direction that semantic change follows, i.e. from concrete to abstract
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3.5. TASTE
The sense of taste is interesting from an etymological point of view. The
English verb taste and its cognates have given rise to a great deal of discussion as
experts do not agree on whether it comes from Lat *taxitare or whether it has an
onomatopoetic ongin.
The proto-form suggested is IE *g'heus. This form is present in words for
'taste' in Greek genomai and Latin (Romance) gustdre. However, in Germanic and
Celtic it appears in words which are related to 'to try' or 'to choose', for example,
Gothic kiusan 'to make trial of, OE ceosan 'to choose'. Finally, in Indo-Iranian
languages it appears in words linked to 'to enjoy', such as Skt jus- 'to enjoy', 'to be
pleased'. Buck (1949:1030) states that the direction of semantic shift is not clear
because the development could have equally gone from 'taste' > 'try, choose' >
'enjoy' or from 'try' > 'taste' > 'enjoy'.
The central verb of taste in Modem English is taste and in Basque, dastatu.
Spanish does have an archaic word related to the two: tastar. The etymological
origin of these words and their cognates in other languages is uncertain and has
brought about much discussion and disagreement among linguists. The following is a
brief review of this issue.
One of the proposals is that these verbs come from Vulgar Latin *tastare.
This word would be the result of a merge between tangere 'to touch' and gustdre 'to
taste'. The DCECH rejects this origin because tangere and gustdre were not
synonyms in Latin and it is very difficult for two words with different meanings to be
blended.
Another proposal is that they come from Vulgar Latin *taxitare > taxdre.
According to Emout and Meillet (1959), taxdre, with the meaning 'to touch firmly
and often', is not a typical word either in Romance or in Latin literature. It could
have been a pseudo-etymological fictitious word created by Aulo Gelio, because
taxdre, which means 'to tax, to evaluate' or 'to reprimand, to censor', does not come
from tangere 'to touch' but from Greek tasset. To this explanation, the DCECH adds
the fact that the development *taxitare > tdter would only be phonetically possible in
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French, because the other Romance languages would not have allowed a syncope,
either after the voicing of the -t- or in any case.
Finally, the last approach proposes an onomatopoeic origin: tas-tas. The
DCECF1 considers this origin as the only sensible one. The fact that the meaning 'to
knock" appears in all Romance languages in their first stage seems to be reason
enough to accept this view. In Modern Italian the verb tastare keeps the meaning "to
touch' (for example in the case when a blind person is feeling his way with a stick;
cf. Sp andar a tientas 'to feel one's way').
It is difficult to decide which of these proposals is the correct one. Based on
the meanings that this group of words had and now retain, the relationship between
touch and taste becomes very evident. Although the DCECH states that the change
from the meaning 'to feel (one's way)' to 'to taste' is very easy from an ideological
point of view (as 'to taste' is lexicalised by different words related to physical and
spiritual sensations in many languages) this change is not so straight forward.
The main verb of taste in English is taste. It comes from OFr taster 'to
touch', 'to feel'. When this loan was first introduced into Middle English it kept
some of these meanings related to the sense of touch, but now these are archaic.
Another interesting point in this verb is that according to the OED, it could also refer
to the perception by some other sense, i.e. smell. Smack is no longer used very much,
however, it was the OE word for the sense of taste. OE smaec 'taste, flavour', hence
smecgan 'to taste', is related to OHG smoc (> MHG smacken > G. schmacken 'to
taste"). Although its main meaning is 'to have a distinctive flavour or taste', it can
also refer to the sense of smell, when it refers to the characteristic smell or taste of
something (To smack of the sea (COL)).
It seems that Basque has borrowed the words to express taste from other
languages (i.e. Romance). The main verb of the sense of taste is dastatu. The
etymology of this verb is discussed above, however, we may add to that information
what Agud and Tovar (1989-) established as its direct source. These authors agree
with the DCECH on the fact that these verbs do not come from Lat. * tastare, but that
dastatu comes from Romance, in particular from Old Occitanian tastar 'to taste".
Azkue (1905) also supports this idea. Dastatu was present in the language from an
early stage, for example it is already found in Etxepare (1545). From all the
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examples I have reviewed, it seems that Basque took this verb only with the meaning
'to taste' in the physical and figurative sense. This verb has a rich dialectal diversity.
In the Northern side dasta- was the only form until the 19th century. By the middle of
the 19th century the variant jasta- is found used with the same frequency, but by the
end of the century this form has superseded the former one. The Souletin dialect uses
txeste. In the South dasta- is the only form found until the 20th century. From the
1920's onwards other variants are also used: jasta-, txesta-. Finally, in the Roncalese
dialect there is the variant testatu.
The sense of taste in Spanish is quite unique because it has kept the two verbs
that were used in Latin for this sense with the same main meanings. In the first place,
there is saber. It comes from Latin sapere, which meant 'to taste' and 'to be wise, to
know'. This verb replaced Latin scire in all Romance languages, except in Romanian
and Sardinian. The meaning of 'to have a taste' is only preserved in Italian and in the
Iberian Romances, whereas in Modern French, for example savoir (< Lat sapere)
only means 'to know'; some reminiscences of its etymological meaning can be seen
in the noun saveur (< Lat sapor) which means 'savour, taste'. The fact that these two
different domains, the perception of tastes and knowledge, are present in the same
word, is what makes Sweetser state that "the sense of taste is here evidently
connected not merely with general experience or perception, but with mental
experience" (1990:37). Although it is true that the sense of taste is linked to the
mental domain, I find it very difficult to accept this assertion on the basis that in
Latin these two meanings were lexicalised by the same verb. This only happens in
Latin and later, in Spanish, but in neither of the other languages of the sample. It is
true that the words that we have been discussing here so far, Basque dastatu and
English taste, are not original words from those languages but loans from other
languages, i.e. Romance, but it is very strange that these words have not developed
such a meaning. If it is true that these semantic changes from the concrete domain to
the abstract domain are cross-linguistic and not language specific, we cannot make
such a generalisation that the sense of taste is linked to the mental domain only on
the basis of this case in Latin, because if it is not shared by other languages, it means
that it is just a particular fact of Latin and its descendants.
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Saber is found in Spanish right from its origins (Glosas (10th ct.), (fid (12th
ct.)), and since then it has developed the meanings it inherited from Latin96. In the
sense of 'to know', saber now also means 'to realise', 'to find out", 'to hear about'
and 'to be able to'. This last meaning is very important because in these cases saber
behaves like a modal verb. It requires the construction saber + infinitive, as in (1):
(1) Maria sabe / no sabe nadar
mary knows / no knows swim
'Mary can/can't swim'
This could be considered a case of grammaticalisation, because the verb has
lost part of its lexical meaning to become a kind of function word (Hopper and
Traugott 1993).
Gustar is the other main verb of the sense of taste in Spanish. It comes from
Latin gustare 'to taste'. In Berceo (13th ct.) this verb appears as gostar, but gustar is
the standard form since the end of the 15th ct. The development of the syntax of this
verb is very interesting. In the Middle Ages gustar was used transitively, with the
person who tasted as the subject. In the Renaissance (Spanish Golden Age in
Literature) the intransitive construction gustar de algo (lit. Tike of something') was
quite frequent. The subject was the person who performed the action. Together with
this syntactic development, there is also a shift in the meaning from the neutral 'to
taste' (as an experiencer-based verb) to 'to take pleasure' to the current usage 'to














In Latin, sapere also meant 'to smell of. This meaning does not seem to occur in Spanish,
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Presently, gustar with the meaning of 'to enjoy', 'to like' usually refers to other
experiences but not food or drink. When you take pleasure in what you are eating and drinking, the
verb degustar (< Lat de-gustare 'to enjoy by the experience of taste') is the correct verb to use.
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Saber and guslar are distinguished by Roque-Barcia (1902) on the basis of
sensibility. According to this author gustar refers to the action of the gustative
organs, whereas saber refers to the pleasure or pain that we feel, when we taste. It is
related to sensibility. Gustar seems to be a condition for saber, because without
guslar something one cannot saborear it (see Section 2.3.5).
3.6. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, I have presented a brief overview of the etymology of
perception verbs in English, Basque and Spanish. The purpose of this chapter has not
been to discuss in detail either how or why the meanings in these perception verbs
have evolved in the way they have, or what their etymological origin is - this falls
beyond the scope of this thesis, whose aim is to analyse the polysemy of the semantic
field of perception verbs from a synchronic perspective.
However, a study of synchronic polysemy would be incomplete if it lacks any
reference to the diachronic development of the semantic field under analysis. Words
do not change, loss, or add meanings suddenly or whimsically; words are
polysemous as a reflection of diachronic semantic changes. I have included a chapter
on the etymology of perception verbs in this thesis for several reasons. On the one
hand, to put together in one place all the information on the etymological
development of the perception verbs discussed in this thesis. Other chapters in the
thesis will make reference to this chapter for the relevant etymological information.
On the other hand, these etymological data have been aimed at supporting some of
the main claims put forward in this thesis, as well as at providing a starting point for
future research on the issue of semantic change (see Chapter 4). One must not forget
that the same questions of how and why polysemy takes place can be applied to
semantic change. And it is a commonly agreed possibility among cognitive linguists
to suppose that the same mechanisms that explain synchronic polysemy can be used
to explain semantic change (see Sweetser 1990, Geeraerts 1997).
Etymology is important because it gives us the necessary background
information about the development of a particular word in a particular language. For
instance, the case of susmatu 'to suspect' in Basque. Without any previous
etymological knowledge, it would be impossible to ascertain that this word is related
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to the sense of smell. We would have to simply accept that this word in
contemporary Basque means do suspect'. However, the etymology of this word
shows that it is related to smell (see Section 3.4) and that at some point in history, the
meaning of this word shifted from physical smell to abstract suspect. As we know
from the analysis of the conceptual mappings in the sense of smell in Chapter 2, the
connection between physical smell and abstract suspicion is also present in the
polysemous verb usaindu do smell'. Therefore, it seems that this link between these
two different conceptual domains is quite common and strong. Etymological data
provided us with further information to support such a claim.
Etymological data is also very useful when analysing cross-linguistic
polysemy, i.e. the meaning extensions that take place in one semantic field in
different languages. One of the theoretical hypotheses in this thesis is that most
semantic extensions of perception verbs are cross-linguistic because these links
between different conceptual domains of experience are motivated by our
understanding and knowledge of the world, which is shared by all humans with the
same cultural background. A way to support the cross-linguistic character of these
mappings is to look at languages from different families. Take, for example, the link
between vision and knowledge. As was shown in Chapter 2, this mapping not only
occurs in English and Spanish, two IE languages whose sight verbs derive from the
same IE roots, but also in Basque, a non-IE language whose vision verb ikust does
not seem to come from any IE root.
In these last two chapters I have described the semantic field of sense
perception verbs. The description of the semantic extensions in these verbs, as well
as their etymological origins, are the 'raw' material that will provide the data
necessary to illustrate and support the theoretical claims on polysemy in the
following chapters.
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CHAPTER 4: PROBLEMS IN POLYSEMY
In the preceding chapters, I have offered a typology of the different meanings
that perception verbs convey in present-day English, Basque and Spanish. I have also
provided an etymological description of these verbs to support the cross-linguistic
character of such extended meamngs. It is on the basis of these data that I will
construct the theoretical hypotheses in this thesis. These hypotheses will explain why
and how these polysemous senses happen.
In this chapter, I review two different approaches to meaning extension.
Sweetser's (1990) semantic account of perception verbs, and Pustejovsky's (1995)
Generative Lexicon. I set out the advantages of these approaches that will be useful
for my own analysis, as well as the gaps in these models that need to be addressed.
Sweetser (1990) investigates the multiple meanings in the semantic field of
English perception verbs. She shows that lexical polysemy cannot be understood
independently of human cognitive structure. The fact that everyday cognition is
metaphorically shaped, at least partially, helps us to understand the way in which the
senses of polysemous words are related. Sweetser's approach to semantic extension
is presented and discussed in Section 4.1.
Although I agree that metaphor is the primary cognitive mechanism by which
the structure of human experience is created and extended, metaphor cannot entirely
explain why some semantic changes do not shift towards a more abstract meaning,
but remain physical. Metaphor also has difficulty in explaining the shifts of meaning
which are caused by the different arguments in the sentence. In order to solve this
problem, Pustejovsky's Generative Lexicon is analysed in Section 4.2, followed by a
discussion of this framework when applied to our data.
Finally, I draw some conclusions in Section 4.3.
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4.1. SWEETSER'S MIND-AS-BODY CONCEPTUAL
METAPHOR
The fact that certain verbs of perception could refer to other non-physical
meanings has been long established. In Bechtel's (1879) study of the different
meanings that sense verbs can convey, he states that subjective perception
expressions originated in the more objective sense expressions, which in turn have a
more concrete origin, in the changes detected by the sensory impressions. Kurath
(1921) notes how Indo-European words for perception, those referring to physical
actions accompanying the relevant emotions and those referring to the organs
affected by those physical actions, developed into words for emotion. Buck (1949)
devotes a whole section to the study of the etymological relations between Indo-
European sense perception verbs. While these studies are more focused on the
etymologies and different senses of these verbs without giving a specific theory of
why they are related98, Sweetser's main aim is to provide a motivated99 explanation
for the relationships between senses of a single morpheme or word and between
diachronically earlier and later sense of a morpheme or word.
Sweetser proposes a semantic link-up that can account for this pervasive
tendency in the Indo-European languages to borrow concepts and vocabulary from
the more accessible physical and social world to refer to the less accessible worlds of
reasoning, emotion and conversational structure; what she calls the mind-as-body
metaphor. This link-up between the vocabularies of the mind and body is not only
rooted in some psychosomatic reactions (Kurath 1921). As Sweetser argues, in some
examples psychosomatic explanations may be enough to account for some cases. For
instance, the fact that it is possible to have emotional tension or to feel low may be
linked to the muscular states of tension and limpness that go with these mental states.
However, other expressions such as hitter anger or sweet revenge cannot be linked to
any direct physical taste response of bitterness or sweetness, they should be regarded
as metaphoncal.
98 Kurath attributes this diachronic development of emotion words to the psychosomatic
nature of emotions.
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This mind-as-body metaphor is motivated by correspondences between our
external experience and our internal emotional and cognitive states. These
correspondences are not isolated; they are parts of a larger system. This metaphor
involves our conceptualising one whole area of experience (i.e. mind) in terms of
another (i.e. body), and therefore, Sweetser suggests that mind-as-body can be
considered as what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) regard as a 'conceptual metaphor'.
Another important point is that correspondences between these two domains
of experience are unidirectional100 (Sweetser 1990: 30): from the vocabulary of
bodily experience to the vocabulary of psychological states. In the case of English
perception verbs, the metaphorical mappings take place between two domains of
experience: the vocabulary of physical perception as the source domain and the
vocabulary of the internal self and sensations as the target domain. Although, in most
cases, the unidirectionality of this mapping is preserved, as we shall see later on in
the discussion, there are some exceptions to this general tendency.
With this mind-as-body metaphor as a background, Sweetser goes on to
analyse the routes into and out of the domain of physical perception. As explained in
Chapter 3, this thesis is not focused on the historical development of the meanings of
perception verbs, but on the present-day polysemous senses conveyed by these verbs.
Nevertheless, I include here Sweetser's description of the routes followed by
perception verbs, not only to give a full overview of her approach, but also because
as she states "through a historical analysis of "routes' of semantic change, it is
possible to elucidate synchronic connections between lexical domains" (1990: 45).
The routes she maps out for English sense-perception verbs are sketched in Table
4.1:
99
By 'motivated' Sweetser understands "an account which appeals to something beyond the
linguist's intuition that these senses are related, or that these two senses are more closely related than
either is to a third sense" (1990: 3).
100
Recent research within the Cognitive Linguistics framework, i.e. Fauconnier and Turner's
theory of'blending' (Fauconnier 1997, Fauconnier and Turner 1994. 1996; Turner and Fauconnier
1995) and some related work on recursive metaphorical chains (see Rohrer, 1997) seems to introduce
a new perspective on this unidirectionality in metaphorical mappings As Barcelona (1997: 13)
suggests, "these studies point towards the existence of multiple projections, although not in the sense
suggested by interactionalist theories of metaphor, such as Black's (1962, 1993)"
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SENSE SEMANTIC SOURCES TARGET DOMAIN
VISION
-Physical nature of sight: light (*leuk-
'light'), the eyes (Lger oegen 'eyes'),
facial movement..
-Metaphors of vision: behold, catch sight
of.. < Lat —scipio 'seize', see < *sekw-
-Basic IE vision roots: *spek'- >
inspect, *weid- > witness
-Physical sight -> Knowledge,
intellection
-Physical vision -> meant 'vision'
-Cases with only mental meaning
HEARING
-Physical domain: *aus- 'ear'
-IE roots: *kleus 'listen ►
-Onomatopoeic origin
crash
-Verbs of hearing: CI Gk kluo, Eng
listen, Dan lystre 'obey'. ►




-It frequently comes under general sense
perception. ►
E.g. Fr sentir 'feel', 'smell' < Lat sentire
-If different from general tactile
sensation, they often derive from specific
physical sensations: a sweet smell, or
from aspects of the physical act of
perception: Eng reek, G rauchen 'smoke'
-Few abstract or mental connotations
E.g. Bad smell is used in English to
indicate bad character or dislikeabie
mental characteristics
E.g. This stinks, stinker
TASTE
-IE root: *g'eus (Lat gnstare). It could
have meant 'try' (Gothic kiusan) or
'choose' (OE ceosan), rather than 'taste'.
-It seems universally to be linked to
personal likes and dislikes in the mental
world.
TOUCH
-General sense of perception
-Physical feeling: Lat sentire, GK pascho
-Emotional feeling.
E.g. deeply touched
Table 4.1: Sweetser's routes for English sense-verbs.
In the case of vision, Sweetser identifies a basic metaphorical understanding
of this sense that leads to the connection of vision to intellectual activity. Some
vision terms involve physical perceptions or manipulations and have correlates in the
domain of intellectual operations. As important as the routes for sense perception are
the patterns that unify these semantic changes. In this case, Sweetser suggests three
reasons for this parallelism between vision and intellection: (i) Vision is our primary
source of objective data about the world. It gives us more information than any of the
other senses, and it appears that children rely most heavily on visual features in their
early categorisation, (ii) The focusing ability of vision that enables us to pick up one
stimulus at will from many, to differentiate fine features, (iii) Vision is identical for
different people who can take the same viewpoint. Therefore, it seems to provide a
basis for shared public knowledge.
Indo-European hearing words usually come from the anatomical domain,
from the physical organ of hearing, i.e. *aus- 'ear'. A common characteristic for
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nominals from IE verbs of hearing is the fact that they do not denote sound (the
physical thing heard), but the content of heard speech. The physical sound has often
an onomatopoeic origin (Buck 1949), as for example, Eng bang or pop, Bq tirots,
zart, punpa "bang", blaustrada, zanpa 'crash' or Sp pum 'bang, pop', patapum
'crash'. In hearing, it is very interesting to note how the proposed unidirectionality of
meaning change from concrete to abstract is not totally universal. Words meaning
mental attention or understanding can come to mean physical hearing. While in most
Romance languages, the words derived from Lat mtendere 'stretch out, direct one's
attention to' come to mean 'understand' (cf. Sp entender, It intendere), in French, the
semantic development went on and in Modern French, entendre means primarily
'hear'.
In Sweetser's opinion, the sense of hearing is similar to the sense of vision,
the most salient sense. Flearing shares with vision some of its characteristics when
speaking about mental activity, but it is not the same kind of activity. In hearing, the
voluntarily on-off control of vision is no longer applicable, we cannot control the
reception of sounds101.
The function of hearing is regarded as linguistic communication, as a means
of intellectual and emotional influence on each other; this is carried out in an
effective manner via the vocal organs and the auditory sense-channel. The sense of
hearing, therefore is connected to: (i) Heedfulness and internal receptivity, (ii)
Internal reception of ideas, understanding what is heard.
This readiness to internally receive and understand implies a readiness to
subject oneself to the influence of the speaker's content, and perhaps this readiness to
further respond in the way desired is what has caused the verb to also mean 'obey'.
As Sweetser states "internal receptiveness to the speaker's intentions which might
subsequently lead to compliance with the speaker's requests" (1990:41). But if the
sense connected par excellence with the sphere of understanding and knowledge is
vision, the question is what the difference between visual and auditory understanding
101
It is true that we cannot close our hearing perception, our ears, in the same way as we can
close our eyes, if we do not want to see something. However, it is equally true that we can decide
when to pay attention to something we are hearing and when not. In this case, I think we do have
some kind of on-off control. This is reflected in the usage of the verbs of hearing, as for instance in the
sentence: I heard her but I did not listen to her (Sp la oipero no la escuchaba).
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is. For Sweetser the difference lies on the fact that "hearing is connected with the
specifically communication aspects of understanding, rather than with intellection at
large" (1990:43).
These two senses, vision and hearing, are usually called in the literature
(Sekuler and Blake 1994; Viberg 1984) 'distant senses' because contact is not
needed in order to perceive through them. According to Sweetser, it is this distance
requirement that links these two senses to objectivity and intellect, whereas in the
cases of touch and taste - 'contact senses' their necessity for closeness with the
thing perceived makes them be connected with subjectivity, intimacy and emotion102.
The sense of touch has often been related to two fields: the general sense of
perception and the emotional feeling. As Sweetser states, in many IE languages, at
least one of the words that denotes 'emotional feeling' is related to the domain of
physical feeling (Sweetser 1990:37) and consequently, expressions such as wounded,
stroked, touched, which belong to the touch and tactile domain can also be used for
emotional sensations103. She also states that in all IE languages, the verb meaning 'to
feel' in the sense of touch is the same as the verb indicating general perception. For
example, the verb sentir (Lat < sentire) in Spanish. However, it seems that this
statement is overstated; in Russian, the verb for 'to feel' cuvstvovat is used in some
forms ('to touch', 'to taste', 'to smell' experience verbs) but in itself it cannot
describe any sensory modality (Moiseeva 1998: 160).
The Indo-European root for taste seems to be *g 'eus, which developed two
different meanings in Romance languages, i.e. 'taste', and in Germanic and Celtic
languages i.e., 'try' or 'choose'. The sense of taste seems to be linked to personal
likes and dislikes in the mental world. Perhaps the reason why this is so lies in the
fact that the sense of taste is most closely associated with fine discrimination.
According to Buck (1949:1031), in Hindi, there are six principal varieties of taste
with sixty-three possible mixtures and in Greek six, including the four fundamental
ones: 'sweet', 'bitter', 'acid' and 'salt'.
102 The implications of this contact/non-contact requirement are discussed in great detail in
Chapter 5, where I will characterise sense perception in terms of properties These properties will
constitute the bodily basis that constrains the creation of the extended meanings presented in Chapter
2 This will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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This makes the sense of taste very accurate from a descriptive point of view,
as it allows us to express ourselves very precisely when we want to describe a taste.
It is worth noting, as a contrast, the case of smell, which as Aristotle pointed out,
lacks any independent classification of smells similar to that of tastes.
Many of the verbs indicating smell often derive from specific physical
sensations or from aspects of the physical act of perception, whenever smell is
differentiated from general tactile sensation. The Indo-European root seems to be
*od- (cf. Lat odor) but it has also been suggested - in the case of English - that smell
is related to the meaning of 'vapour' or 'steam'. Sweetser does not consider this
sense as salient as the other ones in terms of abstract or mental connotations; she
establishes only two: Bad smell to indicate bad character or dislikeable mental
characteristics (e.g. stink) and the detection of such characteristics (e.g. the active
verb smell)104.
In Figure 4.1, Sweetser summarises the structure of English metaphors of
perception.
OBJECTIVE .S7y/?r—*■ Knowledge, mental vision (e.g. 'I see', 'a clear presentation')
INTELLECTUAL \V ontrol, monitoring
Physical manipulation, grasping (understanding = controlling)
Mental manipulation, control (understanding = grasping)
INTERPERSONAL Hearing *■ Internal receptivity ► Obedience
COMMUNICATION (physical reception) (heedfulness vs. being deaf to a plea) (Dan lystre)
SUBJECTIVE + EMOTIONAL FEEL ► EMOTION
TASTE ► PERSONAL PREFERENCE
Figure 4.1: The structure of perception metaphors (After Sweetser 1990:38).
103 Recall that this 'emotional feeling' meaning was included as part of a wider domain 'to
affect' in Section 2.3.3.
104
Olfactory verbs, however, do have more metaphorical meanings than those proposed by
Sweetser (see Section 2.3.4).
117
B. Iraide Ibarretxe-Antuhano Chapter 4: Problems m Polysemy
4.1.1. DISCUSSION
Based on the cognitive semantic principle that language is based on human
understanding and experience of the world, Sweetser claims that the paths of
semantic change are one-way and lead from the external (socio-physical) domain to
our internal (emotional, psychological) domain. In the case of English perception
verbs, the source domain is the vocabulary of physical perception, whereas the target
domain is the vocabulary of internal self and sensations. These domains are
structured by means of metaphor. Finally, Sweetser suggests that these metaphorical
mappings are not particular to one language, but constitute a cross-linguistic
phenomenon.
In Chapter 2, I analysed the semantic field of sense perception in three
different languages: English, Basque and Spanish. Based on these data, it can be said
that - as Sweetser predicts - many of the semantic extensions in this field are shared
by the three languages analysed, despite the fact that in some cases, each language
had even more extended meanings that are not present in the other two.
In the previous section, I presented Sweetser's metaphorical mappings for






As shown in Chapter 2, these are not the only possible metaphorical
mappings in sense perception verbs. What Kovecses (1995, in press) calls the
'metaphorical scope'103 of sense perception verbs is much larger than that proposed
by Sweetser; even in cases, such as smell, where Sweetser claims that it "has fewer
and less deep metaphorical connections with the mental domain than the other
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senses" (1990: 43). Smell, for instance, is not only mapped into dislikeable feelings,
but also into meanings such as 'to investigate', 'to suspect' and 'to guess' (Ibarretxe-
Antunano 1997).
Another factor that is not discussed in Sweetser's analysis is that in some
cases the extensions of meaning do not shift towards more abstract or metaphorical
domains, but they remain physical. For instance, in the case of the meaning 'to
affect' in the sense of touch illustrated in (1).
(1) Just don't touch anything in my room
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, the meaning of (1) does not only imply
physical contact but also a change of state. In (1), the person who utters this sentence
does not want the other person to change the state / position of anything in his / her
room.
Another example of this meaning can be seen in (2).
(2) Blackfly touched the flowers (COL)
This example states that a type of insect physically touched the flowers and
since this insect is harmful to them, the flowers were physically affected
As seen in Chapter 2, semantic extensions from physical perception onto a
physical domain are not only found in the sense of touch. In the sense of smell, we
have the meaning 'to trail something'; in vision, 'to visit' and 'to receive' among
others. These physical extensions of meaning are not taken into account in
Sweetser's analysis.
Metaphor is the cognitive device that Sweetser proposes as the structuring
means to link the physical prototypical domain to more abstract domains. However,
metaphor cannot explain or structure these physical extended meanings, because the
mappings in these cases are not between a physical and an abstract domain, but
between a physical and another physical domain. In Chapter 6, I will propose the
process called Property Selection as a possible solution for this problem
Another point that remains unanswered in her analysis is why certain source
domains get mapped onto certain target domains; the reasons why it is possible to
say Mary smelt the joke but not Mary touched the joke. In the Cognitiv e Linguistics
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model, the bodily basis of these verbs should be taken as the motivation for such
semantic extensions, but this approach does not discuss what it is exactly the bodily
basis in the field of perception. In Chapter 5, I will characterise the five senses in
terms of properties and state that these properties can be considered the bodily basis
of such semantic extensions.
A related issue is also the question of how much of the source domain is
mapped onto the target domain in these extensions of meaning. In other words, what
and how much information from the source domain is selected and transferred onto
the target domain.
It is commonly agreed among metaphor researchers that not everything from
the source domain gets mapped onto the target domain. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:
52) call this partial map of the structure of the source domain the 'used' part of
metaphor. However, in order to constrain metaphorical mappings it is not enough to
say that there is a selection of the source domain, it is necessary to show exactly what
it is that is partially mapped and what constraints are applied to that selection.
Attempts106 to constrain the mapping process in metaphorical production and
comprehension can be found in Lakoff s (1990, 1993) 'Invanance Principle'107, i.e.
"metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology of the source domain in a
way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain" (1993: 215). The
Invariance Principle is useful in order to constrain the nature of those mappings: that
is to say, it is not possible to map from the source domain structure that does not
preserve the inherent structure of the target domain. The only problem with this
principle is that it does not show exactly what part of the source domain is the one
that must be consistent with the structure of the target domain.
In Chapter 6, I introduce the process called 'Property Selection' as a possible
solution. Apart from providing an explanation for physical extended meanings, this
process will show not only how some of the set of properties that characterise the
l0b
These attempts are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
107
See also Lakoff and Turner (1989:82), Brugman (1990), Turner (1987:143-148, 1990,
1991:172-182, 1996).
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source domain are mapped onto the target domain, but also what properties are
mapped.
It is precisely by this selection of properties from the source domain in the
target domain that metaphorical mappings are constrained. The properties selected in
the target domain must be part of the properties identified in the source domain and
no others. The selection of properties does not only take place every time metaphor is
used for extending the meaning of a word, but in every extended meaning. That is
why this process can also account for semantic extensions that remain physical, for
those extensions that lie outside the scope of metaphor.
Finally, another issue that is not discussed in either Sweetser's approach or in
the general Cognitive Linguistics literature is the role that the semantic content of the
different elements in a sentence plays in the overall meamng of that sentence, and
thus, in the creation of polysemous senses. Well-known studies in this framework
have assumed that polysemous senses are carried by single lexical items, without
taking into account the semantic content of the co-occurring elements. Brugman's
(Brugman 1981, Lakoff 1987) analysis of the preposition over is an example of such
an assumption. This study will be reviewed in Section 7.1.1, where I will show how
some of the extended meanings in over are obtained by the interaction of the
semantic content of this preposition and the other co-occurring elements.
In the semantic field of sense perception - as pointed out in Chapter 2 -,
some of the extended meanings are not just the result of a verb being polysemous,
but the result of the semantics of the verb and that of its arguments. For instance, in a
sentence like (3)
(3) I told you to listen to your mother
one of the mappings that takes place in the source domain of heanng verbs is
between physical hearing and the meaning 'to heed', 'to pay attention'. In (3), the
speaker is not only asking the hearer to pay attention to what his/her mother is
saying, he/she is asked to follow and obey his/her mother's requests. In this example,
the argument to your mother is helping to create this shift from the meaning 'to heed'
to 'to obey'.
Chapter 5 discusses what these properties are.
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Another example can be (4).
(4) John hardly touched the food
The extended meamng in this case is 'to partake of food'. In this case, not
only the argument the food causes this meaning, but also the adjunct hardly
emphasises the meaning 'to partake', that is to say that he did not eat very much109. If
we replace the argument the food by the drink, the meaning will not longer be 'to
partake of food', but 'to partake of drink'; and if we change it for any other one not
related to food or drink, this meaning will not be inferred at all.
As neither Sweetser's analysis nor other studies within Cognitive Linguistics
provide an account for this kind of phenomenon, it might be useful to review an
approach that focuses on how individual lexical items - when combined with others
in phrases and clauses - can generate a larger set ofword senses.
As introduced in 1.2.3, Pustejovsky's (1995) Generative Lexicon is such a
model. The Generative Lexicon is an approach to the study of multiple meaning that
proposes a strong compositionality framework. In the following section, I take up
this model in order to see whether it can solve some of the shortcomings found in
Sweeter's theory in respect of the role that the arguments play in the overall meaning
of a sentence.
4.2. PUSTEJOVSKY'S GENERATIVE LEXICON
Pustejovsky's (1995) Generative Lexicon proposes that, within the
characterisation of the semantics of the lexical item - a verb in our case -, it is
possible to include the information that the arguments of the verb imply, and
therefore, to show how the overall meaning of the sentence is formed.
Pustejovsky postulates a generative framework for the composition of lexical
meanings. He proposes a new way of viewing decomposition by looking at the
generative or compositional aspects of Lexical Semantics, rather than decomposition
into a specified number of primitives. He rejects 'weak compositionality' models,
109
As argued in Ibarretxe-Antunano (1999d), the meaning 'to partake' is not only dependent
on the inclusion of the adverb hardly. This only supports or gives more emphasis to one of the
intrinsic characteristics of the sense of touch, namely <briefness >es> This view is extended in the
discussion in Chapter 7.
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where compositionality is achieved by enumeration of senses, and the number of
lexical senses (lexical listings) is proportional to the number of interpretations in the
language. Instead, he introduces a 'strong compositionality' model, where, while
still preserving Frege's principle of compositionality, the number of lexical senses
remains roughly constant relative to the space of possible interpretations in the
language. In his model, Pustejovsky wants to provide a formal statement of language
that is both expressive and flexible enough to capture the generative nature of lexical
creativity and sense extension phenomena.
In this model, there are four levels of representation; that is, the semantics of
a lexical item a is a structure of four components:
(5) a = <A, E, Q, I>
Before this model is adapted to our data, a brief description of each
component is provided.
(i)- ARGUMENT STRUCTURE (A): specification of number and type of
logical arguments, and how they are realised syntactically. There are four types of
arguments for lexical items:
-'True arguments' (ARGn): syntactically realised parameters of the lexical
item.
-"Default arguments' (D-ARG): parameters that participate in the logical
expressions in the qualia, but not necessarily expressed syntactically.
-'Shadow arguments' (S-ARG): parameters that are semantically incorporated
into the lexical item. They can be expressed only by operations of subtyping or
discourse specification.
-'True adjuncts': parameters which modify the logical expression, but are part
of the situational interpretation and are not tied to any particular lexical item's
semantic representation.
(ii)- EVENT STRUCTURE (E): definition of the event type of a lexical item
and a phrase. Making use of the constructions introduced by van Benthem (1983)
and Kamp (1979), Pustejovsky interprets an 'extended event structure' as a tuple < E,
<
, <, °, c=, * >, where E is the set of events, < is a partial order ofpart-of < is a strict
partial order, 0 is overlap, e is inclusion and * designates the 'head' of an event. He
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argues that an event structure with structured subevents can be represented in an
event structure tree, which represents the specific events and their types (En),
together with the ordering restriction over these events (RESTR110).
(iii)- QUALIA STRUCTURE (Q): models of explanation. It provides the
binding of the A and E parameters. The Qualia specifies four essential aspects of a
word's meaning:
-'Constitutive': the relation between an object and its constituent parts.
-'Formal': that which distinguishes it within a larger domain.
-'Telic': its purpose and function.
-'Agentive': factors involved in its origin or 'bringing about'.
In the qualia roles it is very important to bear in mind that on the one hand,
every category expresses a qualia structure, giving in this way a uniform semantic
representation compositionally from all elements of a phrase; and on the other, that
not all lexical items carry a value for each qualia role, allowing the specification or
application of the qualia relative to particular semantic classes.
(iv)- LEXICAL INFIERITANCE STRUCTURE (I): identification of how a
lexical structure is related to other structures in the type lattice, and its contribution to
the global organisation of a lexicon.
The argument, event and qualia types must conform to the well-formedness
conditions that are defined by the type system and by the lexical inheritance structure
when undergoing operations of semantic composition. These four levels are
connected by means of generative devices, which provide the compositional
interpretation of words in context. There are three main devices described in
Pustejovsky (1995:61):
(i)-TYPE COERCION: where a lexical item or phrase is coerced to a
semantic interpretation by a governing item in the phrase, without change of its
syntactic type.
(ii)-SELECTIVE BINDING: where a lexical item or phrase operates
specifically on the substructure of a phrase, without changing the overall type in the
composition.
110 For a complete description of each restriction, see Pustejovsky (1995:67fT.)
124
B. Iraide Ibarretxe-Antunano Chapter 4: Problems in Polysemy
(iii)-CO-COMPOSITION: where multiple elements within a phrase behave as
functors, generating new non-lexicalised senses for the words in composition. Here
there are also included cases of underspecified semantic forms becoming
contextually enriched, such as 'manner co-composition', 'feature transcription', and
'light verb specification'.
With the definition of the functional behaviour of lexical items at these four
different levels of representation, Pustejovsky tries to characterise the lexicon as an
active and integral component in the composition of sentence meaning. Through
different expressive mechanisms, this model aims to group different word senses into
a single 'meta-entry' or, following Pustejovsky and Anick (1988) 'lexical conceptual
paradigms (lcps)', which will encode regularities of word behaviour dependent on
context. These 'lcps' will constrain what a possible word meaning can be through the
mechanism of well-formed semantic expressions. Pustejovsky uses the lcps in order
to account for that inherent 'something' in the semantics of nominals that makes
them able to project any of the separate senses of the noun in distinct syntactic and
semantic environments. He argues that lcps do not represent different senses but
aspects of the same meta-entry. For example, in the case of window as a physical
object and as an aperture, Pustejovsky represents them by means of a dotted type111
of the form:
a: Gi a:a2
lcp (a): CTi . 02 where lcp = (cii . <72, ai, 02}
that is to say for the case of window.
windowJcp = {physobj . aperture, physobj, aperture}
Under Pustejovsky's approach metaphorically extended meanings are not
included as part of the language; these cases are explained pragmatically instead.
Briscoe and Copestake (1991) try to incorporate this in their approach.
111
A 'dotted type' is the logical type relation between the polysemous senses of a lexical
item. (See Pustejovsky 1995: 93, for a more detailed description).
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They argue that whereas other approaches postulate for a cognitive account of
conceptual transfer (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) or for a general pragmatic account of
the 'cue-validity' (Nunberg 1979), these phenomena can be accounted by rule-
governed lexical processes, giving lexical licenses or rules which conventionalised
and language specific aspects of these general conceptual transfers are expressed and
which serve as language-specific filters on the general process.
4.2.1. DISCUSSION
One of the major drawbacks that Pustejovsky sees in previous compositional
approaches is that these do not see the lexicon as an active and central component in
the linguistic description, but either as active functors or passive arguments. In his
Generative Lexicon, Pustejovsky argues that a core set of word senses is used to
generate a larger set of word senses when individual lexical items are combined with
others in phrases and clauses. For instance, in the case of verbs, the extensions of
meaning are achieved by the combination of the verb with its arguments.
In Chapter 2,1 presented a typology of both prototypical and non-prototypical
meanings in sense perception verbs. In the case of the semantic field of touch, 1
proposed several extended meanings, some were still physical such as 'to partake of
food or drink' and 'to affect, physically', and some of them were abstract or
metaphorical as 'to reach' and 'to affect, non-physically'. In this section, I offer a
semantic characterisation of these meanings using Pustejovsky's framework to see
whether this framework is enough to explain how these semantic extensions are
obtained.
One of the meanings proposed for the sense of touch is 'to partake of food or
drink', as illustrated in (6):
(6) John hardly touched the food
ARGSTR = [ARG1 = [7] : human]
[ARG2 = Q] : physobj (TELIC = eat)]
[D-ARG= |T) ' how]
EVENTSTR = [E, = e, activity]
QUALIA = [FORMAL = partake (ei, (T|, Q], Q] )
[AGENTIVE = touch_act (ei, [7],[7] )
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The verb touch in (6) is associated with three arguments: two TRUE
ARGUMENTS (the subject ARG1 and the object ARG2) and a DEFAULT
ARGUMENT, each argument is given a boxed number, called 'tags' (Pollard and
Sag 1994), that indicate how the information is shared between these arguments and
the qualia. The verb is analysed as an activity, as shown in the EVENT
STRUCTURE. Both the ARGSTR and the EVENTSTR are bound by the QUALIA.
The activity is identified as that AGENTIVE act of 'touching' involving the subject
ARG1 and the object ARG2. The FORMAL role expresses the activity of there being
such an object ARG2, whose role and function is expressed by its TELIC quale, and
a D-ARG that tells us about the manner in which the activity was performed. As the
ARG2 in this case is the food, the meaning that I have represented is 'to partake of
food'; however, if we change this ARG2 for another one like the drink, the meaning
would be 'to partake of drink' instead.
It seems that Pustejovsky's analysis accounts for this example quite neatly, as
we can see how every member of the sentence contributes to the overall meaning of
the sentence.
Example (7) is more complicated. There are two possible interpretations: one
is the prototypical meaning of touch as an activity verb, and the other is the extended
physical meaning of To affect'. The characterisation of (7) is as follows:
(7) John touched my clothes
ARGSTR= [ARG1 = [7] : human]
[ARG2 = [J] : phyobj]
EVENTSTR = (a) [Ei = ei activity]
(b) [Ei = ei: activity]
[E2 = e2: result]
RESTR = < ra
QUALIA = [FORMAL = affected (e2, \J\ ) (Only in (b))
[AGENTIVE = touch_act (ei, [7], [Tj ) ( [7] not in (b)).
In this example, the verb touch has two TRUE ARGUMENTS: the subject
ARG1 and the object ARG2. The EVENTSTR in (7) is more complicated than that
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in the previous example, as there are two options. Option (a)"2 corresponds to the
first interpretation, i.e. prototypical activity meaning. In (a), the verb is taken as an
activity in the EVENTSTR, which also results in an AGENTIVE quale that involves
the subject ARG1 and the object ARG2. Option (b) corresponds to the second
interpretation, where there is not only a contact between the subject and the object,
but also an effect on the object, a change of place, position in this case. In (b) then,
the verb is analysed as an accomplishment, containing two subevents, an activity (ei)
and a result (ej). The order in which these subevents occur is restricted by the
relation of 'exhaustive ordered part of represented by < a , where ei and e2 are
temporally ordered such that the first (ei) precedes (e2), each is a logical part of the
event and there is no other event that is part of it (see Pustejovsky 1995: 69). In this
case, the AGENTIVE act of 'touching' involves only the subject ARG1. This
AGENTIVE role is bound to ei (activity). The FORMAL quale expresses the result
of that activity, e2, and the object ARG2, which has been affected by such an activity
upon which the result has been inferred.
Although in (7), there are two possible interpretations inferred, it is possible
to account for both using Pustejovsky's framework. The disambiguation is carried
out by a different characterisation of the EVENTSTR (Options (a) and (b)).
A problematic example, however, is (8) where two unpredictable
interpretations are simultaneously inferred.
(8) John touched Mary
ARGSTR= [ARG1 = [7] : human]
[ARG2 = [7] : human]
EVENTSTR = (a) [E,=e, state]
(b) [Ei = ei; activity]
(c) [Ei = ei; activity]
[E2 = e2: result]
RESTR = < a
QUALIA = [FORMAL = affected (e2, Q] ) (Only in (c))
[AGENTIVE = touch act (ei, m,[T| )( [7] not in (c)).
112 The possibility of having several different options in the EVENTSTR is my modification
of Pustejovsky's model.
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In this example, the verb touch has only two TRUE ARGUMENTS: the
subject ARG1 and the object ARG2. The EVENTSTR in (8) is more complicated
than that in the previous example, as there are three options. In (a), the verb is
understood as a state, in which case, the AGENTIVE act involves the subject ARG1
and the object ARG2. This interpretation can be paraphrased as John being next to
Mary. Options (b) and (c) are explained in the same way, as (a) and (b) in the
previous example (7). In (b), the verb is taken as an activity in the EVENTSTR,
which also results into an AGENTIVE quale that involves the subject ARG1 and the
object ARG2. This option is the prototypical activity meaning of touch, where only
contact is implied. And in (c), the verb is analysed as an accomplishment, containing
two subevents, an activity (eO and a result (e2), also restricted by the relation of
'exhaustive ordered part of represented by < a. Again in (c), John does not only have
some physical contact with Mary, but he causes an effect on her.
However, in (8) there is an added difficulty. In this example it is not possible
to characterise using Pustejovsky's model, the difference in meaning when we are
referring to the physical or to the abstract/metaphorical touching. This ambiguity is
not present if the EVENTSTR is (a), namely when Ei is a state and it is understood
that John is adjacent to Mary; but in those cases when the EVENTSTR is either (b),
i.e. John can touch Mary physically or metaphorically, or (c) i.e. John can affect her,
physically (making her shiver for instance) or metaphorically (feelings). The
semantic characterisation for both arguments and the verb touch under this model is
the same either if the reading is physical or abstract; however, it is very clear that
they are two different interpretations that must be accounted for separately.
Unfortunately, this model does not seem to have a solution for either explaining how
these two meanings are inferred or solving this ambiguity by means of semantic
characterisations. It could be argued that the possible metaphorical readings could be
listed somewhere in the QUALIA, but it is not clear how this would work in cases
like (c), where the same arguments and event type produce two unpredictable
interpretations.
If we look at other metaphorical meanings in this sense, for instance the
meaning 'to reach' illustrated in (9), the same problem seems to be present.
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(9) John touched the highest point in his career
For example, 'to reach' in (9) can be represented as follows:
ARGSTR = [ARG1 = [7] : human]
[ARG2 = [7] : obj [7]: phys or non-phys (TELIC: location)]
[D-ARG= Q] : where]
EVENTSTR = [Ei = ei: activity, [7]: phys or non-phys ]
QUALIA = [FORMAL = reach (e,, [7], Q],Q] ) ]
[AGENTIVE = touch act (ej, [7],Q] )i ]
In this case, there are also two TRUE ARGUMENTS and a DEFAULT
ARGUMENT. The verb is analysed as an activity in the EVENSTR. The activity is
identified as an act of 'touching' involving the subject ARG1 and the object ARG2.
The word point fills in ARG2 in this example and we know by the information
provided in the TELIC quale, that the function of this ARG2 is to give reference to a
location. The problem in this example is twofold. On the one hand, we see that
although the FORMAL quale is 'reach', it does not seem to be very clear how this
meaning is derived from the interaction between the QUALIA and the members of
the ARGSTR. The other problem is that in this case, point does not refer to a
physical point, but to an imaginary one. The point that John has reached is a level in
his career. This problem is solved by specifiying in the ARG2 that the object can be
either physical or non-physical (phys or non-phys). This information is bounded to
the EVENTSTR in a way that, whenever the object in ARG2 is physical then, the
activity referred to is also physical, and whenever the object selected in ARG2 is
non-physical, then the activity in the EVENTSTR is also non-physical. By adding
this information to the description of the ARG2, it seems that we can account for the
metaphorical meaning of (9).
Flowever, in an example like (10), where the meaning inferred is 'to deal
with", we do not need to specify whether ARG2 is physical or non-physical, as the
ARG2 is a concept, i.e. non-physical entity.
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(10) John touched on the topic
ARGSTR = [ARG1 = [7] : human]
[ARG2 = [7] : concept (CONST = abstract/count)]
[D-ARG= Q] : where]
EVENTSTR = [Ht = e): activity]
QUALIA = [FORMAL = dealt with (e,, \J\ ,|T] ,\T\ )
[AGENTIVE = touch act (ei, Q], \T\ )
In this example the FORMAL quale is 'dealt with'. However, as pointed out
in the previous examples how this meaning is obtained is not absolutely clear. It
could be argued that the fact that ARG2 is a concept might result in this reading as
'deal with'. However, the fact that ARG2 is a concept does not seem to explain this
meaning. As we can see in (11), ARG2 is also characterised as a concept, but the
sentence is not felicitous.
(11) *Mary touched the joke
ARGSTR = [ARG1 = [7] : human]
[ARG2 = [7] : concept (CONST = abstract/count)]
EVENTSTR = [Ei = e]; activity]
QUALIA = [AGENTIVE = touch act (ei, Q], |T| )
To sum up, we see that it is possible to account for some metaphorical
meanings under Pustejovsky's approach, either by adding more information in the
ARG2, physical or non-physical as in (9) or by specifying that the ARG2 is a
concept as in (10). However, it seems that this model is unable to explain how and
why restrictions occur; that is to say why (10) is acceptable, but (11) is infelicitous
As will be explained in more detail in Chapter 7, the reason why this example
is not felicitous lies in the fact that ARG2 is not a 'touchable' type of concept, i.e. a
joke cannot be touched in any abstract possible way as a topic is in the previous
example. From a Cognitive Linguistics point of view, the fact that the joke is not
licensed with the verb touch stems from the way we experience this sense in our
lives, in the human embodiment of this sense (Johnson 1987).
In other words, the bodily basis of the tactile sense, which I will characterise
in terms of properties in the following chapter, clashes with the way in which we
seem to understand and experience a joke. In order for this sentence to be felicitous,
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the properties of the ARG2 are required to preserve the properties that characterise
the sense of touch.
This requirement, that I call 'verb property requirement' (see Chapter 7),
seems to be acknowledged by Pustejovsky in the example when he discusses read
and hook. In order for the representation of reading to be considered well-formed, it
is necessary to have a complement not only containing information but also being
prepositional, i.e. a complement that is 'readable'. Pustejovsky solves this
requirement by making reference to the dotted argument x.y in the qualia, apart from
the FORMAL definition of the relation between arguments (1995: 96). I will
propose, however, that this requirement should be present in all cases, even in those
examples where the semantic content of the arguments is more important in the
extension ofmeaning than that of the verb itself (cf. 'to partake of food or drink').
4.3. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, I have revised a cognitive semantic approach to the study of
polysemy and semantic change: Sweetser's mind-AS-body metaphor. This author
claims that the paths of semantic change are unidirectional, from a concrete domain
to an abstract domain. In the case of English perception verbs, the mappings take
place between the vocabulary of physical perception and the vocabulary of the
internal self and sensations. These mappings, which appear to be cross-linguistic, are
not random, but well structured by means ofmetaphor.
Based on the data analysed in Chapter 2, I have concluded that as suggested
by Sweetser, the mappings between these two different domains of experience are
not particular to English, but to other languages such as Basque and Spanish. It is
also argued that the metaphorical scope of sense perception verbs is much larger than
that proposed by Sweetser. In fact, meanings do not only extend to more abstract
domains, but also within the physical domain.
It has been pointed out that under this theory, such physical extended
meanings cannot be accounted for. Another shortcoming of this approach is the fact
that it does not give an explanation for the reasons why a particular source domain is
mapped onto a particular target domain. This model does not show exactly what
'used' part of the source domain is mapped onto the target domain.
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These points are further discussed in Chapter 6, where a process called
'Property Selection' is introduced as a possible way of solving these problems.
Finally, the last point not addressed in this theory is the analysis of the
semantics of the other elements in the sentence and their impact in the overall
meaning. That is to say, the question whether the different senses of a lexical item
are the result of the different senses of a polysemous verb through the interaction
between the semantics of the verb and its arguments; or whether it is the choice of a
particular argument what really determines different meanings.
As a possible solution for this last point, 1 have applied Pustejovsky's
Generative Lexicon to the analysis of some examples drawn from the data analysed
in Chapter 2. I have concluded that this model works very neatly for those physical
extensions ofmeaning, but in the case of metaphorical senses, it does not seem to be
able to constrain what instances are felicitous and what are not. The discussion of
this issue and a possible solution are presented in Chapter 7.
The objective of this thesis is to propose a hypothesis that can account for the
reasons why and the way in which the polysemy in perception verbs occurs. The
framework that I will propose in the following chapters is based on the advantages
that both Sweetser - and Cognitive Linguistics - and Pustejovsky's frameworks
have. The advantages of Sweetser's approach are the use of metaphor as the
structuring cognitive device for abstract extended meanings, the theoretical tenet of
embodiment, i.e. the fact that the bodily basis of these senses motivates these
semantic extensions. The advantage in Pustejovsky's model is the idea that meaning
is generatively compositional113, i.e. the interpretation of the verb is intluenced by
the semantics of its arguments.
113 I would like to point out that one does not need to comply with a generative view of
language, as Pustejovsky does, in order to accept a degree of compositionality in meaning (see
Langacker's work on cognitive grammer and the notions of'constructional schema' (1991b: 15-19).
What I see as an advantage of this model is the way in which Pustejovsky shows how some meanings
are obtained by means of the semantic content of the words that integrate the sentence, not
Pustejovsky's generative framework.
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The main contribution to the study of polysemy in this thesis will be to fill in
the gaps left unanswered by both models. The gaps in Sweetser's model are the lack
of explanation for physical extended meanings; the lack of a description for the
bodily basis of perception verbs, and consequently, the impossibility to show how
this bodily basis constrains both the creation of extended meanings, and the devices
that structure them, i.e. metaphor. The gap in Pustejovsky's model is the lack of a
constraint that could establish what elements can or cannot co-occur with what
elements in the same sentence.
In the following chapter, I will start with the description of the bodily basis of
perception verbs. As pointed out in this discussion, this description is central to the
study of polysemy, because it will provide the tools necessary to constrain not only
the devices used to create extended meanings (Chapter 6), but also what elements
can take part in the creation of such meanings (Chapter 7).
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CHAPTER 5: PERCEPTION, THE SENSES AND
OUR LANGUAGE.
One of the main tenets of Cognitive Linguistics is the idea of embodiment,
i.e. how meaning is grounded in the nature of our bodies and perception, in our
interaction with the physical, social, and cultural environment that surrounds us.
Concepts are grounded in our bodily experience and then elaborated by structures of
imagination, i.e. metaphor. This implies that if we are able to characterise the domain
of experience that constitutes the source domain it will be possible to explain the
semantic extensions that occur in the corresponding target domain. In other words,
the reason why it is possible to use these verbs of perception to express other
meanings - apart from the physical sense perception - must lie in the way we
perceive and experience the senses.
In this chapter, I will establish what the bodily basis of perception verbs is.
Section 5.1 describes how human perception works. In Section 5.2 the relation of the
main properties that describe the process of perception through the five senses is
presented. Section 5.3 states the differences between these properties and semantic
features in Componential Analysis. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section
5.4.
5.1. PERCEPTION AND THE SENSES
According to Sekuler and Blake (1994), perception is a biological process
wherein the brain derives descriptions of objects and events in the world, using
information gathered by the senses. Thus, the traditional five114 senses - vision,
hearing, touch, smell and taste - have been described as "channels for information
about the world" (Sekuler and Blake 1994), and as "different modalities for
conveying information about the physical world" (Classen 1993: 4). There are two
114
There has not always been agreement on the number of senses. Based on the intrinsic
relationship between the senses and the elements - earth, air, fire, water, and the quintessence -
Aristotle, in De Amma (c. 320 BC), was the first one to group them into five. This classification,
however, has been questioned throughout Western history by various philosophers (see Vinge 1975)
and, more recently, by sensory scientists (see Wolfe 1988:xi-xii)
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key words in these definitions: information and different. The five senses give us
information about the world we live in, but the way this information is perceived,
processed, and understood by human beings is different. These differences are based
on biological and cultural constraints. Biologically, each sense has its own receptors
- eyes, ears, skin, nose, mouth - and its own pathways to the brain. Each sense
receptor responds to different stimuli: light, sound waves, mechanical disturbances,
volatile substances, and soluble substances. Culturally, human beings rely more on
some senses than on others. For Western societies, vision is the most reliable sense.
This supremacy of sight over the other senses finds its origin at the Enlightenment,
when philosophers such as Locke and Descartes regarded sight as the sense of
science. However, in earlier periods of Western history, as well as in other
contemporary cultures, senses such as smell, touch, and hearing are considered
important in making sense of the world115. For instance, Classen et al. (1994: ch. 3)
report on the Ongee of the Andaman Islands in the South Pacific, whose lives are
ordered by smell. For the Tzotzil of Mexico, reported in Classen (1993: ch. 6) heat
(hence touch) constitutes the basic force of the cosmos. Yet for Australian aborigines
hearing is more salient than any other sense (Evans and Wilkins 1998).
There are three main elements in perception: the person that carries out the
perception or perceiver (PR), the object - animate or inanimate - being perceived
(OP) and the act of perception itself (P). It is to a description of these elements that
we turn now.
5.1.1. PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES
A complete understanding of how human perception works must include
descriptions of the three elements (PR, OP, P) mentioned above. It is necessary to
understand which parts of our body and brain are involved in the perceptual process,
and how these organs work. The reason for this is that the function and limitations of
these systems shape and constrain our perceptual processes, the way in which we
experience the world. As we have said before, our experience and understanding of
the world motivates our conceptual categories, the meaning of words. Therefore, as
115 See Howes (1991) for a collection of papers devoted to the anthropology of the senses in
different cultures. Ackerman (1990) is also an exploration of the origin and evolution of the senses, as
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we shall see in Chapter 6, our perceptual system must also constrain and affect the
way we conceptualise and use our sense-related language. This is also constrained by
the way we - as human beings - perceive perception, that is to say how we think and
how we experience the act of perception itself.
A full detailed description of human perceptual systems lies outside the scope
of this thesis"6. In the following subsections, however, I will include a brief
description of the physiology of each sense, together with a brief discussion of our
'perception of perception'. These will be extended in Section 5.2, when the
properties defining these senses are introduced. As shown in the analysis, these two
constraints - sense physiology and our perception - do not always coincide. The way
we think we perceive with these senses sometimes does not correspond to the way in
which the physiological processes take place.
5.1.1.1. Vision
The eyes are the first element in the visual system. Eyes capture light -
stimulus for vision - and generate messages about it. The human eye consists of
three concentric layers: the fibrous tunic (outermost layer), the vascular tunic (middle
layer), and the retina. The function of the outermost layer, the fibrous tunic, is to
protect the eyeball. It consists of the sclera (white part) and the cornea (transparent).
The function of the middle layer is to nourish the eyeball. It consists of the choroid, a
dark pigment that nourishes the retina, and the ciliary body, the structure that
contains the aqueous humor that fills the anterior chamber. The ciliary body gives
rise to the iris, a circular patch of tissue that gives the eye its characteristic colour. In
the middle of the iris lies the pupil, an opening within two sets of muscles. These
muscles allow the change of the size of the pupil, which in turn controls the amount
of light reaching the back of the eye. Behind the iris, there is an optical element of
the eye, the crystalline lens. The lens must be transparent to provide a good vision;
an opacity or reduced transparency of the lens - known as cataracts - would cause a
deficient visual perception or even blindness.
well as their variation across cultures.
116
For a full description of the perceptual systems and processes, see Gibson (1966), Harper
(1972), Held (1988), Maelicke (1990), Sekuler and Blake (1994), Wolfe (1988), among others.
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The lens is composed of three components: the elastic capsule, the epithelial
layers and the lens itself. The main function of the capsule is to mould the shape of
the lens, thus focusing sharply near or distant objects upon the retina. This process is
called 'accommodation' (Harper 1972: 115; Sekuler and Blake 1993: 38). Finally,
between the lens and the next layer, the retina, there is the vitreous chamber.
The retina is the neural tissue at the back of the eye. Some landmarks can be
identified in the retina: the macula, in whose centre lies the fovea, the part stimulated
by an object in the direct line of sight; the optic disks, where nerve fibres exit the
retina carrying information to the brain; and the pigment epithelium.
As we have said before, the physical stimulus for vision is light. The visual
system can respond to a very large range of stimulus intensities. Light brings
information about the objects in the environment (Gibson 1966). However, in order
for light to provide information, there are some requirements to be fulfilled (Sekuler
and Blake 1994: 44):
(i) Light must be sufficiently intense to penetrate the eyes, reaching the
photosensitive material in the retina.
(ii) The distribution of light must be properly focused.
(iii) The pattern of light falling on the retina must preserve the spatial
structure of the object from which it is reflected; otherwise, it will not be useful as
a source of information about the structure and layout of objects.
The incoming light must pass through a complex of neural elements before
reaching the photoreceptors in the macula, which are actually responsible for
converting light into neural signals. There are two types of photoreceptors: cones,
which work in daylight; and rods, which work in dim illumination. These
photoreceptors transform the so-called retinal image - the pattern of light distribution
reaching the retina - into a neural image. This neural image passes onto a network of
diverse cells called collector cells. These cells integrate all the information from
groups of neighbouring photoreceptors. The output from the network of collector
cells provides the input to the retinal ganglion cells. Due to the centre / surround
organisation of their receptive fields, their main task is to detect differences in light
level or contrast. These differences, as discussed below, are reflected in language.
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The axons of the ganglion cells form the optic nerve that provides all the
input data for the neural processing of visual information within the brain. The optic
nerves from both eyes converge at the optic chiasm. The optic nerve from each eye
branches into two segments - one crossed, where fibres cross to the opposite side of
the brain; the other uncrossed, where fibres do not change sides. Within the chiasm,
crossed fibres from one eye join with uncrossed fibres from the other eye. These new
combinations are called optic tracts. Most of these fibres are projected to a cluster of
cell bodies called the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN); and the remaining to areas of
the midbrain, such as the superior colliculus. This is designed to guide orienting
movements of the eyes and head towards detected objects. This ability to orientate
the eyes towards the object is reflected in the language in expressions such as point
of view and will be represented later in the analysis under the property <location>.
The colliculus is also prepared for detecting objects located away from the point of
fixation (Sparks 1988). That is why vision, together with hearing, are called the far
distance senses: There is no need for the object perceived to be close to the eye117.
The LGN has two distinct populations of neurones - magnocellular and parvocellular
cells. The output from these cells is sent to the visual cortex in the occipital lobe, the
major visual centre. The visual cortex is composed of cortical cells that respond to
stimulation of a restricted area of the retina. These cells register information about
orientation, direction of motion, binocularity and colour.
In sum, vision provides us with information about the shape, size, orientation,
colour, distance and motion of the OP. In Western society, vision is considered as the
most reliable sense, as the sense that offers the most accurate information about the
world outside.
It is important to notice how the physiology of perception and our perception
of perception is sometimes different. As noticed before, vision is believed to be a
distant sense. That is to say, we do not need to have contact with what we see.
Therefore, despite the fact that human beings perceive vision as an external sense the
physical stimulus for vision - light - must penetrate the eyes to be transformed into
neural elements. In fact, during the Enlightenment, philosophers saw in this
117 This is represented by the property <closeness n0> in Section 5.2.2.
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detachment from the eyes and the OP the basis for the 'objectivity" of vision, and
hence, the basis for the scientific value of this sense. Properties <contact no> and
<internal in Section 5.2.2 reflect this fact.
Analogies between the physiology of vision and metaphorical expressions in
language are very obvious. For instance, the fact that the eyes are the most important
element in the visual system is reflected in expressions like I couldn 7 believe it until
1 saw it with my own eyes, to ascertain the visual taking-in of an authentic situation or
phenomenon (Alm-Arvius 1993: 33; Lipinska-Grzegorek 1977: 4). The eyes are not
only the first element in visual perception. They are perceived as the way to penetrate
the human mind. The eyes are considered as reflecting our real thoughts. That is why
there are expressions such as I couldn 7 see any hint ofremorse in his eyes.
In the description of the lens, it has been mentioned how it must be
transparent in order to see properly. Opacity in the lens is known as cataracts. Similar
analogies with these cataractous lens that damage vision are found in language too,
in sentences like (1):
(1) His greed / hate didn't let him see the truth.
In this sentence there is an analogy between the defective lens118 and the
greed / hate. In both cases they do not let the person see the reality, either physical
( the objects around) or metaphorical (the truth).
Another characteristic of the lens reflected in language is the ability to focus
near or distant objects. This process of 'accommodation' can be seen in expressions
like to be out offocus, to get something into focus, to come into focus and so on.
There are also similarities between the physical stimulus for vision - light -
and some metaphors in languages. In respect to the first condition mentioned above -
intensity in light source -, expressions like (2) - (6) are found in English (Danesi
1990: 223).
(2) That was a brilliant idea.
"s It could be argued that to think that the cataracts constitute the experiential basis for (1) is
a bit far-fetched, especially if we take into account that this kind of semantic extensions may have
arisen before sophisticated knowledge of human physiology (Barcelona p.c ). Perhaps the source for
this type of metaphor comes from the experience of putting an opaque object in front of our eyes This
object could be external as well as internal (cataracts or any cause of blindness).
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(3) I take a dim view of that whole affair
(4) What you are saying is not very clear
(5) That is a transparent argument
(6) Can you elucidate your idea?
In these examples, a different meaning is inferred depending on the intensity
of the visual stimulus. Dim view in (3) implies that this person has a poor
understanding of the affair in question. This is a metaphorical use of dim light, which
refers to a poor or weak light. The opposite case is found in (2), where brilliant
means 'splendid, intelligent'. Again this is a metaphorical use of the adjective
brilliant that refers to shine, brightness119. In other words, the intensity of the light
that our eyes perceive does seem to have an influence on our metaphors. If the
intensity of the light is not enough, we perceive things as negative, weak. If the
intensity of the light is strong, we perceive things as positive, good. That is why we
can utter expressions such as (2) to (6) above, and solve problems by giving them
some Tight' as in (7).
(7) Her speech threw light on the matter (Danesi 1990: 223)
5.1.1.2. Hearing
The stimulus for hearing consists of sound waves, which are captured by the
ears. Our perception of hearing corresponds to the physiological process of these
sound waves coming inside our ears. This is represented by the property <internal
NCS> in Section 5.2.2. These sound waves are then transformed into neural events by
the hair cells and analysed by neurones specialised for frequency and sound location.
In hearing, as in vision, it is possible to locate the source and direction of stimulus,
where sounds are coming from, even if the object that emits the sound is far away
from us, and even if we cannot perceive with our eyes, we can still hear it. Properties
<location yes> and <closeness no> in Section 5.2.2 represent these facts.
1,9
Etymologically, the original sense of this word (< F brilliant, pres. part. OFr briller
'sparkle') was to sparkle as a beryl.
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The ear is divided into three parts: the outer ear, the middle ear, and the inner
ear. The outer ear consists of the pinnae, the auditory channel and the eardrum. The
pinnae act like reflecting surfaces that modify the complexity of sound entering the
ear (Batteau 1967). After the sound is collected by each pinna, it is channelled down
the auditory canal. At the end, sound pressure comes in contact with the eardrum, an
oval membrane that vibrates when sound pressure waves strike it. Both the pinnae
and the eardrum are like a directional microphone. The eardrum forms the outer wall
of the middle ear. In this small chamber, the vibrations in the eardrum are transferred
to the oval window by three small bones called the ossicles. The main function of the
middle ear is to "serve as an impedance matching device and as a circuit overload
protector" (Sekuler and Blake 1994: 304). The next part is the inner ear, where
mechanical vibrations are converted into electrical nerve impulses to be carried to the
brain. The inner ear consists of two series of hollow cavities carved into the temporal
bone of the skull: the semicircular canals, which are concerned with the maintenance
of bodily posture and balance, and the cochlea, which contains specialised receptors
- hair cells - that place us in contact with our environment. These pressure changes
stimulate the receptor cells in the cochlea. The vibration of the oval window causes
pressure changes in the fluid that fills the cochlea. These pressure changes cause
movement in the hair cells, thus providing the stimulus for their activity. The cochlea
transforms sound energy (pressure waves) into neural information, which is carried
out of the inner ear by the auditory nerve. This auditory nerve branches into several
different pathways that reconverge within the auditory cortex. The different
pathways seem to process different aspects of auditory information for locating and
identifying sound sources in the auditory environment (Evans 1974). Vision and
smell too perceive information by 'double' paths and 'double' organs. As was
discussed in the previous section, in vision, fibres branching from the optic nerve of
each eye are projected onto the LGN. In smell, both cavities in the nose seem to
work in alternative cycles. The only difference between hearing on the one hand and
vision and smell on the other is that the PR is not aware of this fact in the case of
vision and smell, only in hearing.
Our perception of the ear both as a cavity where sounds can get in and also
can get out and as a 'double' organ where information is received from two distinct
142
B. Iraide Ibarretxe-Antuhano Chapter 5: Perception, the Senses and our language
sources is shown in language in expressions such as in one ear and out of the other.
An ear is not only a place where sounds can get through, they are also containers for
those sounds, as expressions such as earful attest.
5.1.1.3. Touch
The stimulus for touch consists of mechanical disturbances of the skin when
in contact with a different object. The main characteristic of this sense perceived by
the PR is in fact the contact that exists between the PR and OP120. This characteristic
comes under the property <contact yes> in the following section.
These mechanical disturbances, even the smallest ones, are registered by
several different kinds of specialised 'mechanoreceptors' situated in various layers of
the skin. In the following section, the fact that even a minimal disturbance stimulates
the sense of touch is represented by the property <briefness :,es>- These
mechanoreceptors are sensitive to mechanical pressure or deformation of the skin.
Afferent fibres from these mechanoreceptors carry neural impulses caused by tactile
stimulation into the dorsal side of the spinal cord. Inside the spinal cord, these
afferents make synaptic contact with two major classes of neurones: interneurones
and those constituting the lemniscal pathway. A circuit composed of interneurones,
motor neurones and afferents mediates reflex reactions. Interneurones synapse onto
motor neurones, whose axons go out the spinal cord and travel to muscles near the
body area where the afferents originated. The other class of spinal cord neurones in
the lemniscal pathway carries information to particular regions in the brain stem.
Information about pain and temperature is carried to the brain by a different pathway,
the spinothalamic tract. Within the brain, touch information is processed in various
specialised cortical regions that contain maps of the surface of the body. Touch
information is received and processed by the somatosensory cortex. This cortical
region is subdivided into two major parts: S-I (first somatosensory area) and S-II
(second somatosensory area). Both receive input from the thalamus, but S-II seems
to receive information from S-I as well.
120 This can be seen in many metaphorical expressions in language, for instance, keep in
touch, to loose touch with reality.
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Unlike other senses, touch sensations can arise from stimulation anywhere on
the body's surface. The hand is, however, usually the most common organ of
stimulation. It is important to notice that tactile perception is always superficial and
thus, the PR can in this way obtain information about the temperature, shape, size,
and surface of the OP. By touching an object, the PR can tell what the limits of the
OP are. These two characteristics are represented by the properties <internal n0> and
<limits yes> respectively, in Section 5.2.
5.1.1.4. Smell
The stimulus for smell consists of volatile molecules or vapours, which reach
the olfactory cavity either through the nostrils or through the mouth. This is
represented by the property <internal yes> in the following section. Although these
molecules are in contact with our noses, it is interesting to notice that PRs do not
perceive the sense of smell as one that requires contact. In fact, the sense of smell has
been classified - together with hearing - as a non-contact sense, because it "often
signal[s] the presence of something at a distance from the perceiver" (Viberg 1984:
148). This is represented by the property <contact no> in the following section.
These odour molecules are contained in the air that we need to inhale in order
to breathe; as a result we smell all the time, without being conscious of it all the time.
This is represented by the property <voluntary no> in Section 5.2.
Although odour perception is not as accurate as that of the other senses and
rather dull if compared with that of other species such as the dog (Moulton 1976), the
human nose is very sensitive. It is capable of detecting odours as faint as ethyl
mercaptan in concentrations as minute as 1 part per 50 billion parts of air (Sekuler
and Blake 1994: 426). Despite this ability to detect odours, the identification and
naming of the odour itself is difficult. This difficulty is termed the 'tip of the nose'
phenomenon by some researchers (Lawless and Engen 1977). Later in the analysis,
these two characteristics are represented by the properties <detection Vcs> and
<identification n0>.
Odour sensitivity varies a great deal from odour to odour; it depends on other
factors such as age and gender of the PR, the concentration level of odorous
molecules, and the distance between the PR and the object that emits the odour
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(Sekuler and Blake 1994). The closer the PR is to the source of odour, the stronger
the perception of the odour is, and therefore, the easier its detection. This
characteristic is represented by the property <closeness yes> in Section 5.2.
The two nostrils work in alternating turns, a phenomenon called 'nasal cycle',
which seems to correspond to an increase in brain activity in the hemisphere
contralateral to the dominant nostril (Werntz et al. 1987). The olfactory receptor cells
sit on the olfactory epithelium in the nasal cavity. These cells, between 6 and 10
million in the human nose, are different from other sensory cells such as
photoreceptors, and hair cells. On the one hand, they all have the paraphernalia of
neurones (cell bodies, short dendrites, and long axons); as a consequence, they are
able to carry out two different tasks: to transform chemical stimulation into neural
impulses and to carry those impulses directly to the brain. On the other hand,
olfactory neurones are capable of reproducing; olfactory cells live for about 5 to 8
weeks, and when they die they are replaced by new ones (Graziadei and Monti
Graziadei, 1988). Each olfactory cell has minuscule filaments, called cilia, extending
from the olfactory knobs. These cilia extend beyond the surface of the epithelium,
into the watery mucus that bathes the epithelium. The proteins contained in the cilia
- the olfactory binding proteins - comprise the actual molecular receptors that grasp
for fragrance molecules or portions of them. Each of the sensory nerves has a long
filament, the axon, on the end opposite to the olfactory knob. This axon connects
with other nerve cells in the brain. The information about the odour pattern is
conveyed from the olfactory bulbs to other regions of the brain, such as the
hypothalamus and other limbic system structures. Here it is processed in order to co¬
ordinate and manage our abilities to learn, to remember, to think, to respond, and to
contemplate. The limbic system plays an important role in emotional reactions
(Sekuler and Blake 1994: 444) and this may be a reason that explains why smells
(and tastes) vary greatly from person to person. The property <subjective Ves> in
Section 5.2.2 reflects this possibility.
Smell is nature's oldest and most primitive sense (see Olfactory Research
Fund 1996). When scattered cells that lived in water first inhabited the world, the
only sense that was available to them was 'smell', on which they depended to detect
chemicals. As animals evolved, so did the nervous system, which developed a smell
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brain that helped to locate food, identify mates and detect enemies. Our sense of
smell still uses similar regions of the brain as in the beginning, as the limbic system,
although this has expanded its duties too to become responsible for our emotions,
sexuality, memory and creativity.
5.1.1.5. Taste
The stimulus for taste consists of substances that penetrate into the taste buds
in the tongue and mouth. This is reflected in the property <internal yes> in Section
5.2.2. In order to taste the mouth has to be in contact with the OP, but tasting can be
considered a voluntary act, because it is the PR's decision to actually put the OP that
contains these substances into the mouth. These two characteristics are represented
by the properties <contact yes> and <voluntary yes> in Section 5.2.2. These substances
must be soluble in saliva in order to be tasted. The taste buds are the responsible
receptor cells for the reception of chemical substances. Some of them are situated in
the papillae, the little bumps in the tongue, in the roof of the mouth, inside the
cheeks, and in the throat. The most sensitive part, however, is the tip of the tongue;
this can identify tastes in only a couple of seconds. The property <bnefness ves> in
Section 5.2.2 reflects this fact. The number of taste buds varies across individuals
(Miller and Reedy 1990) and they are in a constant process of degeneration and
replacement by new ones (Beidler and Smallman 1965). Each bud contains an
average of fifty individual taste receptor cells. Each of these cells has a threadlike
structure called a microvillus at their end. When these microvilli come into contact
with taste solutions, an electrical potential is triggered in the receptor cell. Back
inside the papilla, the taste receptor cells make contact with nerve fibres innervating
the tongue, as they themselves do not have the axons to send messages to the brain.
Taste buds in the tongue and mouth are innervated by no less than three distinct
cranial nerves, sometimes even more than one nerve innervates the same taste bud
(Keverne 1982); as a consequence, taste information arrives at the brain over several
different communication lines. In the brain, there are two sections involved: on the
one hand, the insular cortex - located between the temporal and parietal lobes -
whose activity triggers the conscious experience of tastes; and on the other, part of
the limbic system, which registers some behaviourally relevant information about
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taste. As seen in the case of smell, this is a possible explanation for the differences in
the aesthetic judgements of the PRs in reference to the classification of tastes, both
physically and metaphorically. This is represented by the property <subjective yes> in
Section 5.2.2.
5.1.2. SUMMARY
In this section, the physiology of the five senses and the way we perceive
them have been described. It has been shown how these two elements constrain and
influence the way in which we create and use sense-related expressions. For
example, it has been seen how the intensity of light - vision stimulus - has analogies
in language expressions such as dim view and brilliant idea. How the poor
identification process in smell is linked to the inherently weakness in the verbal
description of odours.
These two constraints, however, do not always coincide; in other words, our
perception of the senses is not always in accordance with the physiological
description of the senses themselves. For instance, although vision, hearing and smell
have 'double' organs that perceive individually, it is only in the case of hearing that
PRs are aware of it, and as a consequence we have expressions such as in one ear
and out of the other. The stimuli of the five senses must have some contact with the
perception organs in order to trigger the perceptual process. Nevertheless, it is only
in the cases of touch and taste that PRs are fully aware of such a requirement.
This section constitutes the physiological and perceptual background for the
description of properties in Section 5.2 below.
5.2. PROPERTIES IN SENSE PERCEPTION
In the previous section, the physiology of the human perceptual systems and
the perceptual processes themselves have been descnbed. Perception entails a
sequence of interrelated events. The first step is the physical energy - stimulus - that
triggers the perceptual process. The second step is the sensory transduction, where
this physical energy is transformed into neural events by different receptors. These
neural impulses are then sent to different parts of the brain, concluding the perceptual
process.
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This is the general pattern followed by the five types of sensory perception
analysed: vision, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. However, the requirements for each
sensory modality are not the same; the stimuli, the receptors, the brain areas are
different. That is to say, the way in which the perceiver, the object perceived and the
act of perception itself interact with each other are not the same.
Based on the descriptions presented in Section 5.1, I propose a typology of
the main properties that characterise the different sense modalities, and hence, the
bodily basis of perception verbs. These properties are organised according to various
parameters.
One parameter is the relation between the perceiver (PR), the object
perceived (OP) and the act of perception (P).
Another parameter, which subdivides each of the groups above, is the
distribution of these properties in each sense. Some of these properties can be applied
to all the five senses, whereas others are only relevant to a specific sense. The former
are called 'A level properties', the latter 'B level properties'.
Finally, the last parameter is whether these properties are pure (1st order) or
composed (2nd order) properties; that is to say whether or not they are the result of
the interrelation of several properties.
In the next section, the properties resulting from these parameters are
presented, together with a description of how they are applied to each sense.
5.2.1. TYPOLOGY OF 1st ORDER PROPERTIES
As has been discussed in the previous section, properties are organised
according to the relation between the three main elements in perception: the
perceiver (PR), the object perceived (OP) and the perception (P). Following this
parameter, properties are divided into three groups: (i) those resulting from the
relation between the PR and the OP, (ii) those resulting from the relation between the
PR and the P, (iii) those resulting from the relation between the OP and the P.
Let us examine what they are and how they correspond to each sense.
(i) Properties resulting from the relation between the PR and OP:
these properties are drawn from the physiology of the senses. The properties
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belonging to this first group (PR -> OP) are <contact>, <closeness>, <internal>,
<limits>, and <location>.
♦ <contact>: whether the PR must have a physical contact with the OP in
order to be perceived.
This property has a negative value in the senses of vision, hear and smell; and
a positive value in the senses of touch and taste. Although it is true that in the fifst
three cases, light waves, sound waves and chemical particles in the air must reach us
in order to be perceived, we do not perceive these stimuli as having direct physical
contact with us, as in the other two cases of touch and taste (Sekuler and Blake 1994:
6).
♦ <closeness>: whether the OP must be in the vicinity of the PR to be
perceived.
This property has a negative value in the case of vision and hearing; and a
positive value in the remaining three senses. On the basis of this property, vision and
hearing have been classified as 'far senses', because the eyes and the ears can pick
up information coming from remote sources. Touch, smell and taste have been
considered 'near senses', because their stimuli must be in the vicinity of the PR
(Sekuler and Blake 1994: 6-7; 27). In the case of touch and taste, <closeness> is an
entailment of the property <contact>; the fact that these two senses require direct
contact between the PR and the OP already presupposes that the OP is near the PR.
In smell, this sense works more effectively if the odorous substance is in the vicinity
of the nose121.
♦ <internal>: whether the OP must go inside the PR to be perceived.
This property has a positive value in hearing, smell and taste; and a negative
value in vision and touch. In order to perceive smells, it is necessary to inhale air into
our nostrils; we take a breath and let the air come inside us, in our lungs. Each breath
passes air over our olfactory sites; when we inhale, we smell odours, the odours enter
our bodies. In a similar way, if we want to taste food or dnnk, we must place the OP
inside our mouth, or touch it with the tip of our tongue, where most of our taste buds
121
It is interesting to note here that unlike the other senses the source that emits the odorous
substance does not have to be present, i.e. where the PR is. The fact that the volatile chemicals from
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are (Gibson 1966: 144). Perhaps the reason why we feel that these senses are internal
lies in the fact that the nose, the mouth and the ears have holes or cavities and as a
consequence, we perceive the stimuli of these senses as coming inside our body.
However, as pointed out in Section 5.1, this is only our perception of how these
senses work. In fact, in physiological terms, all senses must be internal. The light
waves enter the eye, and the skin vibrations do also trigger the mechanoreceptors that
will carry the neural input to the spinal cord.
♦ <limits>: whether the PR is aware of the boundaries imposed by the OP
when perceived.
This property only applies to the sense of touch. The sense of touch allows us
to experience, what Gibson (1950) denominated, 'space perception'. We can
perceive the layout of spaces as long as there are objects in these spaces; that is to
say, we perceive the general layout of environmental surfaces and the particular
layout of the surfaces of an object being manipulated, but a completely empty space
is unperceivable. In this sense, "the surface of an organism is actually a boundary
between the organism and its environment" (Gibson 1966: 101). Therefore, when we
touch something, we are invading the space of that thing / person we are touching.
The spaces occupied by the PR and the OP are put together, converge; however,
neither of them can trespass each other's spaces (Ibarretxe-Antunano 1999c).
♦ <location>: whether the PR is aware of the situation of the OP when
perceiving.
This property only applies to vision and hearing. In both senses, it is possible
to localise the source of stimulus as well as the direction of the stimulus. In vision,
the location of the OP in the environment relative to the PR's current position is
called 'egocentric direction' (Sekuler and Blake 1994: 215). This provides us with
two-dimensional information: up/down, right/left. As explained in Section 5.1.1.1,
the information in the two-dimensional egocentric co-ordinate system is preserved in
the two dimensional retinal image. Vision gives us information about another
dimension too: depth perception, i.e. how far the OP is from the PR. In hearing, one
can also identify the direction from which the sounds are coming. This ability present
an odorous substance can be kept in the air is what, for example, allows animals such as the dog to
follow the track left by other animals (Gibson 1966: 1948).
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from the day of birth is called 'sound localisation' (Butterworth and Castillo 1979;
Wertheimer 1961). The spatial location of sounds refers to two directions: 'azimuth'
(horizontal direction of a sound in relation to the PR's head), and 'elevation' (vertical
direction) (Sekuler and Blake 1994: 359).
Taking into account the second parameter specified for the classification of
these properties, namely the distribution of these properties in the senses, the
properties <contact>, <closeness>, and <internal> are considered A level properties
because they are applicable to all the five senses. The properties <limits> and
<location> on the other hand, are classified as B level properties, as their distribution
in the senses is restricted to only particular ones.
(ii) Properties resulting from the relation between PR and P. In this
group, the properties included are <detection>, <identification>, <voluntary>,
<directness>, <subjective>, and <emotional>.
♦ <detection>: how the PR performs the P: how PR discloses the presence of
an object, and distinguishes one object from another122.
This property has a positive value in all the senses, as all of them detect their
corresponding stimuli (light, sound, mechanical disturbances, volatile substances,
and soluble substances) with their corresponding receptors (eyes, ears, body, nose,
and taste buds). Let us illustrate this property with an example from the sense of
smell. If we are in a room without any particular smell and a person starts preparing
some coffee, we immediately smell the new odour; we detect that new smell, which
we later recognise as coffee. After a while, we get used to the smell of coffee and no
longer smell it consciously. But if somebody enters the room, that person will detect
the smell of coffee straight away. This well-documented phenomenon (cf. Ahlstrom
et al. 1986) is called 'odour adaptation', i.e. the decrease of sensitivity to an odour
after a prolonged exposure to it. Some people believe this is due to the unique
122 In perceptual terms, detection and discrimination are two different hierarchically ordered
perceptual processes (first we need to detect the object and then distinguish that object from other
objects, see Sekuler and Blake 1994: 141). These two processes are present in the five senses. They
therefore, do not add any relevant information for our purpose, namely, to create a typology of
properties to differentiate the senses from each other. Thus, detection and discrimination are treated as
one property in our analysis.
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capability of olfactory cells to die and reproduce themselves. Similar processes of
adaptation are also found in taste (Sekuler and Blake 1994: 446).
♦ <identification>: how well the PR can discriminate what he is perceiving,
the P.
This property is negative in smell and positive in the other senses. When we
use the sense of vision, for instance, if we see a dog we immediately recognise that
entity as a dog, unless we have sight problems or we have never seen a dog before.
This does not happen with smell. Smells are difficult to identify. The reason why we
are never a hundred per cent sure about what we are smelling lies in the fact that
olfactory fibres individually can detect that some odorous substance is present.
However, they are unable to provide unequivocal information about the identity of
that substance. Consequently, people can smell an odour, but cannot tell what odour
they are smelling (Engen 1960, 1982). Furthermore, smells are difficult to name. In
De Antma (c. 320 BC) Aristotle already pointed out the fact that the sense of smell
lacks an independent classification similar to that of other senses such as taste {sweet,
bitter...), and in fact, the situation nowadays has not changed. There have been
various attempts123 to classify smells, such as Henning's 'Smell Prism' (1916) and
Schiffman's 'Multidimensional Scaling' (1974). Unfortunately, as Buck
(1949:1024) remarks, "the only widespread popular distinction is that of pleasant and
unpleasant smells - good and bad smells [...] this is linguistically more important
than any similar distinction, that is, of good and bad, in the case of the other senses".
Otherwise, the terms used for defining a smell are taken either from other senses,
primarily from taste (cf. sweet) and touch (cf. pungent, originally 'pricking') or by
naming the object that emits the smell, as the smell ofan apple.
This does not happen in the other senses. For example, as discussed in
Section 5.1.1.1, vision can offer us information about the colour of the OP If we
look at dictionaries, many colour names are listed. But as shown in studies such as
Berlin and Kay (1969), Ratliff (1976), in everyday language only a dozen colour
names are needed. Although the identification of colours varies among people, there
is a great deal of agreement on names for only those few basic colours (Boynton and
'23 For a complete discussion on the topic of the classification of odours, see Sekuler and
Blake (1994: 414-418), Glamble (1921) is a good review and critique on Henning's method
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Olson 1987). Another case is the classification of different tastes. Although there has
been and still are different opinions about the basic tastes (see Schiffman and
Erickson 1980), it is now commonly agreed that there are four basic distinct
categories: sweet, sour, salty, and bitter.
♦ <voluntary>: whether the PR can choose when to perform a P.
This property has a negative value in hearing and smell and a positive value
in vision, touch and taste. In these three sense modalities, the PR can choose whether
to look at something, or to touch something124 or to put something in his mouth.
However, in the case of hearing and smell, the PR does not have control over the
perception. It is true that the PR can block the perception by putting his fingers on his
ears or nose, but usually we perceive by these senses unconsciously. Unless we
suffer from any kind of hearing or olfactory disorder, we perceive through these
senses all the time. Studies in smell (Badia 1995) indicate that we smell a wide
variety of odours throughout every day and night of our lives, but without being
aware of them at all. Only when a smell pleases, annoys, warns or brings a memory
do we stop to take notice of it.
The values assigned to the senses relative to this property are the default
values; that is to say, usually this is the way in which these sense modalities are
perceived. However, it is important to bear in mind that this property depends on the
role of the PR that performs the perceptual process. In perception, the PR can be an
active PR or a passive PR (see Section 2.2. for the linguistic implications of this
distinction). In every sense modality, the PR can perform an active perception, in
which case the property <voluntary> takes the positive value, or the PR can perceive
passively, in which case the value of <voluntary> is negative. For instance, in the
case of smell, it has already been mentioned that we smell all the time, even when we
are asleep, but always without being conscious of it. This is the default situation for
the sense of smell and therefore <voluntary> takes a negative value. However, if we
are presented with a new perfume and we want to know what it smells like we are
not perceiving its fragrance in a passive way, we are active PRs. In this case, the
value of the property <voluntary> is positive.
124 This <voluntary> property of the sense of touch has been labelled as 'active touch' or
'haptics' (Gibson 1966).
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♦ <directness>: whether the P depends on the PR directly, or is mediated by
another element.
This property has a negative value in hearing, and a positive value in the rest
of the senses. In all the senses but in hearing, the PR perceives the OP directly. If we
want to look at something we just have to open our eyes and direct them to what we
want to perceive. If we want to touch something we have to put some part of our
body, usually our hand, in contact with the OP. If we want to taste something, we
have to put it in our mouth. This does not hold in the case of hearing. We cannot hear
a sound unless it is produced by a third element. In a way, the PR is dependable upon
the element that emits the sound. It is in this sense that we understand hearing as a
mediated perception.
Taking into account the second parameter (the distribution of these properties
in the senses), the properties <detection>, <identification>, <voluntary>, and
<directness> are considered A level properties because they are applicable to all the
five senses. There are no B level properties identified in this group.
(iii) Properties resulting from the relation between OP and P. This
group comprises the properties <effects>, <briefness>, and <evaluation>. In this
group, no A level properties are found. All of them seem to be particular to only
some specific senses and not applicable to others.
♦ <effects>: whether the P causes any change in the OP.
This property is only applicable to touch. Active touch is one of the most
reliable methods that we have to explore our environment. As Sekuler and Blake
(1994: 380) put it "when the other senses conflict, touch is usually the ultimate
arbiter". However, when exploring an object via the sense of touch, actions can
change the OPs. The extremities are not only exploratory sense organs, but also
performatory motor organs (Gibson 1966: 99). We can not only explore things with
our hands but also alter them.
♦ <briefness>: how long the relation between P and OP should be in order for
the perception to be successful.
This property is only applicable to touch and taste. The skin is stimulated by
the smallest mechanical disturbance. With only a very brief touch on a surface, it is
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possible to tell how firm, smooth this surface is. It is even possible to tell the
temperature of the surface (Gibson 1966: 109 calls this "touch temperature').
Although sensitivity in the different areas of the tongue varies (Codings 1974), when
we put into contact the tip of the tongue with a sugar cube, we only need a couple of
seconds to decide that it is sweet. Studies (Miller and Bartoshuk 1991) show that for
most people, the highest sensitivity is to bitter tastes. It could be argued that this
property should be applicable to vision, as we do not need to look at things too long
in order to identify them. For instance, if we are driving our car and a police car
passes near us, we need only a few seconds to recognise it as a police car. However,
the fact that we identify the car as a police car straight away is not the result of a
visual perceptual process, but the result of an inferential process. That is to say, we
are able to recognise the car because of the context we are in - driving our car on a
road -, because of our familiarity with the visual clues associated with a police car:
flashing lights of different colours, white cars with fluorescent lines and so on. In
other words, based on the context and our familiarity with the OP, we infer that the
car is a police car. The same argument can be applied to hearing. It does not take too
much time to recognise familiar sounds, somebody calling out our name, to
understand sounds in our own language. This is not based on the perceptual process
itself - as it is in touch and taste - but on our familiarity with the OP and the context
in which the OP is found.
♦ <evaluation>: whether the P assesses the OP.
This property is only applicable to vision and taste. Vision is the sense upon
which Western society relies most. We tend to make judgements based on the
information we receive from what we see. The judgements carried out on the basis of
taste perception are of a different kind. People can rate various tastes along the
dimension of pleasant / unpleasant. These judgements are called 'taste hedonics'
(Sekuler and Blake 1994: 449).
5.2.2. SUMMARY
In the previous section, a typology of the main properties that characterise the
different sense modalities has been presented. These properties are organised in
accordance with two parameters: one parameter is the interrelations between the
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three elements involved in the perceptual process: PR, OP, and P. Another parameter
is the distribution of these properties in the senses All the properties proposed in this
section are considered '1st order properties'. The classification of these properties is
summarised in Table 5.1.
At this point, it is important to comment very briefly on the terminology used
when describing these 1st order properties in Table 5.1. According to the second
parameter, 1st order properties are classified into two groups: 'A level properties'
(applicable to all senses) and 'B level properties' (applicable to only some senses).
For 'A level properties', there are two different values assigned to the property:
positive and negative. Yes and no express this respectively. For 'B level properties', a
yes indicates those senses to which the property is applicable. Empty boxes mean that
the respective property is not applicable to that sense.
(1) (2) Properties VISION HEAR TOUCH SMELL TASTE
PR^ OP A <contact> no no yes no yes
<closeness> no no yes yes yes
<internal> no yes no yes yes
<directness> yes no yes yes yes
B <limits> yes
<location> yes yes
PR-> P A <detection> yes yes yes yes yes
<identification> yes yes yes no yes
<voluntary> yes no yes no yes
B




Table 5.1: Organisation of' 1st order properties' in the sense modalities.
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5.2.3. TYPOLOGY OF 2nd ORDER PROPERTIES
A '2nd order property' is a property that is composed of some 1st order
properties. All 2nd order properties are 'B level properties'; that is, they are only
applicable to some senses. There are two 2nd order properties Correction of
hypothesisl25> and <subjective>.
♦ Correction of hypothesis> (<cor. hyp>): how correct and accurate the
hypotheses formulated about the OP in the P are in comparison with the
real object of P.
This property is composed of <directness> and <identification> and only
seems to apply to vision, hearing and smell. When we perceive with these three
senses, we formulate hypothesis about the nature and characteristics of the OP.
Depending on the sense we use these hypotheses correspond more or less to the
nature of the real object. The hypotheses about the OP formulated on the basis of the
information gathered by the three senses seem to be more correct in the case of
vision, followed by hearing and the by smell. The reasons for this hierarchy in
reliability must lie in the values that the two 1st order properties that compose
Correction of hypothesis> take in each case. These are reproduced in Table 5.2.
VISION HEARING SMELL
<directness> yes no yes
<identification> yes yes no
Table 5.2: Distribution of 1st order properties in Correction of hypothesise
As is seen in Table 5.2, vision has a positive value for both <directness> and
<identification>. The fact that there are no mediators in the perception, as well as the
fact that the identification of what we see is very accurate, make the hypotheses
resulting from vision the ones that correspond best to the real object. Hearing is also
very good at identifying what is heard, however its hypotheses are not as correct as
vision because the P depends on the source of sound. Smell has a positive value for
125
I would like to thank Antonio Barcelona for suggesting this property
l2<>
In fact, this is very clear in court cases; the testimony given by an eyewitness is considered
to be more reliable than hearsay evidence (Dundes 1972: 12; Danesi 1990: 222)
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<directness>, but as discussed in the previous section, it is very difficult to identify
exactly what is being perceived by this sense accurately. The distribution of the
values in these properties and the perceptual processes in these senses are illustrated
in the following figures. The smiley represents the PR, the box the OP, and the arrow
the P.
Figure 5.1: Vision Figure 5.2: Hearing Figure 5.3: Smell
In Figure 5.1 and 5.3, the direction of the arrow (P) goes from the PR to the
OP, whereas in Figure 5.2, the direction is the other way round, from the OP to the
PR. The direction of the arrow represents the property <directness>. In Figure 5.1
and 5.2, the box that represents the OP has continuous lines meaning that it is easily
identifiable. The discontinuous lines in the box in Figure 5.3 show the difficulty of
identification of the OP in the case of smell. A common characteristic of the three
figures is that the arrow does not have a contact with the OP. If we recall the
typology of 1st order properties, these three senses are all <contact no>. Another
property that is shown in these figures is <internal>. In the case of vision, the
property is <internal n0>. Consequently, the arrow (P) does not come inside the
smiley (PR). In hearing and smell the property is <internal ves> and as such, the
arrow (P) goes inside the smiley (PR).
Similar figures can be applied to the other two senses: taste and touch.
©■
Figure 5.4: Taste Figure 5.5: Touch
Contrary to vision, hearing and smell, both taste and touch have <contact yes5-,
as represented by the arrow (P) in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. The difference between these
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two senses seems to lie on the fact that whereas taste is <internal yes>, touch is
<internal no>.
If we compare the properties and the values attached to them in each of the
five senses, we come to the conclusion that the only property that seems to be
decisive when distinguishing between the senses in relation to the 2nd order property
<correction of hypothesis> is <contact>. This property takes a negative value in
vision, hearing and smell, and a positive value in taste and touch. Based on this
observation, we can state the following constraint:
CONSTRAINT: <contact yes> incompatible with 2nd order <cor. hyp.>
As we shall see in the following chapter (Section 6.1), this constraint applies
to the way in which we use vocabulary from the semantic domain of perception, and
to the inferences that we can draw from such perception vocabulary.
♦ <subjective>: how much influence the PR has on the P.
This property is composed of <internal> and <closeness> and only seems to
apply to smell and taste. Although not everybody perceives the stimuli in the same
way in vision (colour, see Sekuler and Blake 1994: 181), hearing (loudness, see
Sekuler and Blake 1994: 337) and touch (Sekuler and Blake 1994: 382), the
information gathered by these senses is more consistent than that in smell and taste.
To start with, smell and taste are perceived as <internal> senses, that is, the OP
comes inside the PR, this makes the OP be perceived as attached to the PR himself.
When looking at a round table all PRs will perceive the table as being of a rounded
shape, although PRs may not agree on whether its shape is that of a perfect circle or
more like a oval. In taste and smell, the PR's perceptions of the stimuli vary a great
deal. Smells and tastes are different for people. A nice smell or taste for one person
could be bad or simply neutral for another. Smell and taste are both cultural
phenomena (Classen et al. 1994). Smells and tastes are context dependent, that is, the
same substance can be perceived in different ways depending on the smells and
tastes in the same environment, a property widely used in the art of cuisine. That is
why the property <closeness> is one of the components of <subjectivity>. As was
pointed out in Section 5.1, a possible physiological reason for the application of this
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property to smell and taste only is the fact that part of the brain region that analyses
the input of these two senses is the limbic system, which plays an important role in
emotional reactions (Sekuler and Blake 1994:444).
The fact that perception with smell and taste varies a great deal depending on
the PR is reflected in the positive value that the two 1st order properties that compose
<subjective> have. Table 5.3 represents the distribution of these two 1st order
properties in the senses.
VISION HEAR TOUCH SMELL TASTE
<internal> no yes no yes yes
<closeness> no no yes yes yes
Table 5.3: Distribution of 1st order properties in <subjective>.
As seen in Table 5.3, although these two 1st order properties are also positive
in other senses, the fact that both of them are positive in smell and taste seem to be
the decisive factor for the restrictive application of <subjective> to smell and taste
only. The property <internal> is not only positive in smell and taste, but also in
hearing. The second property <closeness> is positive in smell and taste, as well as in
touch. Therefore, the constraint that restricts the application of this property to smell
and taste is the following:
CONSTRAINT: if <subjective>, then <internal> and <closeness> must be yes
It is important to notice that although this property applies to both smell and
taste, the kind of subjectivity in each sense is different. This depends on how the OP
is perceived by these senses. In smell, the identification of the OP is not very-
accurate. Whereas in the case of taste the subjectivity refers more to the description
of the OP itself, in smell it seems to apply more to the whole act of perception itself.
For example, sentences (8) and (9):
(8) His taste in clothes is very good
(9) I smell something fishy around here
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In (8), the OP refers clearly to the clothes, whereas in (9) the OP remains
blurred, the PR does not really know what the source of the smell is, he only detects
that there is something wrong there (see the representation of the OP in Figures 5.3
and 5.4). This difference in the perception of the OP refers to the property
<identification>. This property - as discussed in Section 5.2.1 - takes a negative
value in smell and a positive value in taste and seems to be what makes the property
<subjectivity> different in these two senses.
5.2.4. SUMMARY
In this section, a typology of the 2nd order properties has been presented. 2nd
order properties are those that are composed of some 1st order properties. There are
two 2nd order properties: <correction of hypothesis>, composed of <directness> and
<identification>; and <subjectivity>, composed of <internal> and <closeness>. All
2nd order properties are B level properties; that is, they are only applicable to some
senses. Table 5.4 shows this typology.
The same symbols used in Table 5.1 above are applicable here. A level
properties (1st order properties here only) have both negative and positive values
represented by yes and no respectively. B level properties have a ves only in those
senses to which they can be applied and empty boxes for the rest.
2nd order 1st order VISION HEAR TOUCH SMELL TASTE
<cor. hyp.> yes yes yes
<directness> yes no yes yes yes
<identification> yes yes yes no yes
<subjective> yes yes
<internal> no yes no yes yes
<closeness> no no yes yes yes
Table 5.4: Organisation of 2nd order properties in the sense modalities.
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5.3. PROPERTIES VS. SEMANTIC FEATURES
In the previous section, a typology of the properties that characterise sense
perception has been presented. These properties should not be confused with the so-
called 'semantic features (components, markers)' introduced in the framework of
Componential Analysis (Katz and Fodor 1963; Katz and Postal 1964; Weinreich
1966; Bierwisch 1970; Katz 1972). In this approach, the meanings of lexical items
are not unitary concepts, undifferentiated wholes. Meanings can be analysed into
atomic conceptual elements related to each other in several ways; they are complexes
formed by different components of meaning. These atomic concepts are in
themselves semantic primitives - they cannot be reduced to smaller units - and are
symbolically represented by semantic markers127.
These semantic features (markers, components) are theoretical constructs
intended to represent a concept that is part of the sense of a lexical item and other
constituents in natural languages. As Bierwisch (1970: 181) puts it "they are not
defined in terms of physical properties and relations outside the human organism but
symbols for the internal mechanism by means of which such phenomena are
conceived and conceptualised".
For example, the meaning of the lexical item man is composed of the
following semantic features: [animate], [human], [male] and [adult].
Semantic features reflect the systematic semantic relations that exist between
a lexical item and the rest of the vocabulary of the language. They exhibit the
semantic structure in a dictionary entry and the semantic relations between dictionary
entries. In other words, they are used to structure the vocabulary of a language.
A classical example of how these features structure the vocabulary is
illustrated in the analysis of the word bachelor (see Katz and Postal 1963). This word
can have four different meanings (i) a person never married, (ii) a young knight
serving under the standard of another knight, (iii) a person who has the lowest
127 Katz and Fodor (1963) and Katz and Postal (1964) distinguish between 'semantic
markers' and 'semantic distinguishes'. Both are the symbolic devices which represent the atomic
concepts that form the meaning of a lexical item, but whereas markers are "the formal elements that a
semantic component uses to express general semantic properties", distinguishes are "the formal
elements employed to represent what is idiosyncratic about the meaning of a lexical item" (Katz and
Postal 1964: 14).
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academic degree, and (iv) a young fur seal without a mate during the breeding time.
Semantic features can represent the semantic relations that hold among these four
senses of the same lexical item. For instance, meanings (i), (ii) and (iii) are opposed
to (iv) on the basis of the feature [human] vs. [animal]128.
Semantic features do not only show the relations that exist between the
different senses of the same lexical item, but also those between different lexical
items. For example, the word bachelor and the word spingster share the features
[human], [unmarried] and [old], but are differentiated by the feature [male]-[female].
Semantic features are not part of the language being described, but part of a
meta-language, the theoretical vocabulary set up to describe languages. A feature like
[human] or [male] is not an English word, but a construct represented by one.
Therefore, these features are not particular to a language, a semantic field; they are
universal (see Kempson 1977: 88, for a discussion on this universal character of
features).
In sum, semantic features are abstract, universal, theoretical constructs. They
are the means by which meanings of lexical items can be decomposed into atomic
concepts, for structuring the vocabulary of natural languages.
The properties defined in Section 5.2 are totally different from semantic
features. These properties are not abstract, theoretical constructs. As we have seen in
the discussion, these properties come from the description of the physiology of the
five senses and from our perception of these perceptual acts. They are understood as
shorthand ways of referring to the defining properties that describe how we perceive
through these senses.
These properties are not semantic primitives, components of meaning
grouped together to form the complexes that make up the meaning of words. As will
be shown in the next chapter, these properties represent and describe the bodily basis
upon which metaphorical and non-metaphorical extended meanings in the field of
perception verbs are based.
128 The formal representation of an incompatible pair of features such as [human]-[animal],
[male]-[female], is represented by the value + or - of one feature (see Kempson 1977 for a discussion
of this representation).
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These properties are not an exhaustive specification of the meaning of words
(as there is much more to perceiving than shown in Table 5.5 below). They are much
more akin to meaning postulates than componential analysis - but again they differ
in that the relation is not a purely logical one and what is being characterised is not a
relation between vocabulary items but physical characteristics obtained
independently of language.
These properties are not to be considered universal and applicable to any
semantic field as semantic features are. They only apply to the field of sense
perception. It will be necessary to define a totally different set of properties for the
description of other semantic fields. As a consequence, these properties cannot be
used to structure the vocabulary of natural languages, either syntagmatically or
paradigmatically.
5.4. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, I have characterised the semantic field of sense perception in
terms of properties. These properties are to be considered the bodily basis upon
which our sense-related vocabulary is based. The description of this bodily basis is
crucial for my study. They will provide the devices necessary to explain and
constrain not only why some source domains are mapped onto very specific target
domains and not others, but also what elements can take part in the creation of
extended meanings.
Section 5.1 has described the physiology of the five senses and the way in
which human beings understand the perceptual processes. In Section 5.2, a typology
of the main prototypical properties that characterise the source domain of sense
perception was presented. The independence of description of the source domain is
guaranteed by the fact that these properties are based on physiological and
psychological studies on the senses. They are not simply the result of a post hoc
analysis of the semantic extensions found in the target domain (see Kevsar and Bly
1995; Murphy 1996, for a discussion on this issue). These properties are classified
following three parameters: (i) the relation between the PR, the OP and the P, (ii) the
applicability of the properties to the senses, and (iii) the interrelation among
properties. The distribution of these properties in each sense is shown in Table 5.5.
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Finally, in Section 5.3, the differences between these properties and the
semantic features used in Componential Analysis have been stated. These properties
are not considered to be innate atomic conceptual units that, when combined
differently, form the meanings of different words. They are rather taken as shorthand
ways of referring to the defining properties used to describe how we perceive
through the senses.
VISION HEAR TOUCH SMELL TASTE
<contact no> <contact n0> <contact Ves> <contact n0> <contact yes>
<closeness no> <closeness no> <closeness yes> <closeness ves> <closeness yes>
<internal no> <internal ves> <internal no> <internal ves> <internal yes>
<direct. ves> <direct. n0> <direct. ves> <direct. Ves> <direct. ves>
<limits Yes>
<location ves5* <location ves>
<detection yes> <detection yes> <detection ves> <detection ves> <detection ves>
<identific. Ves> <identific. Ves> <identific. ves> <identific. no> <identific. ves>
<voluntary yes> <voluntary no> <voluntary ves> <voluntary no> <voluntary ves>
<effects Ves>
<briefness ves> <briefness ves>
<evaluationves> <evaluationyes>
<cor. hyp. yes> <cor. hyp. yes> <cor. hyp. ves>
<subjectiv. ves> <subjectiv. ves>
Table 5.5: Organisation of 1st and 2nd order properties in the sense modalities.
In the following chapter, it will be discussed how the properties defined in
this chapter constrain and explain how some meanings are conveyed by certain
perception verbs and not others. I concentrate on the semantic extensions of only two
sense perceptions: smell and touch. Based on the properties that descnbe these two
senses, I propose a solution for two of the problems left unsolved by other
approaches: how to account for physical extended meanings and how to constrain
what is generally known by cognitive linguists as the 'used' part of metaphor. This
solution is called 'Property Selection Processes'.
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CHAPTER 6: PROPERTY SELECTION
PROCESSES.
In the previous chapter, it has been seen how the physiology and function of
human perceptual systems influence and determine the way in which we use our
language relative to sense perception. The way in which we experience, perceive and
interact with the world that surrounds us must be reflected in our vocabulary,
because, as Rudzka-Ostyn puts it, "a word that has taken root in a language cannot
acquire just any new sense" (1995: 218). The five different perceptual systems were
characterised in terms of properties. These properties are the means by which it is
possible to solve the question of why some source domains are mapped onto very
specific target domains and not others.
In this chapter two other unsolved puzzles are discussed. Once the source
domain is charactensed by these properties, the next question is which, how, and
how many of these properties are to be present in the target domain in order to
constrain metaphor. Section 6.1 illustrates how these properties are applied to
language. Here, only two properties <contact> and <correction of hypothesis> are
analysed in order to show that conceptual mappings between source and target
domains are not a matter of sheer chance but constrained by our experience of
perception. In Section 6.2 Property Selection Processes are introduced. These
processes are constraints on mappings between the source and the target domain,
both in metaphorical and physical extended meanings. Finally, some conclusions are
drawn in Section 6.3.
6.1. PERCEPTION AND LANGUAGE
In the previous chapter, it has been described how human perceptual systems
and processes function (Section 5.1). This was followed by a typology of the main
properties corresponding to these descriptions (Section 5.2). The question now is
whether, as predicted by Cognitive Linguistics, it is true that the properties that
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characterise these senses can be traced in the way we use expressions related to these
sense modalities.
In this section, I pick up only some examples from the five different senses in
order to give a taste of how this assumption works. In the next section, I shall
concentrate on two of these senses - smell and touch -, and offer an analysis of the
different meanings that olfactory and tactile verbs convey and how each meaning can
be explained by using these properties.
6.1.1. THE PROPERTY CORRECTION OF HYPOTHESIS>
The property <correction of hypothesis> only applies to vision, hearing and
smell. It does not apply to touch and taste because of the constraint: <contact ves>
which is incompatible with <correction of hypothesise
Let us see how this is expressed in language in the following sentences.
(1) I saw that there was going to be trouble
(2) I heard that there was going to be trouble
(3) I smelt that there was going to be trouble
(4) *1 touched that there was going to be trouble
(5) *1 tasted that there was going to be trouble
As seen in these examples, the proposed constraint129 for touch and taste
seems to work when we look at sentences such as (4) and (5). Both senses share the
property <contact yes>, and it is precisely this characteristic that prevents these
sentences from being felicitous, on the one hand it is not possible to touch or taste
trouble without having a contact, either physical or metaphorical; on the other hand,
the positive value of the property <contact> in these two cases makes the formulation
of hypotheses unnecessary. Whereas the first three sentences make sense, the last
two are not acceptable. The meaning in (1), (2) and (3), however, is not the same. (1)
can be paraphrased as To know', (2) as To be told' and (3) as To guess, to suspect'.
129 Constraint: <contact yes-5 incompatible with 2nd order <correction of hypothesis> (see
Section 5.2.3).
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The degree of correctness between the hypotheses inferred from the Ps and the real
object in each sentence varies accordingly. In the case of vision, it is me - the PR -
that figures out that there was going to be some trouble; I saw some indications that
clearly pointed to me that there were going to be some problems. This reflects the
properties <directness yes> and identification yes> in vision. In (2), I myself did not
see with my own eyes that there was going to be trouble, another person told me so;
and as experience tells us, sometimes what other people say, especially when
reporting some event, is not always very accurate. This reflects the property
<directness no> in hearing. Finally in (3), I myself perceived that there was going to
be trouble, but the indications to that conclusion were not very clear, the evidence for
such an assumption is not strong enough for me to be sure of them. This reflects the
property <identification no> in smell.
6.1.2. THE PROPERTY <CONTACT>
The property <contact> takes a negative value in vision, hearing and smell;
and a positive value in touch and taste. This is illustrated in the following examples:
(6) I saw victory
(7) ? I heard victory
(8) I touched victory
(9) I smelt victory
(10) I tasted victory
The meaning in those examples where we use touch and taste implies some
kind of contact with victory, the OP. In (8), the meaning is 'to reach'. This refers to a
situation where, after fighting for some time, I obtain my victory, my goal. In this
meaning, as we shall see in the next chapter, other properties are present as well,
namely <limits> and <briefness>. In (10), the meaning conveyed by the verb is 'to
experience'; I experience what victory was in my own flesh. It is important to notice
that what makes the readings in (8) and (10) different from each other is not the fact
that they both are <contact yes>, but the property <internal>. In the sense of touch,
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this property is <internal no>, and in taste <internal yes>. The different values that this
property takes in each case explain why these meanings are different.
As a result of being <contact no>, the readings for the rest of the sentences are
not understood in the same way. Sentence (6) implies an intellectual process such as
'to foresee'. Sentence (7) is not very felicitous. It can be understood as a physical
perception of the word victory uttered by somebody. Alternatively, in sentences like I
heard that there was a victory, the meaning is 'to be told'. Sentence (9) takes the
meaning 'to guess, to sense'.
6.1.3. SUMMARY
In this section, it is shown how two of the properties defined in the previous
chapter, <correction of hypothesis> and <contact>, constrain and explain how and
why some meanings are conveyed by certain perception verbs and not by others. In
the following section, I shall develop this proposal and apply it to the analysis of the
extended meanings lexicalised by tactile and olfactory verbs. The choice of olfactory
and tactile verbs for the application and support of the theoretical hypotheses put
forward in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 7, is arbitrary. That is, I have focused
on these verbs and their extended meanings because they have not been investigated
as much as other sense verbs, e.g. vision. These hypotheses, however, are applicable
to all the semantic extensions that exist in all perception verbs.
6.2. PROPERTY SELECTION PROCESSES IN TOUCH
AND SMELL.
In Chapter 2 the main cross-linguistic meanings of the five perception
modalities have been analysed. These meanings are divided into two categories: on
the one hand, the so-called 'prototypical' meanings, i.e. those meanings that refer to
physical perception through these senses; on the other, the 'non-prototypical'
meanings, i.e. extended meamngs, physical and non-physical, conveyed by
perception verbs. Prototypical meanings are classified into three groups according to
the semantic role of the arguments that these verbs take. These groups are experience
(animate experiencer subject), activity (animate active subject) and percept
169
B. Iraide Ibarretxe-Antufiano Chapter 6: Property Selection Processes
(experienced entity as subject)130. Non-prototypical extended meanings in tactile
verbs are 'to partake of food/drink', 'to affect', 'to reach', and 'to deal with'. Non-
prototypical meanings in olfactory verbs are 'to trail something', 'to guess', 'to
suspect' and 'to investigate'.
In Chapter 5, a typology of the properties that characterise the senses was
presented. The properties in touch and smell are summarised in Table 6.1. These
properties are called prototypical because they describe how we think that we
perceive through these senses, which is, in turn, the bodily and cultural basis for the
physical prototypical meanings of these sense verbs.
PROPERTIES IN TOUCH PROPERTIES IN SMELL
<contact Ves> <contact no>
<closeness yes> <closeness yes>
<internal no> <internal yes>
<directness yes> <directness yes>
<limits yes>
<detection yes> <detection yes>
<identification ves> <identification no>
<voluntary ves> •^voluntary n0>
<effects Ves>
<briefness Yes>
<correction of hypothesis yes>
<subjectivity yes>
Table 6.1: Prototypical properties in touch and smell
I have already presented the extended meanings of these tactile and olfactory
verbs, and characterised the source domain in terms of properties that show us the
bodily basis for these mappings between different conceptual domains. The next
issue is to determine how much and what part of the source domain is actually
transferred onto the target domain, that is to say what constrains the mappings
between target and source domains.
130 Later in the discussion of smell verbs, the property <voluntary> is used to explain these
differences between experience, active and percept verbs.
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6.2.1. METAPHORICAL CONSTRAINTS: THE INVARIANCE
PRINCIPLE.
It is commonly agreed among metaphor researchers that not everything from
the source domain gets mapped onto the target domain. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:
52) call this partial map of the structure of the source domain the 'used' part of
metaphor (cf. also Johnson 1987: 106).
In the case of tactile and olfactory perception, which is characterised by the
set of properties defined in Table 6.1 above, this statement means that not all these
properties are 'used' in the target domain but only a selection of them.
However, in order to constrain metaphorical mappings it is not enough to say
that there is a selection of the source domain. On the contrary it is necessary to show
exactly what it is that is partially mapped and what constraints are applied to that
selection. Attempts to constrain the mapping process in metaphorical production and
comprehension can be found in Lakoffs (1993) 'Invariance Principle', i.e.
"metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology of the source domain in a
way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain" (1993: 215).
The basis of the Invariance Principle is presented implicitly but not analysed
in Lakoff and Turner (1989). The idea that not everything is transferred from the
source domain to the target domain is suggested, when these authors discuss how the
maxim of quantity guides us to exclude various components of the source and target
domains from the metaphorical mapping.
This basis is formulated as the 'Invariance Hypothesis' in Lakoff (1989,
1990). This hypothesis claims that "metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive
topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain" (1990: 54). In
other words, the topological properties of entities in the source domain of a
metaphorical mapping are mapped as properties of the corresponding entities in the
target domain.
Re-examining this hypothesis, Brugman (1990) points out several
problems1'1, one of which concerns the question of which domain's properties are
preserved in a metaphorical mapping. That is to say, it is not clear enough from the
131 See also Turner (1990a, 1991: 172-182. 1996: 108-109), Iwata(1995).
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formulation of the Invariance Hypothesis whether the source domain properties that
are transferred create the image-schematic structure in the target domain or not.
According to Turner (1990b, 1993), what matters is the image-schematic
structure of the target domain. This structure must be preserved, and the image-
schematic structure of the source domain that takes part in the mapping must be
consistent with that preservation.
Taking into account these problems, Lakoff (1993) reformulates the
Invariance Hypothesis and proposes the Tnvariance Principle'. This principle makes
explicit two claims. Not only must both source and target domain properties be taken
into account, but also target domain properties must be seen as playing a central role
in determining the properties preserved.
The Invariance Principle is useful in order to constrain the nature of
metaphorical mappings: that is to say, it is not possible to map from the source
domain structure that does not preserve the inherent structure of the target domain.
The only problem with this principle is that it does not show exactly what part of the
source domain is the one that must be consistent with the structure of the target
domain.
As a solution, I propose the processes called Property Selection. These
processes will show not only how some of the set of properties that characterise the
source domain are mapped onto the target domain, but also what properties are
mapped. It is precisely by this selection of properties from the source domain in the
target domain that metaphorical mappings are constrained. The properties selected in
the target domain must be part of the properties identified in the source domain and
no others. The number of properties from the source domain preserved in the
extended meanings is not an issue, as this is not the same in each extension. What is
important is the fact that there is a transfer of only some properties from the source to
the target domain.
The fact that all the examples in the following subsections are taken from
English does not mean that Property Selection Processes are language specific. In
Chapter 2, it was shown how these extended meanings are cross-linguistic, they are
also found in the other two languages under investigation - Basque and Spanish.
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Therefore, it is assumed that Property Selection Processes are applicable to any
language.
In the following subsections, it is shown how these processes work in the
semantic fields of tactile and olfactory verbs.
6.2.2. PROPERTY SELECTION PROCESSES IN TOUCH
One of the extended meanings in tactile verbs is 'to affect, physically', as
illustrated in (11).
(11) Blackfly touched the flowers
Example (11) states that a type of insect called 'blackfly' physically touched
the flowers and since this insect is harmful to them, the flowers were affected, and




<contact Ves> <contact yes>










Figure 6.1: Property Selection Processes in (11) 'to affect, physical'.
In this meaning, it is argued that only three properties13'' from the set of
prototypical properties that characterise the sense of touch are selected, namely
132 An issue that needs further research is the question of why there is only a number of
properties, two or three, selected out of a large array of physiological motivated properties Although I
cannot give a full account for it yet, a possible reason for this selection may be metonymy Barcelona
(p c.) suggests that "a substructure of the target (consisting of a number of closely related properties,
e.g., contact + effect of contact) is selected. Then the source is searched to find the same set of
properties in it, and it is these properties only that are mapped in physical extended meanings
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<contact yes>, <closeness yes> and <effects ves>. This selection of only some
properties from the source domain is what is called 'Property Selection'. The
Property Selection Process in (11) is represented in Figure 6.1.
This meaning selects the property <contact yes> because the fly is on the
flowers, the fly touches the flowers and obviously, this means that there is some
contact between this insect and the flowers. If there is some contact between these
two entities, then it is implied that both entities are close to each other, hence the
property <closeness yes>133- The property <effects yes> is selected because there has
been some change in the original state of the flowers as a consequence of the contact
between the blackfly and the flowers.
In (11), the meaning remains physical, although it is not the same as the
prototypical meaning in tactile verbs. There has been a shift from the prototypical
physical meaning of touch to a different physical domain 'to affect, physically'. This
type of physical extension, as argued in Chapter 4, remained unexplained in
Sweetser's theory. However, Property Selection Processes solve this problem. These
processes show how the mapping between the source domain (prototypical physical
touch) and the target domain (affect physically) is established, i.e. by the selection of
some properties from the source domain in the target domain.
The meaning 'to affect' can also be interpreted metaphorically as in (12)
below.
(12) John touched me very deeply
In this case, a person called John said or did something that had an effect on
me. The situation is exactly the same as in (11) and the same properties (<contact
\es>, <closeness >es> and <effects yes>) are selected. However, there is a significant
difference between (11) and (12): whereas in the former the meaning is physical, in
the latter the meaning is metaphorical. The meaning in (12) has taken another step on
top of Property Selection, that of metaphor. These two steps are represented in Figure
6.2.
(metonymy), and in metaphorical senses, if the other properties of the source are incompatible with
the target". Whether or not metonymy can explain this selection of properties is an area that I would
like to investigate in the future.
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In (12), apart from the selection of properties from the source domain by
means of Property Selection Processes, there is a metaphorical mapping from the
domain of touch onto the domain of emotion. The agent that touches is the one that
causes the emotion and the contact he has is the action that causes the emotion, while
the effect in this case, instead of being physical, is the emotion caused by this action.
It is important to bear in mind that the extended metaphorical meaning 'to
affect, non-physically' comes from the first prototypical meaning 'to perceive by
touch' and not from the extended physical meaning 'to affect, physically'. Otherwise
it will be implied that every metaphorical meaning needs to have an extended
physical meaning counterpart. This is not true. The other metaphorical extensions in
this sense ('to deal with' and 'to reach') do not have an extended physical meaning
counterpart. Nevertheless, they can be accounted for by these property selection





<contact ves> <contact Ves>
<closeness ves> <closeness yes>











Figure 6.2: Property selection and metaphorical processes in (12) 'to affect,
non-physically'.
133
As argued in Ibarretxe-Antunano (1999c), in the case of touch the properly <closeness yes>
should be understood as an entailment of the property ''contact ,„>.
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The properties that can explain the extended meaning 'to deal with' as in (13)
are <contact yes> and <closeness yes> In this example, the subject does not want to
have any contact with 'that business', hence these two properties.
(13) I wouldn't touch that business
The property <briefness yes> can also be present in this meaning when it
specifically refers to dealing with something superficially as in (14). This meaning is
obtained not only by the meaning of the verb but also by the meaning conveyed in
the adverb barely and the preposition on (see discussion in 2.3.3. above134).
(14) He barely touched on the incident in his speech
The meaning 'to reach' in (15) selects the properties <contact yes>, <closeness
ves> and <limits yes>.
(15) He touched the high point in his career
The first property is selected because when the subject metaphorically
reaches that status in his career, there is a metaphorical contact with that high point.
This moment in this person's career is an end-point, he cannot go any further, this is
represented by the property <limits yes>-
Finally, the other physical extended meaning in tactile verbs 'to partake of
food / drink' illustrated in (16) selects the properties <contact yes>, <closeness yes>,
because there is a physical contact between John and the food, and therefore, it
implies that these two entities are near one another. It also selects the property
<bnefness yes>, because John has not eaten much135.
(16) John hardly touched the food
134
Chapter 7 is devoted to the explanation of how the semantic content of different co-
occurring lexical items takes part in the creation of the meaning of the sentence.
135 As in the case of (14), it is argued that this property is also implied by the use of the
adverb hardly. The issue of how other words in the sentence help identify which properties are
selected is discussed in Chapter 7.
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6.2.3. PROPERTY SELECTION PROCESSES IN SMELL
Two of the extended meanings of olfactory verbs are 'to trail something" and
'to investigate' illustrated below in (17) and (18). The properties selected in these
meanings are <detection yes> and <voluntary yes>.
(17) The dog was sniffing the ground looking for the hare
(18) The police have been sniffing around here again
These meanings select the property <detection >es> because the dog in (17)
and the police in (18) are trying to detect those hints that would lead then to find
what they are looking for. The property ^voluntary yes> is selected because this
search is carried out consciously, both the dog and the police are active subjects of
the action of smell. It is important to recall that the default value of this property in
the sense of smell as explained in Section 5.2.1 (ii) is negative. This value is reversed
in this meaning because the act of smell is no longer unconscious, but premeditated
by the active subject. In Chapter 2, I discussed the differences between agential and
non-agential subjects. Perception verbs were classified according to the semantic role
of their subjects into three groups: 'experience' (the subject does not consciously
control the stimuli; it refers to a state or inchoative achievement), 'activity'
(unbounded process consciously controlled by a human agent), and 'percept'
(subjects are the stimuli of the perception) (See Section 2.2). The property
<voluntary> can be applied to these three groups. Experience and percept would
have a negative value attached to this property, <voluntary no>; activity like
examples (17) and (18) in this discussion a positive value instead, <voluntarv ves>.
The only difference in these two sentences is that in (17) the action of smell is a
physical one, where the dog is actually using its nose in order to follow the trail left
by the hare, whereas in (18), the police are not smelling physically, but
metaphorically.
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<contact no> <voluntary ves>











Figure 6.3: Property Selection Processes in (17) 'to trail something'.
As in 'to affect, physically' in Section 6.2.2, in the case of the extended
meaning in (17), only Property Selection Processes take part in the extension of this
meaning. This selection of properties from the source domain onto the target domain
not only shows what part of the source domain is transferred in this mapping, but it
also explains the extension of meaning from the prototypical physical meaning 'to
smell physically' to the extended physical meaning 'to trail something'.
Property Selection Processes in (17) are represented in Figure 6.3 above.
However, in (18) 'to investigate' (cf. example (12) 'to affect, non-
physically'), not only Property Selection, but also metaphorical processes take place.
That is why the meaning is no longer concrete but abstract. Both processes are
represented in Figure 6.4.
As was pointed out in the discussion of "to affect' in the previous section, it is
important to take into account the fact that the extended metaphorical meaning 'to
investigate' comes from the first prototypical meaning 'to perceive by smell' and not
from the extended physical meaning 'to trail something'. Otherwise it will be implied
that every metaphorical meaning needs to have a physical counterpart. This
assumption is wrong. Metaphorical extended meanings such as 'to suspect' and 'to
guess' do not have an extended physical meaning counterpart. The only difference
among these meanings lies in properties selected for these meanings.
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<contact no> <voluntary Yes>












Figure 6.4: Property selection and metaphorical processes in (18) 'to
investigate'.
The properties that explain the extended meanings 'to guess' and 'to suspect'
are <voluntary no> and <detection yes>. We do not consciously look for hints that
would lead us to form a suspicion, as it was the case in 'to investigate', we detect that
something happens, but we are passive perceivers of those hints that lead us to
suspect. The property identification no> is also selected, because when we suspect
something, all we know is that something is going on but we cannot tell for sure
whether what we suspect is true or not. In these meanings, the 2nd order property
<correction of hypothesis yes> is also selected. As explained in Section 6.1.1, in the
case of smell, the degree of reliability is less than in the other two senses, vision and
hearing, where this property also applied. Consequently, the reliability of suspected
events is less strong than the reliability of witnessed or heard events.
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6.3. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has explored the question of how linguistic expressions related
to the sense modalities are created and constrained by the way human beings
perceive and understand the five senses.
Based on two of the properties for the five sense modalities defined in
Chapter 5, namely <correction of hypothesis> and <contact>, Section 6.1 has shown
how these two properties constrain some of the possible semantic extensions in
perception verbs.
Section 6.2 has focused on tactile and olfactory semantic extensions. This
section has concentrated on metaphorical constraints. It has revised the 'Invariance
Principle' (Lakoff 1993) and discussed the shortcomings of such a principle. As a
solution, the processes called 'Property Selection' have been introduced. These
processes are defined as "the selection of some of the properties from the set of
prototypical properties that characterise the source domain in the target domain".
These processes show exactly what part of the source domain is used, not only in
metaphorical meaning extensions, but also in physical extended meanings. They can
be considered as a formalisation of what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) called the 'used'
part ofmetaphor.
Figure 6.5 represents how these processes are applied to physical extended
meanings. Figure 6.6 shows
extended meanings.




<prototypical properties> <selected prototypical properties>
►
Property Selection Process
Figure 6.5: Property Selection Processes in extended physical meanings.
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In the case of extended physical meanings, there is only one step taken.
Through Property Selection Processes (PSPs), there is a selection of some properties
from the source domain into the target domain, giving as a result the property
selected physical meaning. In the case of metaphorical extensions, there are two
steps taken. On the one hand, as in physical extended extensions, PSPs carry out the
selection of some of the prototypical properties from one domain onto the other. On
the other hand, metaphorical processes are also applied in order to convert the














Figure 6.6: Property selection and metaphorical processes in metaphorical
extended meanings.
These processes have been applied to the semantic fields of tactile and
olfactory verbs. The properties selected in the extended meanings of these two senses
are summarised in Table 6.2.
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TOUCH <selected properties>
'to partake of food' <contact vesU <closeness ycs>, <briefness ves>
'to affect' <contact Ves>, <closeness ves>, <effects yes>
'to deal with" <contact ves>, <closeness yes>
'to reach" <contact ves> <closeness yes>, <limits yes>
SMELL
'to trail something' <detection ves>, <voluntary yes>
'to investigate' <detection yes>, <voluntary yes>
'to guess' <detection Ves>, <identification no>, <voluntary no>, <cor. hyp. yes>
'to suspect" <detection ves>, <identification n0>, <voluntary n0>, <cor. hyp. yes>
Table 6.2: Selected properties in touch and smell.
In this Chapter, two of the main research questions in this thesis have been
discussed: how to account for extended physical meanings and how to constrain
metaphor. Chapter 7 takes up the issue of polysemy and discusses it in relation with
the extended meanings of tactile and olfactory verbs as well. It will be argued that
the polysemous senses in these verbs are obtained by the interaction of these verbs
with the different elements they co-occur with. The role that these elements and these
verbs plav in the overall meaning of the sentence is not the same, but varies in every
semantic extension. This will be called 'Graduable Polysemy'. It will also be argued
that although semantic extensions are cross-linguistic, the way in which they are
obtained is language specific.
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CHAPTER 7: CONSTRAINTS ON POLYSEMY
A word is understood as polysemous if all its multiple meanings are
systematically related. The relation between the different polysemous senses of a
word is not whimsical and random, but motivated. This motivation finds its grounds
in our understanding and bodily experience of the world in which we live.
In Chapter 5, I have presented what the bodily basis is for the semantic
extensions in the field of sense perception. This bodily basis is characterised in terms
of 'prototypical properties'. These properties characterise the source domain of sense
perception. Based on this typology of properties, in Chapter 6, it has been shown
how extended meanings derived from the source domain of physical perception, both
physical and metaphorical, are constrained by the selection of only part of the
properties in the source domain. Focusing on the polysemous meanings of two sense
perception verbs, touch and smell, the Property Selection processes have been able to
describe exactly what it is that relates these extended meanings to each other and to
their common source domain.
By now, it is clear that the relation between these senses is motivated.
However, there is still a question put forward in Chapter 4 that needs to be tackled.
All these different extended meanings are considered polysemous senses of these
perception verbs, but as already argued in Section 4.1.2, it seems that many of these
meanings are only possible if the perception verb is used in conjunction with a
specific subject, complement, and / or adjunct.
For instance, in sentence (1) it is possible to infer the meaning 'to partake of
food', not only because of the verb touch, but also because the direct complement is
the food, whose restricted role would be to be eaten, and because of the adjunct
hardly, that denotes that the subject John did not touch the food much.
(1) John hardly touched the food
In this Chapter, I take up this issue of polysemy and discuss it in relation with
the extended meanings of tactile and olfactory verbs. In Section 7.1, I set out the
problems that have arisen from previous studies on polysemy. In Subsection 7.1.1,
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taking as a starting point Brugman's analysis of the preposition over, I extend the
discussion of the main problems stemming from such cognitive analyses, already
introduced in Chapter 4. I show how polysemous senses are obtained by the
interaction between the semantics of the rest of the elements in the sentence. Section
7.1.2 focuses on cross-linguistic polysemy, that is to say how the same meanings are
expressed in English, Basque and Spanish. In Section 7.2,1 discuss these problems in
relation to tactile and olfactory verbs and propose an alternative account for these
problems. In Section 7.3,1 explore the implications of this alternative account and its
repercussions for the universality of polysemy. Finally, in Section 7.4, 1 draw some
conclusions.
7.1. INTRODUCTION
7.1.1. BRUGMAN'S ANALYSIS OF OVER.
Well-known studies in Cognitive Linguistics have assumed that the
polysemous senses are carried by single lexical items, without taking into account the
semantics of the other elements of the sentence where those lexical items occur.
Brugman's analysis of the preposition over is an example of such an assumption, i.e.
the spatial relational meaning is contained only in the preposition (over) itself
(Brugman 1981; Lakoff 1987: case study 2).
In her study, Brugman describes all the senses of over and the relations
among them. She finds that the central meaning of this preposition is one that
combines elements of both above and across. Other senses such as the 'above' sense,
the 'covering' sense, and so on are also identified; but for this discussion, I
concentrate on the 'above-across' sense and some of its variants. The prototypical
'above-across' meaning is exemplified in (2).
(2) The plane flew over
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In (2) the plane is understood as a trajector (TR) that is oriented relative to an
unspecified landmark136 (LM). Both TR and LM are generalisations of the concepts
figure and ground (Langacker 1987). This sentence is represented in Figure 7.1.
LM
Figure 7.1: Schema l.NC.
The path is above the LM and goes all the way across the LM from the
boundary on one side to the boundary on the other. A dotted line represents the
boundaries of the LM. There is no contact between the LM and the TR in this case.
A special case of (2) is sentence (3).
(3) The bird flew over the yard
The same schema 1 applies to this sentence, but in this case more information
specifying the nature of the LM is added. This is represented in Figure 7.2.
(V)L - -_ w
Figure 7.2: Schema l.X.NC
In (2), the yard is the LM and the bird is the TR. This LM is 'extended', i.e.
when "the landmark extends over a distance or area" (Lakoff 1987: 420). This
information is abbreviated with an 'X' in the schema. As it was the case in (2), there
136 The 'trajector' is the figure or the most prominent element in any relational structure. The
'landmark' is the other entity in the relation.
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is no contact between the TR and the LM either in this sentence. This is abbreviated
with an 'NC' in the schema.
Sentence (4) is another variation of sentence (2), represented in Figure 7.3.
(4) Sam climbed over the wall
In this sentence, the LM is the wall and the TR is Sam. There are new pieces
of information in (4) different from the prototypical senses exemplified in (2). The
LM is 'vertical'; that is to say, the wall is in an upward position. A 'V' represents
this. Unlike in (2) and (3), where TR and LM did not have contact, in this case the
TR Sam touches the LM the wall in the process of climbing. There is contact
between the TR and the LM. A 'C' represents this.
Finally another variation of sentence (2) is example (5) illustrated in Figure
LM \
:
Figure 7.3: Schema l.V.C
7.4.
(5) Sausalito is over the bridge
Figure 7.4: Schema l .X.C.E
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In (5), the LM is the bridge and the TR is Sausalito. The LM is extended,
there is contact between the TR and the LM, and there is also a focus on the end
point of the path, abbreviated by an 'E\ Over has the sense of 'on the other side of.
These are just four different examples taken from Brugman's analysis of the
preposition over. According to this author, the central sense of the preposition
over'37, 'above-across' has different variants depending on the contact or no contact
between the LM and TR, on the position and extension of the LM and on the
endpoint focus. However, not all these extra bits of information are contained in the
preposition itself, but on the other elements of the sentence. For instance, the fact that
in some cases over implies contact is not inferred from the preposition but from the
verb used. In (4), the information provided by the verb, climbed, automatically
entails that there is a contact between the subject Sam - the TR -, and the wall - the
LM -, because it is impossible to climb a wall without touching it. In a similar way,
the no-contact characteristic of over in (2) and (3) is also implied in the verb flew. In
most cases, when we say that something is flying, we visualise the flying object
(bird, plane...) as not touching any surface (see Figure 7.2). In (4), the additional
information that the LM is vertical, is not only provided by the LM - the wall -
itself, but also implied by the verb climbed, which implies an upward movement by
default. Even in the case of end-point focus, where it is claimed that this meaning is
not added by anything in the sentence, but "the result of a general process that
applies in many, but not all English prepositions" (Lakoff 1987: 424), the other
members of the sentence contribute to this meaning. Without the static verb to be,
implying that there is no movement, and the bridge (a structure with a beginning and
an end), the end-point focus could not be inferred.
All the meanings analysed in this section belong to the central meaning
'above-across'; the same comments can be made about the other meanings assigned
to over. For instance, over in a sentence like (6) belongs to the so-called 'excess
schema'. Although it is true that without the preposition over, it could not be
understood that the river was carrying much more water than its banks could allow, it
137
See Boers (1996) and Ibarretxe-Antunano and Serratrice (m.s), for a discussion on the
central sense of over
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is equally true that without the verb to flow and the NP the river, this meaning cannot
be inferred.
(6) The river overflowed
The same 'excess' meaning can be inferred from other sentences as well. For
example, sentence (7).
(7) ? The table overflowed
In (7), the word river is substituted by the word table. At first sight, this
sentence may sound a little bit odd. In the case of river, it is assumed that a river
carries water, and metonymically understood that the excess of water in the river was
what caused the flood. In (7), this process is not so obvious and that is why this
sentence can be considered awkward as it stands. There are two ways in which this
sentence can be turned into a felicitous sentence.
On the one hand, if we take into consideration the context in which this
sentence has been uttered. Imagine, for example, that we are at a reception where
there is plenty of food and drink. We did not expect so much because we were told
that we were going to be given just a light snack. When we report to somebody else
how the reception was, we say (7). In this case, the hearer would not have problems
in understanding what we mean by saying the table overflowed. On the other hand,
we can add more information to the sentence itself, for example, a prepositional
phrase like with food as in (8).
(8) The table overflowed with food
The first solution is of a pragmatic character. We rely on the external
contextual information to solve the failure in the understanding process. The second
solution is of a semantic character. We have solved the problem by adding a new
overt element to the sentence. The semantic content of this new element has
contributed to the understanding of the sentence itself.
In this Chapter, I will not deal with pragmatic contextual information, but will
focus on the role that the semantic content of the different overt elements that co-
occur in a sentence play in the overall meaning of the sentence.
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Based on these examples, it can be argued that the polysemy in the
preposition over is not only obtained by the semantic content of this preposition, but
also in conjunction with the semantic content of the words that accompany this
preposition in the sentence where it occurs. Sinha and Kuteva (1995) have reached a
similar conclusion when analysing spatial relational meaning in locative particles. As
is the case with over, the meaning of locative particles is strongly dependent on the
1
meanings of items co-present in the same syntagm . These authors claim that "the
spatial relational meaning is not mapped exclusively to the locative particle, but is
distributed over the other elements in the syntagm as well" (1995: 170)139.
In this subsection, all the examples are drawn from one language, English. It
has been shown how polysemy is not always localised on one single word, but that
the other elements of the sentence also contribute to build up that meaning. This fact
becomes even more obvious if we examine cross-linguistic polysemy; that is to say,
if we examine how different languages that share the same mappings between
different domains - the same polysemous senses - express such meanings. Cross-
linguistic polysemy is introduced in the next subsection.
7.1.2. CROSS-LINGUISTIC POLYSEMY
In the previous section, it has been argued that polysemous senses are not the
result of the meaning of a single lexical item alone, but the result of the interaction of
such a lexical item with the other elements in the sentence.
This is of special importance when we examine cross-linguistic polysemy.
Different languages express the same concept in different ways, with different
elements. For example, if we look at motion verbs in English, like to go up, to go
down and so on, we notice that in order to express the concept of upwards motion, it
is necessary to use the verb go in conjunction to the preposition up. Other languages,
however, use a different strategy to convey this meaning.
138 Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) also notice this contextual dependence of locative
particles (For a different argument see Landau and Jackendoff 1993).
139 This proposal called 'Distributed Spatial Semantics' is supported by data coming from
language acquisition studies such as Sinha et al. (1994), Thorseng (1997). See also Sinha and
Thorseng (1995) for a coding system for spatial relational reference
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In the context of some people waiting for the lift, English speakers could say
the following sentences.
(9) -Going upl
-Yes, I'm going to the third floor





-Si, voy al tercer piso
yes go. 1 SG:PRES to.the third floor




-Bai, hirugarren pisura noa
yes third floor.ALL go.lSG.PRES
'Yes, I'm going to the third floor'
In (10), the Spanish speaker expresses the same concept of upward movement
by only using the verb subtr 'to go up'. In (11), the Basque speaker uses the adverb
gora'40 'upward' in the same case.
The differences in the use of motion verbs cross-linguistically have been the
object of a great deal of research. Stylistic studies such as Vinay and Darbelnet (1975
[1995]) already pointed out these divergences between English and French. More
140 Gora is formed by the adjective got 'high' and the allative case marker -ra Sentence (9)
can be alternatively expressed by a single verb like in Spanish with the verb igo to go up' and by the
adverb gora accompanied by the verb joan 'to go'
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recently and in the Cognitive Linguistics framework, Talmy's 'event-frames' theory
(1985, 1991, 1996) proposes a more unified way of accounting for these typological
differences.
Talmy assumes that it is possible to isolate elements separately within the
domain ofmeaning and within the domain of surface expression (verb, adposition...)
and satellites ("certain immediate constituents of a verb root other than inflections,
auxiliaries, or nominal arguments'' (1985: 102)). The association between semantic
elements and surface elements is not a one-to-one relationship. A combination of
semantic elements can be expressed by a single surface element or vice versa. Or
semantic elements of different types can be expressed by the same type of surface
element, as well as the same type by several different ones (1985: 57). This varies
across languages. Talmy classifies languages into two typological groups: (i) 'verb-
framed' languages, those that "characteristically mapped the core schema141 into the
verb" and (ii) 'satellite-framed' languages, those that "map the core schema onto the
satellite" (Talmy 1991: 486). The examples discussed above belong to what Talmy
calls the 'motion event'. A motion event is "a situation containing movement or the
maintenance of a stationary location" (1985: 60). A motion event consists of several
semantic components: the 'Figure' (F) - the moving or conceptually movable object
whose path or site is at issue -, the 'Ground' (G) - a reference-frame, or a reference
- point stationary within a reference-frame, with respect to which the figure's path or
site is characterised -, the 'Path" (P) - the course followed or site occupied by the F
object with respect to the G object -, and the 'Motion' (M) - the presence per se in
the event ofmotion or location (Talmy 1985: 61).
According to Talmy's approach142, English is a satellite-framed language,
because a satellite to the verb, the preposition up, conveys the core information of the
141 The 'core schema' is "the schematic core of a framing event". A 'frame event' is in turn,
the event that "has the character of delineating a certain type of schematic structure in any particular
set of organised conceptual domains" (Talmy 1991: 482).
142
Although Basque is not included among the languages analysed by Talmy, it seems that it
might be included among the satellite-framed languages. However, more research into this aspect is
needed in order to support this statement
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path ofmovement, whereas Spanish is a verb-framed language because it is the verb
itself, subir 'to ascend', that conveys that information143.
The same structures in (9), (10), and (11) can convey metaphorical meanings.
Sentences (12), (13) and (14) are examples of Lakoff and Johnson's orientational144
metaphor more is up. According to these authors, the physical basis of this metaphor
is our experience of the fact that when we add more of a substance or of physical
objects to a container, the level goes up.
(12) The number of books printed each year keeps going up (Lakoff and
Johnson (1980: 15)).
(13) El numero de libros publicados cada ano
sigue subiendo
the number of books published each year
keeps going.up
'The number of books printed each year keeps going up'
(14) Urtero argitaratako liburuen kopuruak goraka
jarraitzen du
year.each published.ADN book.GEN number.ERG up
keep.HAB aux
'The number of books published each year keeps going up'
As seen in the examples, this metaphorical mapping is not only found in
English, but also in Spanish (13) and Basque (14). What is different between these
languages is the overt syntactical representation of such metaphorical meaning. As is
the case in the physical examples above, in English it is necessary to use the verb go
followed by the preposition up, in Spanish the verb subir covers this meaning and in
Basque, the adverb goraka145.
143
See Aske (1989) and Slobin (1996) for a more detailed discussion of the 'motion event' in
English and Spanish.
144 An 'orientational' metaphor "organises a whole system of concepts with respect to one
another" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:14). These metaphors are usually related with spatial orientation:
up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral
145 Goraka is formed by gora 'upwards' and the suffix -ka. This suffix denotes a repetitive
action.
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7.1.3. SUMMARY
In this section, two main ideas are put forward; on the one hand, that
polysemous senses are the result of the interaction of the meaning of the different
parts of a sentence; and on the other, that although the same meanings are expressed
in different languages, the way in which these different languages convey such
meanings can be different.
In the following section, I take up these ideas and apply them to the different
semantic extensions of tactile and olfactory verbs. It will be argued that the
compositionality of meaning is not the same in all cases, but hierarchically organised
according to which element of the sentence - that is, the semantic content of which
element - exercises a major influence in the overall meaning. Although the same
semantic structures are possible in the three languages under investigation, the way
in which these languages express such meanings is different.
7.2. TACTILE AND OLFACTORY POLYSEMY: AN
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH.
As was shown in Chapter 2, tactile and olfactory verbs can convey a wide
range of physical and metaphorical extended meanings. These verbs are polysemous,
but the issue here is to address the question of what causes this polysemy and how
we can account for it. In Section 7.1, it is argued that previous cognitive analyses of
polysemy in prepositions do not take into account the semantics of the other elements
in the syntagm in which the preposition appears. It is shown that without these other
elements it is not possible to infer such meanings.
As a possible solution to this problem, Pustejovsky's compositional approach
to polysemy was introduced in Chapter 4. The main thesis of Pustejovsky's
Generative Lexicon is that a core set of word senses is used to generate a larger set of
word senses when individual lexical items are combined with others into phrases and
clauses. After applying this model to some of the semantic extensions in tactile
verbs, it was concluded that although Pustejovsky's model seems to account for
some of the main central physical meanings of this semantic field, it fails to constrain
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how and why metaphorical expressions take place, because it allows the formation of
infelicitous sentences (see Section 4.2.).
In sum, we need an approach that takes into account the role that the
semantics of the different elements in a sentence plays in the overall meaning of that
sentence, but at the same time constrains what elements can be put together in order
to obtain such meaning. It is to this alternative approach that we turn now.
7.2.1. GRADUABLE POLYSEMY
In Section 7.1, it has been argued that all the elements in a sentence take part
in the overall meaning of the sentence itself. The same statement can be made about
the semantic extensions of tactile146 and olfactory verbs. Below there are some
examples of such extensions in English.
(15) John hardly touched the food
(16) The dog was sniffing around looking for the hare
As has already been discussed in this thesis several times, the meaning of (15)
is inferred not only because of the verb touch, but also because of the direct
complement the food and the adjunct hardly. It would be impossible to infer a
meaning like 'to partake of food' without having a complement that denotes some
kind of edible object. Therefore, it is possible to predict that whenever the
complement of the verb to touch refers to an edible object, then the meaning is 'to
partake of food'.
The meaning in (16) is 'to trail something'. This meaning is inferred not just
because of the verb to sniff, but also because the subject of the sentence is the dog, an
animal known for its accurate and sharp sense of smell; the preposition around that
gives us the information that there is not a certain point where the dog is smelling,
but a vague area, and the fact that the action of sniffing has a purpose, i.e. to look for
the hare. We also know that animals, as well as people, leave a distinctive trail that
can be easily followed by dogs.
146 See Ibarretxe-Antunano (1999d) for an initial approach to polysemy in tactile verbs.
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Ifwe substitute around for other prepositions such as out and at, the meaning
of the sentence changes completely.
(17) The dog sniffed out the hare
In (17), the preposition out changes the meaning of the sentence completely.
(17) does not mean that the dog is following the trail left behind by the hare, but that
the dog has already discovered where the hare was. Although I am not going to focus
on this issue in this thesis, it is worth noticing that in order to obtain this meaning, it
has been necessary to change the verb phrase in (17). 'To trail something' is an
activity and as such, it requires the aspect of the VP to be progressive. 'To discover',
however, is an achievement and requires a non-progressive duration of action instead
(* 'Che dog was sniffing out the hare).
The same conclusions can be reached ifwe use the preposition at as in (18).
(18) The dog was sniffing at the hare
In (18), the preposition at cancels the sense of vagueness inferred by around.
In this case, at points towards a very specific area of action, what the dog is sniffing
is a very definite entity, the hare. At the same time, it is important to point out that
the meaning of the sentence shifts from the extended physical of 'to follow a trail' to
the prototypical physical meaning of 'to smell (activity)'.
This change is even more dramatic if, instead of the physical extended
meaning 'to follow a trail', we change the preposition in the metaphorical extended
meaning 'to investigate' illustrated in (19).
(19) The police have been sniffing around this place
In this example, the subject the police helps to obtain the meaning 'to
investigate', as it is commonly assumed that one of the main activities of the police is
obviously to investigate cases, looking for evidence, and so on. The preposition
around tells us that the police have been investigating in this area. They have not
gone to a specific place in particular, but covered a whole area.
However, if we change around for at as in (20), the reading we obtain is very
different.
(20) The police have been sniffing at this place
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The preposition at, as in sentence (18), narrows down the area of activity of
the police. Now it is not a whole area where they have been investigating but a very
specific spot. But what is more, the meaning of (20) changes from being an extended
metaphorical meaning - 'to investigate' -, to the prototypical physical meaning of 'to
smell (activity)'.
In all these examples, it would be impossible to infer such meanings without
the specific use of these elements. The situation is somehow different in the
following examples.
(21) Who touched my clothes?
(22) An appeal that touches us all
(23) He touched the highest point in his career
(24) Mary can smell danger from miles away
In (21), the extended meaning is 'to affect'. Somebody has changed the state
in which the clothes were and we want to know who that person is. In order to infer
this meaning we need an entity that is able to carry the action of touching, as well as
an entity that can be touched by the subject. Unlike in (19) and (20), the choice of
both subject and complement is very wide; there are many entities that can carry out
both tasks. The obtaining of this meaning does not depend upon such a restrictive
choice of arguments.
The same statement can be made about the other two sentences. The meaning
in (22) is also 'to affect', but metaphorically. An appeal is an entity- that can have an
effect on us, it is not a concrete entity and therefore the meaning inferred cannot be
physical, but metaphorical. Therefore, the choice of this kind of abstract subject does
have a consequence in the meaning in this sentence. But, as in (21), there are many
abstract entities that can fill this position (a situation, a reaction) resulting in the
same extended meaning of 'affect', so the choice of subject is not as restrictive as
before.
In (23), the meaning is 'to reach'. In this case, the fact that an end-point is
implied is not only conveyed by the nature of the tactile verb itself, but also by the
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complement the highest point that denotes a limit to that metaphorical action of
touching. And since the highest point is without dimension, we get the achievement
reading of 'to reach'. As in the other examples, there are many other entities like
bottom, eternity that can be placed in this position.
Finally, the meaning in (24) is 'to guess, to sense something'. This is also a
metaphorical extension, the object trouble is an abstract entity, and therefore cannot
be physically smelt as a flower can. Here again, there is a great deal of other entities
that can be placed in this position (business, money), and therefore, the choice of
complement is very wide.
In these four examples, the semantics of the other elements of the sentence
plays a role in the overall meaning, but the importance of these elements is not as big
as in the previous examples, (19) and (20). In order to obtain the meanings 'to
affect', 'to reach', and 'to guess', it is necessary to have subjects that are able to
touch and smell, and complements that can be touched and smelt. The achievement
of that meaning, however, is not as dependent on these arguments as in (19) and (20).
In (21), (22), (23), and (24) the intrinsic meaning of the verb itself plays a much
more important role, than that of its arguments.
Finally, we have sentence (25) with the meaning 'to affect'.
(25) John touchedMary
As argued in Section 4.2.1, this sentence is highly ambiguous; there are
simultaneous interpretations of this sentence. (25) can infer a physical contact
between John and Mary, i.e. the prototypical meaning of touch; the meaning 'to
affect, physically' as in a situation where John is not expected by Mary and when he
touches her, he makes her shiver; and the meaning 'to affect, metaphorically', in
which case an emotional reaction from Mary is implied. Without any more
information about the context in which this sentence is uttered, one cannot decide
whether (25) should be interpreted physically or metaphorically.
Unlike the other examples, (25) cannot be predicted by the semantic
properties of the arguments that the verb takes. John and Mary are too vague to
constrain the semantic extension that takes place in this example. In the case of the
meaning 'to partake of food', the complement the food constrains the semantic
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extension of the verb, because there are not too many things that can be done with
food, apart from eating, cooking... With John and Mary the case is different, the
possibilities for these two entities are infinite. And yet, the meanings that we have
are the prototypical meaning, and 'to affect', both physically and metaphorically.
In sum, based on these sets of examples, we can divide these polysemous
senses into two groups. On the one hand, examples like (25), where it is not possible
to predict what the interpretation is by means of the choice of arguments - these are
called 'unpredictable' cases of polysemy; and on the other, those cases where the
choice of arguments leads to a specific predicted extension of meaning. This latter
group is further classified depending on the degree of influence of the semantics of
the arguments involved. Where meanings such as 'to partake of food' and 'to trail
something' are mainly determined by the arguments and other elements in the
sentence, in other meanings like 'to affect', 'to reach', and 'to guess', it is the verb
that mainly governs the choice of arguments and meaning. The former cases are
called 'argument-driven extensions' and the latter, 'verb-driven extensions'. The
fact that the weight of the semantics of the different elements in the overall meaning
of a sentence is not the same in all extended meanings, but hierarchically organised
according to the degree of influence of the lexical items involved, is what I call
graduable polysemy'.
In this section, I have shown that extended meanings are obtained by the
interaction of the semantic content of both the perception verb and its complements.
The role of the semantics of both the perception verb and its complements is not the
same in all extended meanings; in some cases, the verb is more important and in
some other cases, the complements are. If the semantic content of the complements
of these perception verbs is so crucial in some of the extended meanings found in this
semantic field, the next question that arises is whether or not these complements are
required to have a very specific semantic content in order to obtain that specific
extended meaning. Whether or not the choice of these complements is constrained by
the characteristics of this semantic field of perception. It is to this issue that I turn
now.
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7.2.2. VERB-PROPERTY REQUIREMENT
In the previous section, the concept of graduable polysemy has been
introduced. According to the degree of influence in the overall meaning of the
sentence that the semantic content of the perception verb and the other elements of
the sentence had, semantic extensions were classified as (i) unpredictable polysemy,
(ii) verb-driven extensions, and (iii) argument-driven extensions.
In this thesis, it has been argued that different conceptual domains are not
linked as a result of chance. In Chapter 6, it is shown that the different semantic
extensions that take place in perception verbs are constrained by and based on the
physiology of these senses, as well as on our perception of these senses themselves.
In other words, there is a bodily-based motivation for extending the meaning of one
conceptual domain into another different one.
If this constraint is correct, then it follows that all those elements that
contribute to the extension of meaning must also be constrained in a similar way. I
have argued in Section 7.2.1 that polysemous meanings are not just contained in a
particular tactile or olfactory verb in every extension of meaning. In predictable cases
of polysemy, the other co-occurring elements contribute with their own semantic
content to the configuration of the polysemous sense. Therefore, these elements that
play a more or less crucial role in the creation of the polysemous meanings are
required to follow the same bodily-based motivation. A motivation, that as shown in
Chapter 5, is characterised in terms of properties.
This requirement will constrain the choice of elements in two different ways.
On the one hand, it will explain why certain elements cannot co-occur with certain
verbs in particular, why sentences like (26) and (27) below are ruled out. On the
other hand, it will show how some properties that characterise these perceptual
processes are highlighted by the semantic content of these elements themselves. I call
this requirement on the choice of co-occurring elements in extended meanings the
verb-property requirement'.
Firstly, let us focus on the first issue: why these sentences below are not
accepted.
(26) *John touched the joke
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(27) *John smelt the highest point in his career
Without any more contextual information147, both (26) and (27) are not
felicitous. In (26), the reason why this is so lies in the fact that the joke does not seem
to be taken as a 'touchable' type of concept. In other words, a joke cannot be touched
in any physical way as objects like the table, the clothes can; but it can neither be
touched in any abstract possible way as other concepts like the topic, the highest
point can. The same statement can be made about (27). Whereas concepts such as the
joke, danger and so on seem to be licensed in this situation, the highest point is
rejected, it does not seem to be a 'smellable' type of concept, either physically (a
point does not give off any smell) or metaphorically.
To say that these complements are not 'touchable' or 'smellable' types of
concepts means that these complements do not seem to share the same properties that
these two perceptual processes have. The properties that characterise these
complements, their semantic content, seem to clash with some of the properties that
characterised these verbs.
For instance, the complement the highest point in (27) clashes with some of
the properties of the verb smell. A characteristic of this sense is the property
identification no^- This property refers to the fact that it is very difficult to identify
what the stimuli for smell are. With the sense of smell, it is possible to detect the
stimuli, but when it comes to identifying what the smell is, the sense of smell is not
as accurate as the other senses (see also Section 6.1.1). The complement in this
sentence implies a very specific entity: it is a point situated at the very top of
something; and therefore, it clashes with one of the properties required by the sense
of smell. In other words, this complement is not 'smellable', and therefore, it violates
the 'verb-property requirement'.
A similar explanation can be given for (26). The joke, as it stands in this
example (see footnote 147), clashes with the perceptual requirements of the tactile
verb. In this sense, <contact yes> is one of its properties, i.e. the PR must have a
147
As pointed out in Ibarretxe-Antunano (1999d: 210), (26) could be accepted if used
negatively and in a very specific context. For instance, if we say Don't touch that joke when you make
your speech before the committee. However, if this example is analysed internally, i.e without any
context, then it is no longer possible.
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physical contact with the OP in order to be perceived148. However, it does not seem
to be possible to establish any kind of physical or metaphorical contact between the
P, John, and the OP, the joke. The joke is too vague149 as an entity to be able to be
touched, and therefore, it clashes with the property <contact yes>.
Therefore, it is argued that these sentences are infelicitous because the
properties that characterise each of these senses clash with the possible properties
that these concepts have. In other words, they do not abide by the 'verb-property
requirement', because the properties of the different elements that are put together in
a sentence violate the properties that constitute the bodily basis of these sense
perception verbs.
The second part of the 'verb-property requirement' deals with the way in
which some properties that characterised these perceptual processes are highlighted
by the semantic content of these elements.
Sentence (28) is an example of the argument-driven semantic extension 'to
partake of food' in tactile verbs.
(28) John hardly touched the food
As was explained in Section 7.2.1, this meaning is inferred not only because
of the verb touch, but also because of the direct complement the food and the adjunct
hardly. What led this extended meaning to be classified as argument driven is the
fact that without either of these two elements it would not be possible to obtain this
meaning in particular. Now we need to recall the properties selected in this meaning
in Chapter 6; these properties are <contact ycs>, <closeness yes> and <bncfncss yes>
In this example, the property <briefness yes> is being highlighted by the adjunct
hardly, which refers to a 'small quantity of something'. In fact, if we remove this
adverb from the sentence, the extended meaning of 'partake' disappears completely,
148
It is important to bear in mind that the physical property <contact yes> is no longer
understood as 'physical' in abstract meanings because in these cases there is no physical contact
required. For instance, it is possible to say sentences like Her attitude touched me even though you
have only read about it, and even if she is far away from you (Barcelona p.c ). What exists and must
be present in the metaphorical cases is an abstract counterpart of <contact>.
149 It is important to recall here the way in which the OP was represented in Figures 5.3 and
5.5 in Section 5.2.3. The OP in smell was a discontinuous line square, and the OP in touch was a
continuous line instead. These lines represented the way in which perception was carried out through
these senses, as well as the nature of those OPs. Whereas in smell, the boundaries of the OP are vague,
not well defined, in touch, the boundaries of the OP are.
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and the sentence John touched the food comes to infer the prototypical physical
meaning of touch as an activity verb150.
In verb-driven semantic extensions, it is also possible to observe how some of
the properties selected are distributed or highlighted by the different elements that
co-occur in the sentence. For example, in (29) at Tenerife highlights one of the
properties that is selected in the extended meaning 'to reach', the property <limits
yes>, that refers to the fact that the ship has reached her end-point, the ship has arrived
at her destination, i.e. Tenerife.
(29) The ship touched at Tenerife
An interesting example is the extended meaning 'to deal with'. As argued in
Chapter 6, this meaning selects the properties <contact yes> and <closeness yes> in a
sentence like / wouldn't touch that business. However, when this meaning
specifically refers to dealing with something superficially as in (30), the property
<briefness yes> is also selected.
(30) He barely touched on the incident in his speech
As is the case in the other examples discussed above, in (30) the property
<bnefness ves5" is highlighted by the adverb barely. This is corroborated if we look at
examples like (31), where instead of an adverb like barely we include an adverbial
expression like many times, for a long time.
(31) I have already touched that topic many times in the meeting
In this case, the meaning is no longer 'to deal with something superficially',
we have dealt with that topic so many times that we are now very familiar with it.
7.2.3. SUMMARY
Starting from the basic idea that polysemy is not to be localised on a single
lexical item - the perception verb in this thesis -, in this section I have proposed two
major constraints on polysemy: 'graduable polysemy' and "verb-property
requirement'.
150 It is important to point out that the property <briefness Vcs> is still present in this
prototypical physical meaning; it forms part of the set of prototypical properties that characterise this
sense perception (see Chapter 5).
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Graduable polysemy states that the weight of the semantic content of the
different elements in the overall meaning of a sentence is not the same in all
extended meanings, but hierarchically organised in three different degrees:
'unpredictable polysemy', 'verb-driven extensions', and 'argument-driven
extensions'.
Verb-property requirement states that the properties that characterise the
different elements that interact with the verb must not violate the prototypical
properties that constitute the bodily basis upon which the polysemy of this semantic
field is based.
Polysemy, then, is constrained not only by the weight of the semantic content
of each participating element in these extended meanings; but also by the specific
choice of only those elements whose semantic content does not clash with the nature
(properties) of the semantic field of perception.
7.3. HOW UNIVERSAL IS POLYSEMY?
Throughout this thesis, I have been analysing and describing the polysemy
that takes place in perception verbs. In Chapter 2,1 gave a description of the different
polysemous meanings that are found in this semantic field. Based on the linguistic
framework of Cognitive Linguistics, and on Sweetser's previous work on these
verbs, I argued that these semantic extensions were not the result of chance, but that
they were grounded in our experience of the senses themselves, on the way we
perceive we use our five senses. Each sense is different from each other, and each
sense is perceived in a different way from each other. These differences in the way
we conceptualise each sense are shown and constrained by the way in which we
create our language. Stemming from the typology of properties defined in Chapter 5
for the characterisation of this bodily basis for the different meanings in perception
verbs, I introduced the processes called 'Property Selection' in Chapter 6. These
processes are constraints on mappings between the source and the target domain,
both in metaphorical and physical extended meanings.
In preceding chapters, I have discussed another important issue: the question
of whether these mappings across different conceptual domains are universal or
specific to one language.
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According to cognitive linguistic theory, these mappings ought to be shared
by different languages. If the semantic extensions that take place in a particular
semantic field are based on, constrained and explained by our understanding and
experience of the world in which we, as humans, live, it then follows that the
different conceptualisations that we have, as well as the mappings between different
conceptual domains of experience, have to be the same.
Based on the results from the synchronic analysis of perception verbs in
Chapter 2, this statement seems to be true. In this Chapter, I not only analysed the
meanings in English perception verbs, but also those in Basque and Spanish
perception verbs. Although some of the extended meanings were particular to one of
the languages, these three languages shared the majority of these meanings, despite
the etymologically different origin of these verbs (see Chapter 3) and the differences
between these languages.
In sum, these results seem to support the universal character of these
mappings between the physical domain of perception and that of internal self and
sensations (Sweetser 1990).
In this chapter, I have continued the discussion on polysemy from a different
perspective. Here, I was not so much concerned about the conceptual mappings
between different domains, but about the way in which these mappings are overtly
expressed in a language. That is to say, how these polysemous senses are obtained in
each language, how the meaning of the different elements that co-occur with the
perception verb in the same sentence constrains and contributes to the creation of the
extended meaning.
I started the chapter by reviewing Brugman's analysis of the English
preposition over. I showed how some of the meanings attributed to this preposition
were obtained through the interaction of the semantic content of this preposition and
the other elements in the sentence (verb, noun, etc.). This same conclusion was
supported by the analysis of tactile and olfactory verbs in Section 7.2. Based on these
data, I introduced the concept of 'graduable polysemy'. Graduable polysemy stated
that the interaction between the semantic content of the different elements in a
sentence - in this case, the tactile and olfactory verb and its arguments - is subject to
three different degrees of compositionality.
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In Section 7.2, graduable polysemy was only applied to the semantic
extensions of English tactile and olfactory verbs. However, as has already been
pointed out in Section 7.1.2, the way languages have to express the same concepts is
not always the same. What in one language can be expressed by one word (cf.
Spanish subir), in others may need the interaction of the meaning of two different
words (cf. English go up). That is to say, what in some languages are 'unpredictable'
cases of polysemy in others may be 'predictable' cases; what in some languages are
'argument-driven extensions', in others can be 'verb-driven extensions'.
In other words, graduable polysemy does not seem to be universal151, but
specific to each language.
Before we tackle the theoretical implications of this statement, let us illustrate
this point with the last example from the previous section, reproduced here as (32).
(32) John touched Mary
In English, this is an example of unpredictable polysemy because the
different polysemous senses of this sentence cannot be predicted by the meaning of
the arguments the verb takes. The question now is whether in the other two
languages under investigation, the same unpredictable polysemy is found as well.
The same sentence can be translated into Basque (33) and Spanish (34).
(33) Jonek Miren ukitu zuen
john.ERG mary.ABS touch AUX
'John touched Mary'
(34) Juan toco a Maria
john touched to mary
'John touched Mary'
In both languages, the only possible interpretation of (33) and (34) is the
physical reading. In these sentences, it is understood that John physically touched
151 It is important to bear in mind that this universality is restricted to those languages that
share a common cultural background. English, Basque and Spanish - although linguistically different
languages - share the same Western culture. It would be necessary to study this semantic field of
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Mary. In no way can they have the metaphorical ambiguity that exists in English.
This is not to say that it is impossible to express the metaphorical To affect' reading
in these two languages with tactile verbs. See, for instance examples (35) in Basque
and (36) in Spanish.
(35) Edertasunak ukitu du azkenean Ifiakiren bihotz
gogorra
beauty.ERG touch aux end.lNE inaki.GEN heart
strong.abs
'In the end, beauty changed Inaki's hard feelings'
(36) Juan le toco el corazon a Maria
john 3sg.DAT touched the heart to mary
'John touched Mary's heart'
In Basque as well as in Spanish the mapping between the physical domain of
touch and that of 'to affect' is allowed as well; but in order to reach this meaning it is
necessary to add a complement to the verb that denotes feelings. The direct object in
(35) and (36), the heart, is understood not as a physical object; under the cognitive
approach, heart is a metaphorical realisation of the image schema of a container,
where heart is a container for feelings (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In fact, as
Moliner (1983) points out, in Spanish the verb tocar needs expressions such as el
corazon The heart', el amor propio 'one's own pride', la dignidad 'dignity' in order
to imply this interpretation.
In Basque, there is another possibility. Instead of using the verb ukitu, the
meaning To affect (metaphorically)' can be expressed by the verb hunkitu, as in (37).
(37) Jonek Miren hunkitu zuen
jon.ERG mary.ABS touch AUX
'John touched Mary'
sense perception in other languages free from this Western cultural background in order to prove or
disprove the universal character of these mappings.
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In Basque, the verbs ukitu and hunkitu are etymologically related (see
Michelena 1990 [1985], and Chapter 3). In general, however, ukitu is more widely
used for the physical contact and hunkitu is usually restricted to the abstract
interpretation. Nevertheless, both verbs can also be used in the other way, provided
that an adjunct or argument specifies that a hand is being used for the touching, as in
(38), or that the subject is non-physical, as in (39).
(38) Eskuaz hunkitu diot
hand.instr touch aux
"He touched him with his hand' (Aulestia 1989)
(39) Zure hitzek sakon ukitu naute
your words. ERG deeply touch AUX
"Your words touched me very deeply'
One of the semantic extensions proposed by Sweetser (1990; see also Chapter
4) in the sense of smell is use of bad smell in English to refer to bad character or
dislikeable characteristics (1990: 37). In a sentence like (40) below, the meaning can
be taken as ambiguous, without any context it is not possible to tell whether we are
referring to a physical 'bad smell' or a metaphorical 'bad smell'.
(40) What John is doing stinks
In this sentence, what John is doing, is too vague without a context to be able
to tell whether the meaning is metaphorical or not. If we change the subject for an
entity like business in (41), then the ambiguity disappears because of the
characteristics that an entity like business has, a business cannot actually give off a
physical smell. Therefore, (41) must be understood metaphorically.
(41) This business stinks
According to the classification of graduable polysemy proposed in the
previous section, (40) is an example of 'unpredictable polysemy' and (41) of 'verb-
driven extension".
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However, in this section our major concern is not to classify this meaning
according to the hierarchical graduable polysemy, but to see whether this
classification for the English sentences corresponds to the same classification in its
Basque and Spanish counterparts.
In Basque, as pointed out in Chapter 2, there are no percept olfactory verbs.
This meaning is expressed by the periphrasis usain erton 'to give off smell' as in (42)
and (43).
(42) Jon egiten ari denari usain txarra dario
john.abs do.hab be busy aux.rel.dat smell bad.abs gives
'What John is doing stinks'
(43) Negozio honi usain txarra dario
business that.DAT smell bad.ABS gives
'That business stinks'
As is the case in English, (42) can be interpreted both physically - what John
is doing is producing a foul smell -, and metaphorically - what John is doing is not
good, legal. In (43), on the other hand, the meaning is metaphorical due to the subject
negozio honi 'that business'. However, it is important to notice that the negative
content in these two sentences - the fact that it is a bad smell -, is inferred by the
adjective txar 'bad', not by the verb itself as it was the case in English.
In Spanish, sentence (44) can be translated in two different ways.
(44) Lo que esta haciendo Juan huele mal
it.acc that is doing John smells badly
'What John is doing stinks'
(45) Lo que esta haciendo Juan me huele mal
it.acc that is doing John I.dat smells badly
'What John is doing stinks'
Sentence (44) corresponds to the physical meaning of stink. John is doing
something and it is giving off this bad smell. We know that it has a bad smell
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because of the adverb mal 'badly', unlike in English, this negative quality of smell is
not contained in the verb itself, but in the adverb or adverbial expression that is
added to the verb152. Sentence (45), on the other hand, corresponds to the
metaphoncal meaning of stink. The only difference between these two sentences in
Spanish is the use of the dative personal pronoun, me. Therefore, it seems that this
pronoun triggers the shift from a physical domain to a metaphoncal domain.
The dative pronoun me suggests a major involvement of the speaker into the
action he is reporting. Whereas in (44) the speaker simply says that what John is
doing does not have a good smell, in (45) the speaker is not only reporting that, but
also judging John's activity. In (44), the verb smell is understood as a percept verb -
emission of smell. In (45), the verb smell changes from being a percept verb to an
experiencer verb - perception of smell carried out unconsciously by the subject153.
This change is carried out by the pronoun me.
Interestingly enough, an unambiguous sentence like (41), where the subject
this business seems to be crucial in the metaphorical interpretation, can be translated
with or without the dative pronoun in Spanish as in (46). In both cases, the meaning
remains metaphorical.
(46) Este negocio (me) huele mal
this business I.DAT smells badly
'This business stinks'
These examples show that, although the same semantic mappings between
different domains take place cross-linguistically, the strategies that each language
follows to express such meanings are different.
152
The Spanish verb apestar is the closest equivalent to English stink (see Ibarretxe-
Antunano 1997) Apestar can refer to both physical and metaphorical meanings. This verb is not used
in this example, however, because it is not etymologically related to olfactory verbs, it comes from the
word peste 'plague' (< Lat. pestis 'destruction, plague'). Its semantic development, nevertheless, has
followed a similar path. As noticed in Chapter 5, smells are usually named after the entity that gives
off the smell, i.e. the plague. After the verbalisation of this noun, the verb apestar has shifted from the
physical meaning of giving off a bad smell to indicate that something has bad characteristics.
153
Recall the distribution of properties in the semantic extensions of smell in Section 6 2.3,
(45) exemplifies the meaning 'to suspect", characterised by the properties <voluntary no>, <detection
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What in one language can be overtly expressed by a single lexical item - a
verb in another language may require the meaning resulting from several lexical
items - a verb and arguments.
This statement has important implications for our theory of polysemy and its
universal character.
First of all, it is important to make a distinction between conceptual mappings
on the one hand, and overt realisations of those conceptual mappings on the other,
between the links established between different domains of experience and the
different strategies that languages follow to overtly express those links. In other
words, one thing appeals to our conceptualisation of the world, shared by all humans
with the same cultural background; the other, to the linguistic means that each
language in particular has.
In previous analyses of so called polysemous lexical items, there was no
distinction between these two concepts. If a lexical item was to be taken as
polysemous in itself, that is to say if polysemous senses were localised in one lexical
item without taking into account the semantic content of the other words that co-
occur with this lexical item, then both conceptual structure and overt expression of
such conceptual structure were the same. If the conceptual structure were cross-
linguistic, and conceptual structure and the overt expression of such conceptual
structure were the same, then, transitively, it could be argued that both were cross-
linguistic.
However, I have shown that this is not the case. Lexical items are not
generally polysemous in themselves, unless they are cases of 'unpredictable
polysemy'. They need the help of the semantic content of other lexical items in order
to obtain those polysemous senses, and as shown in this section, which lexical items
are required to trigger and build the different extended polysemous readings are not
the same in every language134.
It is for these reasons that I will consider that the verbs themselves are not
polysemous, but that the conceptual domain of sense perception is polysemous. The
154
It is important to bear in mind that although these lexical items are not the same cross-
linguistically, they cannot just have any semantic content. The choice of what lexical items co-occur
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different mappings presented in Chapter 2 are not to be taken as semantic extensions
of the perception verbs themselves, but polysemous senses of the conceptual domain
of sense perception. I will call the group of these extended meanings 'conceptual
polysemy'
In sum, 1 argue that when we analyse the meanings that take place in a
semantic field, we need to distinguish and address two different sides.
On the one hand, we need to establish its 'conceptual polysemy7, i.e. the
conceptual mappings that take place between different domains of expenence. This
conceptual polysemy is constrained by the different properties that characterise the
bodily basis of the semantic field under analysis; in our case, the bodily basis of
sense perception defined in Chapter 5. Because this bodily basis is shared by and
common to all humans with the same cultural background, conceptual polysemy is
cross-linguistic.
On the other hand, it is necessary to establish which elements are involved in
the creation of such conceptual polysemy, and to what extent their semantic content
participates in the creation of such extended meanings. The choice of what elements
are required is constrained by the verb-property requirement. This requirement only
allows those elements whose semantic content does not clash with the bodily basis of
the semantic field under investigation (see Section 7.2.2). Graduable polysemy
establishes and classifies the importance of the semantic content of these elements in
the creation of such conceptual polysemy in three different degrees of
compositionality (see Section 7.2.1). The results obtained in this part of the analysis
are to be considered language specific.
I would like to finish this section with a brief mention of how this dichotomy
may affect the processes that we use to map one domain of experience onto a
different domain, namely metaphor and property selection.
Property Selection processes are defined as the selection of some of the
properties from the set of prototypical properties that characterise the source domain
in the target domain. These processes show exactly what part of the source domain is
used, not only in metaphorical expressions, but also in physical extended meanings
with the perception verb is constrained by the 'verb property requirement' as explained in Section
7.2.2.
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Metaphor is a cognitive tool that - in conjunction with property selection
processes - structures the mappings between a physical domain and an abstract
domain.
The main function of both cognitive devices is to account for and structure
the different semantic extensions of the semantic field under study, that is to say its
conceptual polysemy.
Property Selection and metaphorical processes are constrained by the bodily
basis of the semantic field under investigation; they are the cognitive tools that we
have to map and structure our conceptual systems experientially. Therefore, we
ought to include them in the first part of our analysis, the one that tackles cross-
linguistic conceptual polysemy.
However, they are also affected by the overt realisation of the conceptual
polysemy, because - as stated in the discussion on graduable polysemy in Section
7.2.1 - metaphorical and physical extended meanings are triggered by the semantic
content of the different elements that co-occur in the same sentence to a bigger or
smaller degree.
Recall that three different degrees of graduable polysemy have been
established according to the degree of influence that the semantic content of the
different lexical items that co-occur in the same sentence has in the overall meaning,
(i) Unpredictable cases of polysemy were those cases where it is not possible to
predict what the interpretation is by means of the choice of arguments {John touched
Mary), (if) verb-driven extensions were those in which the semantic content of the
perception verb is most decisive for the meaning (Mary can smell danger from miles
away), and (iii) argument-driven extensions were those where the semantic content
of the argument determines the meaning {John hardly touched the food).
I have shown in this section that these three degrees are not the same cross-
linguistically because languages have different strategies to express conceptual
polysemy. This implies that the way in which these two cognitive devices are
accessed is specific to each particular language. In other words, metaphor and
property selection processes belong to the conceptual, cross-linguistic side because
they structure our conceptual systems experientally, but because what actually
triggers these mappings is the bigger or smaller interaction of the semantic content of
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the co-occurring elements, then it follows that these two cognitive devices are also
constrained by the way in which graduable polysemy affects each particular
language.
This is an interesting point because it may explain why and how different the
evolution of the meaning in some lexical items is from a cross-linguistic point of
view. Take, for example, the case of the verbs chosen in this study for tactile
perception, namely Eng touch, Bq ukitu, and Sp tocar. In English, the metaphorical
extended meaning 'to affect (emotionally)' is an unpredictable case of polysemy (see
Section 7.2.). In Basque and Spanish, on the other hand, the inclusion of a lexical
item(s) with a very specific semantic content is necessary in order to access this
meaning, they are verb-driven extensions instead. The fact that the English verb does
not require so much 'help' from the other elements of the sentence for the creation of
this meaning may indicate that a semantic change is a step closer to happen in
English than in the other two languages, where the 'help' of other elements is still
required155. Further research into this area is necessary to support this hypothesis.
7.4. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has focused on the question of how the polysemous senses of a
lexical item are obtained; whether they are the result of the meaning of that particular
item, or the result of the interaction between the semantics of that lexical item and
the other elements that co-occur in the same sentence.
In Section 7.1, I have reviewed Brugman's analysis of the polysemy of the
preposition over and shown that these polysemous senses are not localised on the
preposition itself. The other elements that accompanied the preposition are decisive
in these meanings. I have also stated that the elements that are needed to convey the
extended meanings are not the same from a cross-linguistic point of view.
Section 7.2 applies these preliminary results to the polysemy of tactile and
olfactory verbs and puts forward a hypothesis to constrain polysemy, called
'Graduable polysemy'. This hypothesis states that extended meanings are obtained
through the interaction of the different elements of a sentence. Elowever, the weight
155 This may also explain why the default meaning of Bq hunkitu is precisely 'to affect
(emotionally)'.
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of the semantics of the different elements in the overall meaning of a sentence is not
the same in all extended meamngs, but graduable.
There are three different grades of polysemy: (i) 'Unpredictable polysemy',
when it is not possible to predict what the interpretation is by means of the choice of
arguments, (ii) 'Verb-driven extensions', when it is the verb that mainly governs the
choice of arguments and meaning, (iii) 'Argument-driven extensions', when the
meaning is mainly determined by the verb arguments and other elements of the
sentence.
It has been argued that these different elements that contribute to build up the
polysemous senses of tactile and olfactory verbs in different degrees are constrained
by the 'verb property requirement'. This requirement states that the properties that
characterise the different elements that interact with the verb must not violate the
prototypical properties that constitute the bodily basis upon which the polysemy of
these verbs is based. This requirement also shows the way in which some properties
that characterised these perceptual processes are highlighted by the semantic content
of these elements.
Finally, Section 7.3 has addressed the question of how universal polysemy is.
Based on the results obtained from the application of graduable polysemy to the
other two languages under investigation - Basque and Spanish -, it has been
concluded that in order to analyse the polysemy found in a specific semantic field, it
is necessary to distinguish between what I have called 'conceptual polysemy' and its
overt realisation in different languages.
Conceptual polysemy refers to the conceptual mappings that take place
between different domains of experience. It is constrained by the different properties
that characterise the bodily basis of the semantic field under analysis, and therefore,
it is not specific to one language but cross-linguistic. Cognitive devices such as
metaphor and property selection processes carry it out.
The overt realisation of conceptual polysemy is language specific. Graduable
polysemy establishes and classifies the importance of the semantic content of these
elements in the creation of such conceptual polysemy in three different degrees of




The work described in this thesis has been primarily concerned with the
analysis of polysemy in the semantic field of perception verbs. This thesis set out to
explore how and why these polysemous structures happen between the domain of
physical perception and other different conceptual domains; and to what extent
different languages share these polysemous senses.
The data analysis presented in Chapter 2 showed that these verbs convey a
wide range of both physical and metaphorical meanings apart from the prototypical
physical sense perception, and that many of these extended meanings were found
cross-linguistically. The revision of different approaches to polysemy in Chapter 4
indicated that polysemy must be analysed under two complementary perspectives.
On the one hand, as proposed in Cognitive Linguistics, meanings are motivated and
grounded more or less directly in experience, in our bodily, physical and social /
cultural experiences, and then elaborated by structures of imagination such as
metaphor. Therefore, it is important to establish what the bodily basis of the semantic
field under investigation is because it explains why certain mappings between
different domains of experience occur. On the other hand, as proposed in
Pustejovsky's Generative Lexicon, meanings are not obtained by means of only one
lexical item, but by the interaction of the semantics of the different elements that
occur in the same sentence. Therefore, it is important to analyse and state what
elements and to what extent these elements contribute to the overall meaning. The
framework developed in this thesis is summarised in the following section.
8.1. A NEW MODEL FOR POLYSEMY
The model for the analysis of polysemy put forward in this thesis is
composed of two related parts. One part is concerned with the explanation of
conceptual mappings between different domains of experience; and the other part
with the explanation of how these conceptual mappings are overtly expressed by
lexical items in different languages. Figure 8.1 summarises this approach.
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Figure 8.1: A new model for polysemy.
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The upper square in Figure 8.1 shows how the analysis of conceptual
mappings between different conceptual domains of experience is carried out. Here,
there are two different domains: the source domain of physical perception, and the
target domain, composed of extended physical and abstract meanings. The source
domain is charactensed in terms of properties. These properties are to be considered
the bodily basis upon which our sense-related vocabulary is based. The bodily basis
of sense perception is the physiology of the five senses and the way in which human
beings perceive the perceptual processes. Because it applies to all human beings that
share the same cultural background, the bodily basis is not applicable to one
language only, but cross-linguistic.
The mappings between the source domain and the target domain are carried
out by two different devices: Property Selection and Metaphor. Property Selection
processes are used to show what properties from the set of properties that
characterise the source domain are selected in the extended meanings. In these
meanings, not all the properties that define the source domain are mapped, but only a
selection of them. These processes show exactly what is transferred from one domain
of experience onto the other. These processes take place in both physical and abstract
extended meanings. Metaphor only applies to abstract meanings. This cognitive
device makes it possible to link a physical domain with an abstract domain. Both
Property Selection and metaphor are the cognitive tools that we have in order to map
and structure our conceptual systems experientially. All extended meanings are
therefore, constrained by the bodily basis of the source domain from which they
originated, and structured by these two processes above.
In this part, we have talked about mappings between different conceptual
domains. The diagrams show how one conceptual domain, the source domain of
perception, has created by means of different cognitive tools several other conceptual
semantic extensions, i.e. knowledge, reasoning, emotion... In this sense, it is argued
that the domain of physical perception is polysemous because it does not only refer
to physical perception itself, but also to other domains of experience. The group
formed by the conceptual mappings that take place between different domains of
experience is called conceptual polysemy.
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The lower square in Figure 8.1 describes the techniques that languages use to
overtly express and obtain the extended meanings that correspond to conceptual
polysemy of a specific semantic field; and how these techniques are constrained.
Unlike the upper part, this is not cross-linguistic, but specific to one language. In
other words, conceptual polysemy is based on, and constrained by, the bodily basis
of a domain of experience. This bodily basis is shared by and common to all humans
with the same cultural background, it then follows that conceptual polysemy is
universal. However, the semantic content of lexical items varies in different
languages. What in one language is expressed by two words, in other languages may
need the contribution of three words, or just one, therefore language-specific.
In this thesis, I chose perception verbs as the lexical domain which overtly
expresses the source domain of physical perception. The next step is to show to what
extent the semantic content of these verbs is responsible for the creation of these
extended meanings, and to what degree the semantic content of other lexical items
takes part in the creation of such meaning extensions. Graduable polysemy
establishes and classifies the importance of the semantic content of these elements in
the creation of such conceptual polysemy in three degrees of compositionality: (1)
'Unpredictable polysemy', when it is not possible to predict what the interpretation is
by means of the choice of arguments, (ii) 'Verb-driven extensions', when it is the
verb that mainly governs the choice of arguments and meaning, (iii) 'Argument-
driven extensions', when the meaning is mainly determined by the verb arguments
and other elements of the sentence.
The choice of these different elements that contribute to build up the
polysemous senses in different degrees is constrained by the verb property
requirement. This requirement states that the properties that characterise the different
elements that interact with the verb must not violate the prototypical properties that
constitute the bodily basis upon which the polysemy of these verbs is based. This
requirement also shows the way in which some properties that characterise these
perceptual processes are highlighted by the semantic content of these elements.
In sum, the model for polysemy proposed in this thesis comprises three stages
of analysis: (i) to determine the bodily basis of the semantic field under investigation,
(ii) to establish its conceptual polysemy, and (iii) to establish its graduable polysemy.
218
B. Iraide Ibarretxe-Antuhano Chapter 8: Conclusions
8.2. POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The model proposed in this thesis has been created on the basis of the results
obtained from the analysis of synchronic data on perception verbs in three languages:
English, Basque and Spanish.
There are three main directions in which the work described in this thesis
could be developed.
The first is the issue of the universality of the conceptual polysemy described
in this thesis. Our hypothesis stated that the extended meanings found in these
languages had to be universal, because they were constrained by and based on our
experience and understanding of the world that surrounds us. The data from these
languages supported this hypothesis. However, the universality of the conceptual
polysemy described in this thesis has to be understood within the boundaries of
Western culture. In other words, these languages are typologically different, but they
are embedded in the same Western cultural patterns. A possible direction for further
research could be then, to look at this semantic field of sense perception in other
languages that belong to different cultural backgrounds, such as African or Asian
languages for example. The analysis of the conceptual polysemy in these languages
will shed further light on the issue of how far meanings are motivated by our own
conceptualisation and understanding of the world in which we live.
The second direction in which this work can be extended is the application of
this model to the analysis of other semantic fields. This model accounts for the
polysemy in sense perception. However only by applying this model to other fields it
will be possible to test whether this model is suitable for the analysis of polysemy.
A third direction for further research could be the application of this model to
the analysis of semantic change. If this model can explain how and why different
synchronic conceptual mappings occur in a certain way and direction, then it might
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